Left Flank

As promised (as I still struggle with a slow Internet connection), here are some pictures of a wonderful anniversary meal in Kwangan-li in Busan. I could eat hwae (korean-style sashimi) everyday. This restaurant is famous for a particular style of cabbage kimchi, or mugun (overcooked) kimchi. In addition, a welcome surprise were figs lathered in honey.

The part about Korean-style sashimi I have always enjoyed is the freedom to choose how to arrange the various components (lettuces, seafood, sauces, and vegetables) into a small mouthful. The same principle operates with beef and pork, but for some reason, for me with seafood, the whole presentation is more elegant without being so artistic as to frustrate the enjoyment (my problem with Japanese food).

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It was a Korea day!

I measured my connection times in fractions of hours today—seriously, it took fifteen minutes to send an email! I was biting my nails, because I had to send an assignment to my prof (an assignment for which I did not have the book because of the mails). Well, I think the email got through. My firewall has benn attacked relentlessly the last two days, too. Suddenly, about three minutes ago, connectivity returned!

So, little reading online. I tried to post pictures of a great dinner I had at Kwang-an Beach on Saturday, but that will have to wait, too.

Meanwhile, here's some smack for the eyes—Honey Lee!.

Finally! Korea has a worthy contestant for Miss Universe! The gorgeous Honey Lee, 24 looks more Japanese than Korean with her cute, sexy image, but there is no denying that she is a total stunner!

The Seoul National University graduate is not the traditional Korean beauty with pale translucent skin and delicate features (think Song Hyegyo or Lee Youngae), she represents the best of what Korea has to offer—taking advantage all the excellent resources of the domestic beauty industry—plastic surgery to enhance her already gorgeous features, skincare, and perfect hair & makeup.

Ouch!

GI Korea asks who really cares about Pyongyang's attempts at provocation. Perhaps Washington, particularly the Defense Department, is too worried about Taiwan and China (via The View from Taiwan).

I sometimes wonder if the US underestimates China's abilities, and the new links it is forging with the pro-China side in Taiwan....it is interesting that they chose to warn Beijing that it could lose its right to host the '08 Olympics—as if they know China is at this very moment contemplating an attack. I've speculated before what a Chinese attack might look like, and also that it might be sooner than anyone thinks.

The "blunt warning" misses a key point: sanctions go both ways. While the US has been breaking its military and its treasury in its stupid and criminal failure in Iraq, China has been on the march all over the world. If the US intervenes, Chinese markets might be closed to it for years afterwards, and Chinese allies hostile to its interests. Here's a sobering thought for the Pentagon: we are more hated than China at the moment, and given the manifest incompetence and venality of our President, this will only get worse.

With all this bravado flying around, along with missiles and an Aegis-class destroyer, I stopped tonight to watch Thirteen Days, starring Kevin Costner, Steven Culp, and Bruce Greenwood (and about a hundred other noteworthy character actors). For me, as a student, the Cuban Missile Crisis reveals the hollowness of the ordinary chatter about "national interest", and the way laypeople talk about "the US thinks this", etc. Governments are fractious creatures, full of ambitious mortals following procedures that sometimes get the best of them. Rationality in the midst of crisis is not a presupposition, it's a goal, and a nearly impossible one at that.

Unlike in the Kennedy years, economics now is no longer just a secondary issue.

I hope the sun rises tomorrow, because I see so few "men of good will'.

There's a remarkably heated and, eventually, unsatisfying debate between James Mann and David M. Lampton on China at FP. Mann's new book, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression is the starting-point. I think Mann makes his point, but only because Lampton doesn't reveal his major assumption.

Mann: My principal argument has been that political change in China is not inevitable—and that in fact China’s one-party state is likely to persist for a long time. The claim that trade leads to political change was a rationalization used to line up support for U.S. economic policies that have proved beneficial, above all, to U.S. and multinational corporations. Now, Lampton is telling us to stop looking for far-reaching change, and to expect only more humane governance from a one-party state that permits no organized opposition. That is truly sad.

(...)

Lampton: It’s Mann who is being naive. The truth is, U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic of China has never been predicated on a false belief that China would move toward democracy soon, if it all. Seven consecutive U.S. presidents, backed by Congress and the American public, have weighed their options and decided that security and economic considerations rank above promoting Chinese democracy in the priority list. Mann wants to upend the ranking. Democratization promotes those other valid objectives, he believes. But that argument has not won the policy day thus far.

