Left Flank

I apologize for the silence these past days. A thunderstorm struck on Sunday, frying my motherboard. It's taken this long just to be able to post again. I haven't read a blog or paper for two days, and all I've watched is CNN. Man, that sucks!

I have stuff to say about the second execution in Afghanistan, and I'm sure there's plenty of video I've missed.

Anyway, I'm exhausted trying to nurse my computer to health.

Blogger D. Whitlock at Dead Armadillos opines on the South Korean hostage crisis in Afghanistan. J.D. is an Air Force Health Information Management worker at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan.

I have toured the Korean clinic here at Bagram Airfield and had coffee with their commander. I have been to South Korea and think the world of the South Koreans. Every morning at 0615 I hear the South Korean national anthem playing, because their camp is right next to ours. I am glad they are here helping the Afghans with their medical and engineering missions.

But unless other countries step up to the plate to help fight the Taliban, or at the very least continue their support missions, then the world will increasingly just see the big bad U.S. hyperpower, in the aftermath of Iraq, throwing its weight around. Again.

Afghanistan is not Iraq. Al Qaeda really will follow us back home if we don’t whack them here. The Taliban really will export their rabid Islamofascism to wherever they can from wherever they can.

So, South Korea, if you’re going to talk tough, back it up. Continue your support mission in Afghanistan. You can afford it.

J.D. highlights the cowardice and the hypocrisy Seoul is displaying during this crisis. On one hand, Seoul wants the Taliban to take South Korea seriously enough not to harm its citizens held hostage. On the other hand, it cannot convince South Korean citizens (a phrase that seemingly has no meaning for leftists bent on unifying the two Korean states) to increase both the number of its military forces in Afghanistan and change their mission to something other than combat support.

Is it any wonder the Taliban would choose to kidnap such a group of aid workers as the South Korean Presbyterian group? There's no better way to create further divisions within their opponent's alliance against them, and garner press coverage, by which to convince locals of their political legitimacy.

North Korea and The Philippines are building on bilateral ties established since 2000, both on the issues of small arms transfer and nuclear weapons and energy. The first issue involves manila directly, and concerns the political situation in Mindanao.

â€ūCloser ties between the two countries could prevent any transfer of firearms from North Korea to armed groups in the country like Muslim and communist rebels,â€? the source said.

North Korea has been a lucrative source of arms for armed groups in the Philippines, whether insurgents or criminal groups, the source said.

The second issues involve Manila as a member of ASEAN, and ultimately look forward to security guarantees, to ensure a nuclear-weapons-free zone, and the peaceful trading of nuclear power within ASEAN members.

Go figure, Pyongyang, a recognized nuclear power exporter?

Watching Fat Man and Little Boy seemed fitting tonight, considering the alleged problems in the US-India nuclear deal. What good are all the constitutional safeguards, if no one follows them?

I also recall an excellent post concerning the deployment of the world's first two atomic weapons.

Duck of Minerva's M. Gemmill questions one leg of the standard arguments offered for the benefits of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings in a book review.

During World War II, teams of scientists raced to build the ultimate weapon: the atomic bomb. This weapon, everyone believed, was so powerful that it would force the Japanese to surrender immediately, eliminating the need for an extremely costly invasion of the Japanese main islands. They built two weapons using two different models: Little Boy, a uranium gun-style weapon, and, just in case the first one wasn't enough, the Fat Man, a plutonium implosion weapon. When the weapons were ready, President Truman, who knew nothing about the Manhattan Project until Roosevelt's death, struggled mightily with the moral implications of using these ultimate weapons. The atomic bomb, once dropped on Hiroshima, and then three days later, on Nagasaki, proved America's overwhelming military superiority to the Japanese, and they promptly surrendered.

(...)

Michael Gordin's Five Days in August challenges the central premise of this story: that the atomic bomb was perceived as a weapon qualitatively different from what we now call conventional weaponry. Instead, he argues, many (though not all) of the scientists and political and military decision makers understood the new nuclear weapons as simply a more powerful and efficient method of delivering destruction than conventional weaponry, and that this viewpoint was dominant. Although the atomic bomb was part of a larger plan to «shock and awe» the Japanese into surrender, it was only one component of that plan, along with the conventional firebombing of Japanese cities and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in the Pacific. Most people involved expected the war to continue for some time longer--at the very least, into September, and they expected that they would need to continue to deliver additional atomic weapons throughout this period. The true impact of the atomic bomb, particularly its radiological effects, was unknown, even to the Manhattan Project scientists, who initially discounted reports of radiation sickness in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as Japanese propaganda. The US was surprised not only by the effects of the atomic bombs, but also by the speed of the Japanese surrender.

