Left Flank

It's no longer a secret how the Democratic party will decide its presidential nominee. But, it's still not any easier to calculate the ranks of delegates and super-delegates. The Economist does as good a job as Reuters (above) explaining the mysterious X factor, the "super-delegates", and adds:

If the superdelegates were to force the selection of the candidate who won fewer of the ordinary delegates, it would be quite a propaganda gift to the Republicans. But if they conclude that Mrs Clinton, though ahead, cannot win against John McCain, they might just do it.

TNR's Dayo Olopade, though, dissents, arguing that superdelegates "don't really matter":

With many superdelegates, their voting status at the convention is just a minor part of why the campaigns are wooing them so fervently. But in the same way that a string of high-profile endorsements of Obama from red-state Democrats has been interpreted as a sign of his crossover appeal, examining the roster of superdelegates who have endorsed so far is revealing of larger dynamics in the party. Hillary Clinton has garnered the most support among women and Hispanic superdelegates, and is showing strongly with those from Washington, D.C. and Northeastern states like New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. She also holds a 99-31 advantage among unelected superdelegates, longtime party members who may already have personal relationships with the Clintons.

Still, the fluidity of superdelegate allegiances undermines the case for their disproportionate influence. Though a handful of superdelegates have clear affinities--Hillary and Bill Clinton, as well as Clinton campaign operatives Harold Ickes and Terry McAuliffe, for example, aren't impartial--support is often soft until the day of the convention. A majority have stayed uncommitted so far, and even those who have already endorsed a candidate are still technically «unpledged.» Furthermore, superdelegates follow the political tides--Clinton built a substantial lead among them when she led national polls throughout the summer, while several dozen superdelegates surged into Obama's camp after his Iowa victory. In 2004, superdelegates backpedaled from their endorsements of Dean, rallying around Kerry after he won early caucuses and primaries. (In most years, the also-rans symbolically turn over their delegates to the prospective nominee as well.

But let's say that the Clinton-Obama race remains dead-even, even after votes are in. The 350 or so superdelegates who have already pledged their support to a candidate are unlikely to jump ship, but the truly «unpledged» will face increasing pressure to make an affirmative decision. Of course, both candidates will continue their attempts to sway superdelegates, though Clinton certainly holds a natural advantage here. If these allegiances hold, an up-or-down vote on the convention floor could easily tip in her favor. But if history is any guide, the odds of such a dramatic rescue for either campaign are slim--unanimity is a powerful force for the Democrats, and barring an absolute tie, superdelegates are unlikely to side against the primary-season winner, the peoples' choice.

First, there was the 2000 presidential election, and now the Democratic primary race, both of which have been decided on a non-"democratic" basis. I f readers want to do so, they can wade through the Democratic party's manual. These selection rules for delegates were introduced after the 1980 election, and allow elected Democrats in national, state, and party office to guide party nominations.

I am not a progressive. The United States is a constitutional republic, not a direct, or even a representative, democracy. In Federalist No. 59, Alexander Hamilton, in this case speaking of the Senate, nonetheless touched upon the salient problem:

I shall not deny, that there is a degree of weight in the observation, that the interests of each State, to be represented in the federal councils, will be a security against the abuse of a power over its elections in the hands of the State legislatures. But the security will not be considered as complete, by those who attend to the force of an obvious distinction between the interest of the people in the public felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the power and consequence of their offices. The people of America may be warmly attached to the government of the Union, at times when the particular rulers of particular States, stimulated by the natural rivalship of power, and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement, and supported by a strong faction in each of those States, may be in a very opposite temper. This diversity of sentiment between a majority of the people, and the individuals who have the greatest credit in their councils, is exemplified in some of the States at the present moment, on the present question. The scheme of separate confederacies, which will always nultiply the chances of ambition, will be a never failing bait to all such influential characters in the State administrations as are capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the public weal. With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the exclusive power of regulating elections for the national government, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the most considerable States, where the temptation will always be the strongest, might accomplish the destruction of the Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the people (and which perhaps they may themselves have excited), to discontinue the choice of members for the federal House of Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm union of this country, under an efficient government, will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe; and that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them. Its preservation, therefore ought in no case that can be avoided, to be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and vigilant performance of the trust.

Party elections are federal elections writ small. The same protection against an accretion of power in the majority striving against a minority, or vice versa, is as necessary in one as the other. The requisite jealousy between people and rulers fosters republicanism, rather than weakens it. Safeguarding against precipitous actions is tantamount, if a truly republican government is to be preserved.

And, further, superdelegates can keep the media on its toes, because the media will never be able to ascertain the facts until the actual party nomination. Checks and balances, huzzah!