Why not? First, even if democracy were to rank first among U.S. goals in dealing with Beijing, could the United States achieve or effectively promote it? Again, consider the dispiriting U.S. interventions in Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Or if it’s verbal condemnations of human rights abuse Mann prefers, consider Myanmar, Cuba, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya—all states that have blithely ignored the opprobrium of human rights advocates and U.S. politicians for decades.

Second, even if we thought U.S. capabilities to promote democracy were extensive, how should we most effectively do so? Most of the China field, myself included, has been involved in efforts to bring legal studies to China, promote development of nongovernmental organizations there, and contribute in other ways to the development of social and institutional structures conducive to at least more humane governance, if not democratization, over the long haul.

Which brings me to my final argument. It takes time to build democratic political institutions such as competitive political parties and independent courts. For democracy to take root, societies need to pass through a sequence of stages: from building national identity, to constructing functioning state institutions, to assuring participation in those institutions, to distributing benefits more equitably. Moreover, it takes time for the democratic values and behaviors that support those institutions to develop; each society, including China, must be allowed to find its own path to more pluralistic, participatory, and humane governance. Move too quickly, and the likely result is disorder and backsliding on democracy and human rights, both of which we have seen in post-Communist Russia. Unfortunately, there is not a scintilla of recognition in Mann’s book or in his comments here that it is easier to talk about democracy than it is to produce it.

Lampton is not an impartial interlocutor in this debate, as Mann points out. Precedent created by the lack of trying to find alternatives, however supported by appeals to authority are also not convincing. Unilateral attempts at destroying regimes is also not a policy of democratization. Finally, I want Lampton to lay out what security and economic interests outweigh democratization. Lampton seems impatient for some sort of reward or quid pro quo only China can bestow. Might not the benefits Lampton desires be accruable in the long haul if attention to political rights accompany economic globalization?

The argument, that free trade brings aggregate economic benefits to consumers, is theoretical and offers little guidance for the political decisions that come in liberalization's wake. In the same way, that democratization will flow from economic liberalization, offers no guidance for the harm change will bring. That guidance should come from example, from those states that have weathered the course previously. That implies a diplomatic component to liberalization and democratization both Mann and Lampton ignore. The winners must guide the strivers, and both must deal with the losers and spoilers.

That's why it's regrettable both authors seemingly dismiss the example of other East Asian states.

Lampton: There is a hope, and even some evidence—such as the recent Beijing policy decision to reduce the scope of the death penalty—that steady engagement, globalization, and the logic of change in China itself will gradually produce more humane governance domestically and more cooperative behavior internationally. This is not mere fantasy: Development theory strongly suggests that it takes time to build working political institutions and to develop the popular and elite habits of the heart that make functioning democracy even possible. And as the difficult experiences of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti dramatically illustrate, societies must pass through a sequence of stages in order to become functioning democracies. Yet Mann, waving aside South Korea and Taiwan’s instructive (but admittedly imperfect) examples of societies that successfully transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy, is ready to rush ahead. Calls for patience, in Mann’s derisive telling, are merely disingenuous attempts by self-interested scholars, government officials, and business people to encourage the U.S. public and Congress to look beyond Beijing’s abuses in order to keep the corporate profits rolling in.

It’s true that despite rapid economic and social reform, change toward electoral and multiparty governance has been slow to nonexistent in China. The Beijing elite has made it abundantly clear that it will use harsh means to preserve Chinese Communist Party authority. And so Mann fears, not unreasonably, that China may prove to be the rare case of a capitalist state in which the middle class grows but political rights lag far behind.

Mann seems somehow to have misunderstood that the notion that China would steadily open up politically was (and remains) an expectation to be realized over a long period of time, not a guarantee. The purpose of engagement is more to achieve U.S. interests, only one of which is democratization, and perhaps not even the most important interest. In fact, few China experts (beyond Bruce Gilley and Henry Rowen) have predicted that China would democratize quickly. Even so, there is moderate good news to report: Today’s China is much more cooperative on issues important to the United States than it was in the past; it is less of a proliferation danger; its people have much more freedom to realize their individual potential; and, significantly, the Chinese system has moved from totalitarian rule under Mao Zedong to an authoritarian system in which an entrenched but growing elite evinces greatly diminished ambitions for control of society.

