Left Flank

Rovin: «Of course, this all falls under the category of diplomacy, which (according to the left) the Bush Administration has no interest in pursuing.»

What else could all this be? Is it the past repeating itself?

On May 23, 1997, Mohammad Khatami's unexpected election as Iran's president sparked hopes within the Clinton administration of Iran-US rapprochement. Khatami stoked these hopes even further when he sat down on January 7, 1998 with CNN's Christiane Amanpour for an interview, in which he said all the right things to facilitate dialogue. What ensued was years of carefully crafted secret messages and gestures initiated by both states, as all the while events threatened to derail any progress towards reconciliation.

The Clinton administration used a variety of tools to express its wishes. In October, 1997, it removed Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) from the official list of terrorist groups.  In 1998, Vice-President Al Gore, Jr. sent a message to Iran through the Saudis. In May, 1998, the US granted waivers to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act to European companies. In December, 1998, President Clinton removed Iran from the list of terrorist states exporting narcotics. On April 12, 1999, President Clinton made remarks at a formal White House dinner about seeking an «accommodation» with Iran. Even when the Saudis gave the Clinton administration proof of Iranian complicity in the bombing of the Khobar Towers, the Clinton administration refused to announce its findings.These diplomatic maneuvers are just a sampling of the many tactics the Clinton administration, which early in its first term had put Iran on the official list of terrorist states.

it seems the Bush administration is traveling the same road with Syria, from «Axis of Evil» now to conferences, that the Clinton administration pursued with Iran in the late 1990s. The Clinton administration tried «Dual Containment», and on numerous occasions considered military strikes. The tactics don't change, only the players.

What got me thinking about this was Ed Morrissey's conjectural piece (and Ken Pollack's book on Iran):

It seems odd to include Syria in this conference, given current circumstances. The US just green-lighted an attack on a rogue nuclear facility in Syria, and Syria just assassinated another Lebanese politician in a car-bomb attack. Bashar Assad doesn't seem particularly interested in getting along with his neighbors, even the Muslim nations on his border. After the Israeli raid, Assad could get motivated by self-preservation, but his support for Hamas and Hezbollah doesn't give much confidence that Syria will add any productive energy to this effort.

Of course, too, the analogy to the Clinton administration and Iran might turn into template for a conference with Iran and Iraq in the wake of this conference.

What exactly happened at Dayr az-Zwar, regardless of «what» was recovered or not, becomes even more interesting, but possibly little more than prologue. It all also makes the Six-Party talks timeline seem wholly normal by comparison. The only palpable difference is the public disagreements between administration hawks and State department diplomats played out on the world stage.

Yes, this is diplomacy! Finally, in the eleventh hour the Bush administration is getting serious.

(Oh, and the comments sections at CQ have some choice speculation.)