In the movie, there is also a scene where the value of a demonstration, witnessed by the Japanese, is debated, instead of dropping the atomic bomb without warning. Like so much in the film, the issue is not handled fully. However, this is another piece of the standard account of that fateful decision usually glossed over.

With all its flaws, and with the US-India deal in the background, the film did impress upon me one conclusion. The decisions that propelled the creation of an atomic device were voluntary, and not necessitated by any conditions, such as the Pacific War. Information existed and military and political leaders struggled with momentous moral arguments, but no conclusion just presented itself. If there is a lesson in this opening episode, it is that people can make mistakes even when they know full well they should deliberate carefully. It seems optimal to accept that the final decision will be flawed, and begin the deliberative process humbly with that failure in mind.

According to an AP report, a Taliban spokesman demanded the release of Taliban prisoners and not ransom. But Qari Yousef Ahmadi also mentioned, that the South Korean hostages were divided into 11 groups, to thwart rescue attempts.

Meanwhile, in an interview conducted by cellphone and broadcast on CBS News and the BBC, one of the captured Koreans described her fellow hostages as being in declining spirits and urged the Afghan government to release Taliban prisoners in exchange for their freedom.

«All of us are in difficulty,» said a woman identified by Korean media as Im Hyun-joo, a 32-year-old former nurse. She spoke briefly before the phone was taken away. «Day by day, it is getting very difficult. Our situation is dangerous. You tell them to do something to get us released.»

Qari Yousef Ahmadi, who says he speaks for the Taliban, told South Korea's Yonhap news agency that the hostages had been split into 11 groups to stave off rescue attempts. He also acknowledged that some of the hostages were suffering.

«It is true that some of the hostages are sick,» Ahmadi said. «We have only two types of painkillers, and a food shortage is a problem.»

Sometimes individuals and organizations are culpable, and perhaps censure, even reorganization or dissolution, is necessary.

The confluence of Protestant Christianity, American missionaries, and Japanese imperialism on the history of Korea from the late 19th Century to present is frequently commemorated, but the Taliban's kidnapping of 23 South Korean Presbyterian aid workers from the Saemmul Church in Bundang, Seoul has refocused attention. The BBC, reporting on how organizations related to that church are reevaluating their missionary activities, provides a capsule history of the genesis of the Korean impulse to proselytize.

Protestant missionaries from the US came to the Korean peninsula in the late 19th century.

Christianity initially failed to make a big impact in China and Japan, where missionaries were regarded as agents of Western imperialism.

But the «religion from the West» spread quickly in the Hermit Kingdom, and American missionaries were seen by Korean nationalists as a source of support in their fight against Japanese colonial rulers.

Now South Korea has the largest percentage of evangelical Christians in Asia, at about 25% of the population.

Having achieved such a following at home, Korean churches have started in the last couple of decades to look at ways to expand abroad.

«Pastors of big churches want to show off that they are doing something great for Christianity. Korea is a small country that has achieved a strong economy, and it wants to show its success to the world,» said Chung-shin Park, a professor of Korean church history.

«Apart from the strong religious zeal, there is also a sense of nationalism behind this,» he said.

«The church's ambition is to overtake the US and become the world's number one exporter of missionaries within the next two decades.»

IHT's Choe Sang-hun reports on the business of missionary work:

«In South Korean churches, emphasis has always been on growth and expansion,» said Lee Won Gue, a professor at Methodist Theological Seminary in Seoul. «There is a fierce competition among churches—so much so that the reputation of the pastor or his church often depends on how many missionaries are sent abroad and how many churches are built there.»

Even small churches finance missionary expeditions, thanks to congregations that are generous with cash donations. Churches advertise their overseas missionary work to attract young members.

«Traditionally, the number of missionaries from a country has depended on that country's economic power,» said Song Jae Ryong, a sociologist at Kyunghee University in Seoul. «In South Korea's case, the number far exceeds its economic standing. Like Koreans in general, the Korean churches have a strong tendency of following a trend as a pack and going relentlessly after a goal.»

In such an atmosphere, young people going on short-term missions arranged by the churches are often not properly trained in safety issues and learn little about the religious and cultural realities of their host countries, Song said.