Lampton's riding the issue of pace of development is just bullying, but he skips over South Korea, Taiwan, and, I would add, Japan, too quickly. This is where China trades and possibly could war. The US is just the place Beijing holds its savings. Structural weakness distorts Sino-US policy, but its interests are not immediate and historical as China's neighbors. If US interests are all that matters, the US can end its fixation with China in the long haul with fiscal and macroeconomic reform. But, if globalization is really what matters, then the US should look to East Asia.

Japan's success as a globalized economic powerhouse is an excellent example to Beijing, but not when Tokyo pushes the US into confrontation with the mainland. Bill Gertz's recent editorial about F-22 sales to Tokyo is a reminder of how complicated American interests are in the region. Barnett provides a solution.

One place to start is Taiwan, especially one ruled by a "moderate" DPP executive like Frank Hsieh. Here's a "China" America can respect, and which Beijing would, too, if Americans, like Lampton, were not simple-minded rationalizers, but realists.

K.M. Lawson posts Office of War Information (OWI) public diplomacy guidelines, and some of them actually make good policy. I think it's wrong to call these guidelines by the pejorative term "propaganda", though. When considering the damage caused by Sneed article during the Virginia Tech episode, where a reporter initially identified Korean-American Seung Hui Cho as "Chinese", there is something to say for some government agency taking an interest in what the repercussions of comments by American officials and citizens might be.

Sept 7, 1945: “Caustion: Use special care in avoiding the use of any materials which might be considered derogatory to the Far Eastern peoples in general, such as, ancestor worship or reference to color, size, or “Oriental” appearance.

There then is this wonderful guideline displaying how contentious was the American relationship with Chiang Kai-shek:

May 30, 1945 “As an indication of American interest in the problem, report the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek]’s proposed cooperation with Harley and Wedemeyer on easing up of censorship. Make use of any comment which favords such a development and which favors evidence of such a change.” [Text was crossed out in original]

Read all the guidelines!

Lung Ying-tai delivered a speech at Cambridge University on 17 May 2007:

The so-called international world has become a common global community.  But the people of Taiwan have been deprived of the social and cultural rights to participate in this global community.  Do you know that the deprivation of social and cultural rights is against the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights?  Please read Articles 2 and 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 22: Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

The western European countries are members of the United Nations.  I ask how you would explain the spirit of these two articles to the children of Taiwan.

37 years of self-imposed blockage and 35 years of forced blockage.  No matter whether it was self-imposed or forced, aren't the people innocent?  The international isolation and "abandonment" of Taiwan made the people of Taiwan feel that they are being "punished" because they fought for democracy.  The global community watch coldly that one generation after another of Taiwan children grow up in the global village, they are talented and they work hard, but they are deprived of their global citizenship as well as the basic dignity of citizens.

The damage from this deprivation is twofold:

1. Democracy in Taiwan cannot be improved materially.  You tell me whether a society that cannot participate in international affairs, that cannot gain experience from international affairs and cannot that fulfill its international duties and obligations can possibly become a democracy with better quality?

2. The continuation of the isolation of Taiwan and the repeated defeats inflicted on its people has caused greater hostility towards the "originator" of the isolation: China.  As the desire to oppose or separate from China grows, the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan strait becomes higher.

The international community should care about the situation of Taiwan not just for the sake of the people of Taiwan, but also for the sake of the security of the global village itself.  The logic is actually simple: on the path of China's question for modernization, the Taiwan experience -- whether the good or the bad part -- should be an importance reference point for China.  If an open and rational China with citizen participation is essential to world peace and stability, then the global community must not ignore the importance of Taiwan.  That is to say, the more the global community supports and looks after democracy in Taiwan, the more guarantee there is for stability in the Taiwan strait and world peace.

You cannot ignore the international blockade of Taiwan and the deprivation of global citizenship to the children of Taiwan.  This has to stop, not just for Taiwan but for the sake of international peace.

In a subsequent interview, Lung makes two comments worth considering further:

Q: As I was saying, you were facing an European audience and you were definitely calling for something.  What exactly were you calling for?

