Left Flank

The remaining seven of 23 South Korean hostages kidnapped by the Taliban in Ghazni province, Afghanistan on July 19 have been set free. The Joong-ang Daily is as optimistic about the consequences of the Afghan hostage crisis as is possible: «It will be the beginning of debates and a look back at what went wrong. This crisis raised grave questions about the divide between the country?s responsibility and the responsibility of individuals.» The Roh administration stared down its choices, between supporting international law and Afghanistan's sovereignty and what appears to be dependence on domestic progressive parties, Beijing, Muslim states, and energy needs, and it took the second course. It's yet another indication Seoul's alliance with the US is all but dead except in name only.

On the issue that sparked the Taliban's kidnapping, followed by the executions of two men, including the mission's pastor, there is a consensus that South Korean Christian churches, principally the Saemmul Presbyterian Church, are fully culpable. According to the Chosun Daily, Seoul and Saemmul have agreed, that the Bundang church will reimburse the government for certain expenses, such as transportation for the hostages returning to South Korea, but there's no mention of legal action. Hankyoreh also highlights the «need for self discipline and self-restraint» in protestant churches in South Korea. The CSM has a good article on the 19th-Century missionary model South Korean churches followed, and how it needs to be updated. On one level, the hostage crisis begins and ends here.

But then, there's the Roh administration's role in this disquieting affair. From an incompetent blunder, created by the lack of proper regulation of foreign travel, the Roh administration created diplomatic blunders far more destructive than the Saemmul 23's arrogance. Instead of heeding advice not to negotiate with the Taliban, a decision rightly criticized by foreign governments, the Roh administration dispatched an entire diplomatic team, replete with Foreign Ministry officials and a presidential aide, to Kabul. This is where blunder turns into responsibility.

Firstly, according to Al-Jazeera, there are rumors of a ransom payment:

Alan Fisher said there had been rumours in the capital that up to $20 million had been paid to secure the release.

«I spoke to one senior Afghan authority who, while not confirming the figure, did say that money was paid - that the South Koreans had paid cash to the Taliban.»

But Qari Mohammad Bashir, a Taliban commander, denied that a ransom had been paid.

«I strongly deny this. It's not true that money was involved,» he said.

Al Jazeera's Tony Birtley, reporting from South Korea, said: «Most people here [in Seoul] think that South Korea has probably paid a ransom, but that will be debated later when the hostages have returned home safely.»

Secondly, Seoul's actions undermined Kabul's Karzai government.

«This release under these conditions will make our difficulties in Afghanistan even bigger,» Farhand said German radio station, Bayerischer Rundfunk.

«We fear that this decision could become a precedent. The Taliban will continue trying to take hostages to attain their aims in Afghanistan.»

South Korea also said it had promised to send no more «Christian missionaries» into the Muslim country. For its part, the Taliban dropped its demands for the release of prisoners.

In the deadly battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, Seoul gave the Taliban exactly what it needed, a diplomatic precedent to undermine the legal standard opposing its existence.

While there was no sign that they extracted any other concessions, analysts say the Taliban emerged from the crisis with renewed political legitimacy because for the first time since their 2001 ouster they negotiated with a foreign government.

«Taliban now have diplomacy, they have got spokesmen, they value cameras, they have a political dimension for their movement, and their aim is to be recognized as legitimate,» said Mustafa Alani, director of security and terrorism studies at the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center.

South Korea has denied doing anything wrong, saying it was normal practice to negotiate with hostage takers.

In a WaPo report, a Taliban commander brags about the hostage negotiations.

Abdullah, a top Taliban commander who helped orchestrate the kidnapping, said in a telephone interview that the episode had been a strategic victory. «We showed to the world that the United States is not taking care of its allies in the so-called war on terror,» he said. «We will continue such a strategy to isolate the U.S. and its installed government in Kabul.»

He called kidnapping «a good and cost-effective strategy for putting pressure on the enemy.»

In other words, Seoul's urgent need to cover up its incompetence trumps all principles. But, then again, aside from its previous support for the Karzai government, as expressed by the deployment of 200 ROK troops in Afghanistan, South Korean progressives view the negotiations as a diplomatic victory of another sort.

The kidnapping incident has also required that Seoul learn better diplomacy toward Islamic countries located in the Middle East. Despite heightened tension after the Taliban killed two of the captives, the government sought face-to-face meetings with the insurgents, dismissing pressure from the international community not to negotiate with terrorists. In the process, Seoul officials strove to gain support from Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Indonesia.

?It must have been a tough decision for the government to seek face-to-face meetings with the Taliban, considering past diplomatic practices,? said Lee Dae-hoon, a member of People?s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy who is working on arms reduction for peace. ?We could give high scores for efforts designed to secure the safe release of its people,? he said, adding that they could be remembered as an important turning point in the nation?s diplomacy with Middle Eastern countries down the road.

This is just an incredible way to spin the reports of Saudi and Pakistani involvement.

Lastly, how can Seoul claim the results of the negotiations as anything other than capitulation? The Taliban gains the pledges to withdraw South Korean troops and never to allow Christian missionary work. Seoul receives two less hostages, angers Kabul (and, just about every other government in the world), possibly loses some cash, and picks up an IOU for Saudi Arabia's and Pakistan's help. The only positive developments would be the impetus to join some sort of vague Sino-Pakistani alliance in Central Asia and deploying the hedge against Washington's support for Israel Tokyo so skillfully performs in Muslim Western Asia.

Has Seoul become nothing more than a bit player in yet another alliance its diplomatic incompetence has nothing to offer?