Left Flank

NK Econ Watch's Curtis Melvin has in the K-Sphere one of those rarest of beasties: low ideology analyses of North Korean issues, in this case, collapse scenarios. After offering a handy diagram of Andrei Lankov's prognostications, Melvin concludes:

Using this framework, we see that Lankov's first scenario falls into quadrant 2 (upper right), and economic reforms lead to a weakening of the central government, pushing the country into quadrants 3 or 4. This transition is based on the notion that the North Korean central government, or whichever coalition holds it together, can't survive an economic transition, mainly due to the visible success of South Korea. I think this is an interesting argument, but I am not entirely convinced by it. Hong Kong is not inspiring revolts in China for the same reasons that North Korea does not need to fall prey to political upheaval—mainly, keep people from organizing and dispersing information, and make sure that some fraction of the productive gains from economic reforms are strategically redistributed as political rents.

I take issue with a number of presuppositions. Firstly, if Pyongyang's authority implodes, the resulting rush of regional foreign power, from Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and perhaps, the US and Russia, will not be a polite affair. Secondly, both Melvin and Lankov assume that the lack of information about ROK's economic prowess invites a certain awe. However, as Marcus Noland argues, North Koreans «expectations may be lower. This potentially means less migratory responsiveness and less of a shift away from home goods.» Related to this «imponderable», North Koreans differ from East Germans by their «politics, attitudes, and spirit.» (Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse, p. 299) Both Melvin and Lankov confuse political culture with government action.

As I have insisted many times, the existence of free and affluent South Korea can profoundly influence North Korean people. Simply put, although Chinese people know that the U.S. and Japan are much wealthier than themselves, they know, at the same time, that China cannot be united with these countries to match their level of consumption with the developed countries' ones.

If North Korean people achieve the freedom to access information and to do at least as much as Chinese people have lately been able to do, the attraction of South Korea will make the Northern regime insecure.

The North Korean people will think that North Korea can easily solve its economic problems and raise their consumption level up to South Korean standards through unification and subsequent co-option into South Korea. Sure enough it is a fantasy, but this fantasy can weaken the North Korean regime.

As the self-proclaimed 'North Korean elite' demonstrated, it is possible for a North Korean, even one not receiving rents from the regime, to be both nationalistic and condescending, even when the economic situation in both states is compared.

Still, I applaud Melvin's efforts to use game theory. It does help to simplify a complicated case. However, complexity is part of the problem.