The element of Korean nationalism has had a profound effect on religious education and political development in Korea. In New God, New Nation: Protestants and Self-Reconstruction, Nationalism in Korea 1896-1937, Kenneth M. Wells draws a genealogical line from Protestantism to members of the Independence Club (including a young Syngman Rhee), the Korean Products Promotion Society (including Cho man-sik) in Pyongyang, to even the modern juche theology and the New Village Movement. American missionaries and businessmen, such as Horace N. Allen, played dramatic roles in Korean politics. Dr. Allen enters Korean history saving the life of Min Yong-ik, the Queen's nephew, brutally wounded and assumed dead by Japanese soldiers during an abortive coup on December 4, 1884. During a lucrative career, Allen mixed business, court politics, and diplomacy, and eventually espoused pro-Japanese sentiments.

Protestantism is both nationalistic and aggressively permeates all aspects of Korean life.

Meanwhile, the church members' contrition and reevaluation seems to have no effect on the national daily newspapers. The Chosun Daily recognizes responsibility, but calls for assistance:

At this point, Korean diplomacy must use two different approaches at the same time. In face-to-face talks, Korea must abide by international standards and regulations in dealing with terrorist groups. This is unavoidable when the entire world is looking at how Korea handles itself diplomatically.

But on the other side, we must use all the resources available to us. It is impossible for us to physically suppress the terrorist group. Regarding the slaying of Rev. Bae, the Korean government said the abductors cannot avoid being held responsible for their actions. But right now, there is no viable method of retaliation. If that’s the case, there is no other alternative than to deliver a strong message to Kabul and Washington that saving Korean lives must be the top priority. The U.S. and Afghan governments are in a dilemma as well. But there can be no disagreements that the lives of the hostages are the most important factor.

The U.S. and Afghan governments must restrain from undertaking hasty military actions, while taking a flexible stance against the demands and conditions set by the Taliban. This is the wish of the Korean people. The problem is that different Taliban factions, which are keeping the hostages in three different locations, are making different demands. One of those factions almost released eight of the hostages, while another murdered Rev. Bae, demonstrating starkly different behavior. The governments of Korea and related countries need to resolve the crisis by dealing with these different sets of demands. They must secure the release of any abductees that are possible under the circumstances.

The Dong=A Daily asks for Muslim prayers:

If the kidnappers possess an ounce of humanity, they must pay attention to the voices of people from across the world. If they ignore them and harm the hostages, they will be digging their own graves. I beg people all over the world to seek ways to warm the cold hearts of the abductees. I strongly plead that the 1.6 billion Muslims across the world join hands to stop their brothers from committing an unthinkable crime.

The Joong-ang Daily emphasizes the Roh administration's attempts to negotiate:

Blue House Spokesman Cheon Ho Seon said that the visit by Baek Jong-chun, the chief presidential security advisor, reflected Seoul’s desire to resolve the crisis. An official said yesterday, â€ūWe are talking to them and we will continue talking,â€? when asked to comment about the latest deadline. â€ūThe dispatch of a special envoy means the president is giving this his very best,â€? Cheon said without elaborating. Baek was scheduled to meet with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and senior officials, including his Afghan counterpart.

The Hankyoreh attempts to tackle the most perplexing question: where are the hostages?

The government seems roughly to have grasped the situation of the remaining 14 hostages. During the National Assembly conference on July 25, Foreign Minister Song Min-soon had a note with the numbers, â€ū8+6+9â€? written on it, as was seen in a photograph taken at the conference. Under the numbers eight and six were the words, â€ūmoneyâ€? and â€ūsolutions,â€? while the word â€ūhard-lineâ€? was written under the number nine. It can be guessed that the first two numbers, which include the word, â€ūmoneyâ€? and â€ūsolutions,â€? mean that the issue can be resolved through financial reward, but that the third number written, classified as â€ūhard-line,â€? means that the negotiators are having difficulty moving forward because the Taliban is demanding the release of Taliban prisoners in exchange for the hostages. The first number eight on the minister’s memo, under which the words money and solutions were written, directly corresponds with the number of abductees who were expected to have been freed, while also matching the number of hostages from the Taliban’s moderate group. It is highly possible that Bae, however, belonged to the nine hostages detained by the hard-line Taliban militants.

It is understood that the government still thinks it is effective to divide the kidnapped into the â€ū8+6+8â€? groups, after Bae was killed. However, it is not clear how the abductees are dispersed in the seven regions in which the hostages are now being held.

