Left Flank

Scenarios concerning the aftermath of the Lal Masjid operation in which 73 rebels and nine soldiers have officially died, are starting to multiply like the bodies estimated to lie in the red mosque. Al Qaeda, on the occasion of Abdul Rashid Ghazi's funeral, vowed vengeance.

Peter Bergen sets up the Lal Masjid debacle as the end game between the forces General Pervez Musharraf manipulated to gain power in the first place.

Unfortunately for those who want a return to genuine civilian rule, Musharraf appears to have something of a Messiah complex, making him loath to relinquish any of his power. Readers of his 2006 autobiography, In the Line of Fire, were treated to an ode to the author's sagacity and leadership ability that was striking even by the self-serving conventions of political memoir. Perhaps it is not surprising that a dictator would convince himself that only he can save his country. What is surprising is that Musharraf has managed to convince others as well. And no one has fallen for this hoax harder than President Bush. It is a central plank of the administration's foreign policy that democratization is the best way to counter militant Islamists. Yet Bush has been strikingly silent on the need for Musharraf to loosen his grip on Pakistan, the world's second-largest Muslim country. Contra the widespread myth that democracy would merely empower Pakistan's Islamists, it would likely damage the MMA, the coalition of religious parties that has never succeeded in winning more than 12 percent of the vote. (And that was in the 2002 election, which Musharraf fixed to disadvantage the two main secular parties.) In fact, polling indicates that the MMA will garner around 5 percent of ballots in the upcoming election. The Islamist militants of the Red Mosque, in other words, may be feisty enough to weaken Musharraf politically through their protests and violence, but they are not nearly numerous enough to run the country.

So who might benefit from the upcoming vote, if not the Islamists? That's where Benazir Bhutto comes in. For months, Islamabad was atwitter about the nature of the deal Musharraf and Bhutto were widely presumed to be cutting. The rumored agreement would allow Bhutto to return to Pakistan to campaign for her party--although not to run for prime minister, as she has already served the two terms allowable under the present constitution–while Musharraf would drop the corruption charges that he used to chase her out of the country in the first place. Bhutto would then play the key role in selecting the next prime minister. For his part, Musharraf would retain the presidency.

That deal now appears to be in jeopardy after riots in Karachi in May, where members of a party allied with Musharraf killed a number of Bhutto's supporters. Musharraf has also recently reiterated that Bhutto is banned from Pakistan. However, that won't necessarily stop Bhutto from returning to her homeland, since she probably wins no matter what Musharraf does. If he throws her in jail, he turns her into a martyr and summons potent memories of the military dictator Muhammad Zia's imprisonment and execution of her popular father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. If he does nothing when Bhutto returns, she will be greeted as a heroine by the millions who will attend her political rallies.

And so the coming months will likely present Musharraf with a choice. He can assert his authority as a rigid autocrat. Or he can agree to some sort of power-sharing arrangement with Bhutto and her allies–a deal that would cement an alliance between the secular political parties and the military based on a liberal, moderate vision of Pakistan's future, but one that would effectively end his one-man rule. Hassan Abbas, a former senior Pakistani police official now at Harvard's Kennedy School, is not optimistic that Musharraf will do the right thing. «All the signs are that he will rig the elections,» he predicts. Whatever choice he makes, the Pakistani leader's grasp on power has never seemed so tenuous. Abdul Rashid Ghazi may be dead, but Musharraf's problems are just beginning.

But, what about former Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry? Bergen mentions him, but does not conclude with him:

Meanwhile, Chaudhry has been traveling to rallies around the country, where he is routinely greeted by boisterous crowds of tens of thousands of Pakistanis from all walks of life. Their demands are simple: that the government uphold the independence of the judiciary and that Musharraf give up his dual status as president and military chief. This emergence of a grassroots, democratic movement suggests that wide swaths of the public want Pakistan to emulate neighboring India–a democratic state that does not constantly revert to military rule, as Pakistan has done four times since the two countries gained independence from the British in 1947.

Can someone tell me why this guy can't be president? Why bring back Bhutto, who, as far as I know, was not a spectacular leader. Her only qualification seems to be, that she's not Musharraf.

Really, though, the odds in favor of the Bush administration acknowledging any of these other political contingencies is remote. US intelligence chiefs, according to the above-linked Alsharq Alawsat article—perhaps with this argument in hand—urged Musharraf to take the fight to the border provinces more rigorously. But, Munaeem cautions against that:

If Musharraf decides to continue the operation in the tribal area, it will divide the Pakistan army. When the operation started in the tribal area  hundreds of Paktoon army officers and soldiers refused to fire on their Pakhtoon brothers. They were court marshaled for their disobedience.

Musharraf is like a catalytic agent that stirs dissent and discontent. Certainly, when confronted with brazen contempt, as Abdul Rashid Ghazi displayed, lethal force is justified. But only, crucially, if the wielder is considered legitimate, and Musharraf is no longer that. It's clear General Musharraf is no longer an asset.