A coercive response is in the process of unfolding in the Persian Gulf (as well as this CFR article). The Economist indicates three reasons why Iran abducted the 15 sailors and marines.
At first blush it looks like a re-run. In 2004 Iranian forces, without provocation, snatched British sailors in the Persian Gulf. Last week Iranian forces, probably the Revolutionary Guard, did so again, detaining 15 sailors on patrol in small boats. But the later incident is proving to be the more worrying. In 2004, Iran’s government held the British sailors for a while, made them confess to crossing into Iranian waters, and let them go. This time, Iran evidently wants more.
This time the British insist that there is absolutely no doubt its sailors and marines were well on the Iraqi side of the Shatt-al-Arab, the waterway dividing Iraq and Iran. They were on a routine mission inspecting an Iraqi ship, something that Iranians have often monitored them doing. Iran, in particular the Revolutionary Guards who have reportedly taken the sailors to Tehran, is in a provocative mood. Shortly before the Britons were snatched last week the country’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, commemorating the Persian new year, delivered an unusually bristling and defiant speech for that normally cheerful holiday. He gave warning that Iran would strike back with all its capabilities at any invading enemy.
Firstly, there are the recent UNSC sanctions on Iran for nukes. Secondly, Russia's decision not to deliver fuel to Bushehr. Lastly, revenge for the American abduction of Iranian officials.
What should London do? The first step is to define the policy goal. London should seek to de-escalate Iran from its rhetoric, and then seek the release of the 15 personnel. Any other goals exceeds the legitmacy of Britain's response.
I'm worried now that the US has sent in the Stennis and Eisenhower, along with other American and British vessels for an exercise, that London and Washington will not be able to operate with restraint. The two aircraft carriers are a powerful warning, but I wonder if the US can deter another abduction or a coordinated series of bombings in Shi'ite areas within Iraq. In that case, the two carriers would be a sign of frustration and a mis-match. According to a former submariner-turned-blogger (via Danger Room), this deployment might actually be a mistake:
It interests me that we're going for a «show of force» option that tends to minimize our ability to actually conduct any attacks on Iran; this is good news for those of us who don't think war with Iran is the right option at this time. While the Kos Kids might think that this is a precursor to an attack on Iran, in actuality the absolute worst initial conditions for a U.S. attack on Iran would be to have both (or any) carriers inside the Persian Gulf - that's the only place where the Iranian forces could conceivably hurt our capital ships. For that reason, while a «show of force» has some public relations uses, I'm not sure it's the right move at this time from a strictly military standpoint-- the Iranians might actually be intending on starting something. (I don't think they are, but it's hard to read the mullah's minds.) Putting the carriers in a better position to defend themselves (i.e. pulling the Eisenhower out of the Gulf) would have sent a stronger message to the Iranian military -- at the cost of appearing «weak» to those who don't understand the military at a tactical level. On the other hand, this might be the Administration's way of being «de-escalatory» themselves.
Any British or American response would also unify Iranian public opinion against both. I think this situation will require coordination among the UNSC, Britain, the US, and probably, if not China and Russia, some outside state, like Germany or Saudi Arabia.
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