I disagree with GI Korea, that Seoul should dispatch the ROK Special Forces to hunt down the hostages or negotiate with the extremists. Firstly, the hostages are not in one location, a fact that complicates any series of missions. Secondly, it's a huge gamble, and would likely rival the much-derided Operation Eagle Claw for executive mistakes. Thirdly, Hamid Karzai needs to do this. It's Karzai's misguided decision in March of this year that is responsible for this grab by the Taliban, and Kabul needs to send a message that kidnapping is not a practical option for the Taliban. Right now, the Taliban gains strength watching Seoul and Kabul bumble. Seoul needs to salvage its klutzy act, and the culpability of its own citizens, by sitting on its hands and allowing South Koreans to pillory the government for its errors. As a matter of fact, someone should just burn an effigy of Roh Moo-hyun now, to redirect rage from Muslims and Presbyterians right now. Thankfully, the hostages are still alive, or so we are led to believe.

Or, take action at the source One form of extremism is as bad as another.

This is an issue South Koreans need to tackle «within the family», before the arrogance goes any further.

(2 stars out of 5, for cinematography and the epilogue)

Update: Mavsman at PWeb also bashes Splendid Holiday, along with more personal reflections and background. The movie doesn't deserve his contemplation.

I just returned from the theater, where my wife and I watched Splendid Holiday (Hwa Hyeo Han Hyu Ga), about the 1980 Gwangju Massacre.

According to the director, Kim Ji-hoon:

«This movie is not focused on politics or ideology but on people. I wanted to show how ordinary people were helplessly sucked into the whirlwind of the tragedy and how their peaceful lives were destroyed...»

That's putting it mildly. In the first scene, the commanding officer tells his officers that they are attacking North Korea. Another officer looks out the window, notices the position of the sun, and tells his comrade, «We are headed south!» Politics nearly disappears after this. Aside from horrific scenes of blood splattering across billboards and under hospital gurneys and some whizzing bullets and shells crashing through walls, this is a very restrained film. What happened on the college campuses is bypassed for the assaults and clashes on the streets, where civilians, high school students, and crack troops rumble, pause for the national anthem, and even share some laughs.

What I did not like about this film is, that the important part of the history intrudes upon a fantasy world where people fall in love and families deal with mundane issues. It's a middle class fable of a generation that came of age in a very contentious age. One day we were courting, and then the next day bad soldiers were splitting skulls. The only provocative scene is the epilogue, where the movie finds its center.

As all the characters, from both sides, meet in a wedding portrait, we notice how sad and angry the survivors, most remarkably the bride (Lee Yo-won) are. The dead, including South Korean officers, the retired colonel turned protest leader (Ahn Sung-ki), and the groom (Kim Sang-kyeong), are smiling and joking with one another. The love affair should have blossomed into a marriage, if only the groom had lived. The dead have made their peace with one another; the living were denied that right.

I'm glad that the film did eschew the politics of American involvement. There is no smoke-filled scene in Seoul where the Americans diabolically allow Chun Doo-hwan to squash Gwangju. Instead, there is a brief scene where a Catholic pastor brings a New York Times, with the protest as the main headline, and beams about how America will help them. The realistic colonel soberly tells them that America will not take sides.

South Korean movies have achieved the Hollywood look without any depth. There is a epic sweep to this film, and even a certain trite pathos. But the characters are so metaphorical, even in bad 80s clothing, that they lack the ability to fix attention. One of my favorite actors, Ahn Sung-ki, is wasted as the former colonel turned protest leader. Modern language is used, like «Fighting!». The characters, shades really, are types, not even the names on the graves at the Gwangju Memorial. As a matter of fact, it is only because of those gruesome photographs at Gwangju that I want to understand those people. This movie did not help me understand why a person would walk into the streets to confront the phalanxes and tanks.

I want the political subtext, the controversy, the partisan anger. Instead I got a mawkish fairy tale. Visit Gwangju if you want to know about 1980, and don't see this film.

TFM tipped me about Scott Thomas Beauchamp. I've read enough for now. I have to admit I've not read as much TNR since this scandal has arisen, and I even emailed the magazine about its refund policy (thanks, TNR, at least you consistently refuse to respond to emails).

Let me say it straight: I'm disgusted!

Firstly, Franklin Foer has still not proven to me why he should be editor-in-chief, still. Trust is a very important commodity, and Foer has lost mine. If no staffer, or leftist sycophant subscriber understands this, they are just too jaded for my money.

Secondly, is Beauchamp reliable? Is he a Walter Mitty?

I now think that what the TNR has on its hands is not a fraudulent soldier, but a Walter Mitty. He’s there, he’s bored, and he’s using his real experiences as a basis to make stuff up.

Is he perhaps a bit insane over-educated?

Thirdly, there's the allegations of tawdry office connections and Plame-ish games. I leave readers the displeasure of reviewing these allegations.

It all makes the Bush administration look competent.

Meanwhile, why can't TNR find another blogger like Phil Carter?