A: My first call of the day was that the Europeans should recognize what the problem is.  The blockage of Taiwan was not as simple as the western world understands it.  They believe that it was just a political blockade.  They did not know that the long-term political blockade also permeates into all levels of society and life, including the arts, academics and literature.  My second call was that the blockage of Taiwan was not just about the problem of Taiwan itself.  The goodness or badness of democracy in Taiwan is an important factor in the search on mainland China about the future of its modernization.  Therefore, I attempted to present this logic out today.  If you believe that the peaceful and stable development of China is important for world peace , then you must believe that the development of the democratic system in Taiwan is an important factor in coming up with a good model for the democracy in China.  Under this kind of logic, the western world should know that the very fragile state of democracy in Taiwan requires your intervention.  I was addressing a European audience today.  Under the democratic system in Europe, you first identify the problem and the next step is for you to influence your government.

(...)

Q: In the logic that you presented today, it was basically a logic that only by protecting democracy in Taiwan will there be a democratic China.  But the pan-green camp folks will assert that there is no connection between Taiwan and China and that it is best that Chinese people and Taiwan persons with origins outside of Taiwan just get out of Taiwan altogether.  They definitely don't give a dámn about democracy in China.

A: I am opposed to his type of deep-green ideology.  I can support Taiwan independence.  I feel that many people in Taiwan support Taiwan independence.  But what if you ask them whether it is worthwhile to go to war to achieve Taiwan independence?  Then it is different.  Is the price worthwhile?  My answer is definitely not the same.  Therefore this is a complex question.  My criticism against the deep-green is this: I can accept your Taiwan independence, but I cannot accept your "Taiwan nationalism."

To take one step back and suppose that Taiwan is an independent nation.  How can you not care about China?  At the political level, you are just a sailboat in an ocean next to an aircraft carrier.  Should you not care what the aircraft carrier does?  If it so much changes direction, you will sink.  Does Singapore not care about what Indonesia is up to?  Would you dare not to worry about China is up to?  Therefore, I felt that they are stupid when they say that they don't care.  Secondly, apart from the political level, you can look at it as pure idealism.  Did you not begin your movement based upon humanitarianism?  So how can you not worry about the human rights issues and the happiness of the people in mainland China, which account for one-quarter of the population of the world?  Whatever happened to your sense of morality?  Whether in terms of pragmatic politics or the insistence on morality and ideals, you cannot insist that you don't care about whether China lives or dies.

Seven impressive soldiers tell the Democratic party what it needs to do to get their votes. Finally, here's some subject-matter experts for Democrats to embrace, instead of anti-war defeatists and Rosie O'Donnell (I agree with The Populist, who also has video).

I was most impressed, and not in any particular order, by Phillip Carter:

I still care deeply about the social issues that I learned to care about during my first tour on active duty. In 2008, I will pay close attention to health care, immigration, and taxation, because I think they have a profound effect on my life and our country. What concerns me most, however, is that for the past seven years our nation has drifted rudderless through the war on terrorism. The “preventive war” doctrine proved such a bust in Iraq that today we have no strategy. In the absence of guidance from the White House, decisions about military strategy and resources are being made in a vacuum. In 2008, then, I will be looking for the candidate who articulates a viable national security strategy, and shows me the ability to implement it in a responsive and flexible way that restores America’s place in the world and keeps us safe. I think, given what I’ve seen of the presidential field so far, that candidate will be a Democrat.

Garth Stewart:

Lastly, I have a problem with al-Qaeda. We might have been diverted from fighting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but that doesn’t mean we aren’t also fighting al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. I cannot give my vote to anyone who would advocate withdrawal in the face of our sworn enemies. Unfortunately, that’s what leading Democrats are doing, and why they’re unlikely to get my support. Whoever comes forward and owns the “withdrawal vote” in 2008 can be sure to lose mine. The Democrat who can gain my vote will be the one who comes forward with a plan to win.

Andrew Exum:

The destruction of the Army and Marine Corps stemmed from a failure of the Bush administration—its greatest failure: the inability to articulate or even understand what kind of war we’re fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. As any student of Clausewitz can tell you, if you fail to understand the nature of the war you’re fighting, you’re doomed before the first shot is fired.

And, Melissa Tryon:

For any Democratic candidate genuinely interested in making inroads with the military, learning about the perspectives of enlisted soldiers and lower-ranking officers—not admirals and generals—will be essential. With any luck, such a candidate will come away convinced of the need for greater accountability from the upper ranks, echoing down through subordinate leaders and across to civilian counterparts. At the very least, he or she will begin to grasp the extent of the military’s problems today. And anyone who does that—and who can offer some hope of reenergizing the spirit of American service that the military represents— wins.

This is some of the best writing on what Democrats need to hear—America needs a security policy, not feel-good medicine.