Left Flank

Putting the al-Kibar «reactor» disclosures into a geostrategic framework is necessary. Stratfor's George Friedman discusses a possible Israel-Syria agreement:

Iran will not be happy about all this. Tehran has invested a fair amount of resources in bulking up Hezbollah, and will not be pleased to see the militia shift from Syrian management to Syrian control. But in the end, what can Iran do? It cannot support Hezbollah directly, and even if it were to attempt to undermine Damascus, those Syrians most susceptible to Tehran's Shiite-flavored entreaties are the Alawites themselves.

The other player that at the very least would be uneasy about all of this is the United States. The American view of Syria remains extremely negative, still driven by the sense that the Syrians continue to empower militants in Iraq. Certainly that aid — and that negative U.S. feeling — is not as intense as it was two years ago, but the Americans might not feel that this is the right time for such a deal. Thus, the release of the information on the Syrian reactor might well have been an attempt to throw a spoke in the wheel of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations.

This interpretation is further reinforced by independent analyses of those videos from al-Kibar.

Professor William Beeman at the University of Minnesota passed along a note today from «a colleague with a U.S. security clearance» about the mysterious Syrian site targeted in a Sept. 6 Israeli airstrike.

The note raises more questions about the evidence shown last week by U.S. intelligence officials to lawmakers in the House and Senate.

1. Satellite photos of the alleged reactor building show no air defenses or anti-aircraft batteries such as the ones found around the Natanz nuclear site in central Iran.
2. The satellite images do not show any military checkpoints on roads near the building.
3. Where are the power lines? The photos show neither electricity lines or substations.
4. Here is a link to a photo of the North Korean facility that the Syrian site was based on. Look at all the buildings surrounding it. The Syrian site was just one building.

The author of the note pinpoints irregularities about the photographs. Beeman's source alleges that the CIA «enhanced» some of the images.

Gee, I feel so empowered to be a minor dupe in a diplomatic ploy!

Image by peace chicken via Flickr

There has already been much discussion about the remaining mysteries surrounding the Syrian plutonium-generation reactor. My own guess (and it is just a guess) is that the Syrian reactor was the fruit of a three-way partnership composed of Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Iran provided the money, idea, and leadership. Iran ordered Syria to provide the site and some of the labor. North Korea provided the expertise, for which Iran paid (directly or indirectly) in cash.

But where Westhawk is even more helpful is the other half of his post: , the NPT system is broken, so he asks, «What will replace the broken NPT-IAEA system?» I would argue that the system is fundamentally sound, if only nuclear powers with intelligence assets would share information and let the IAEA do its job.

The challenge of proliferation control lies not in the lack of proven techniques but in the absence of moral suasion and sustained diplomacy by the world leaders. The American government subsidized the spread of nuclear knowledge through the Atoms for Peace program to counter Soviet influence, and at virtually every critical juncture since then successive administrations have set aside long-term proliferation goals in favor of short-term strategic priorities. (Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets, and How We Could Have Stopped Him, p. 1844, Palm e-book)

Collins and Frantz advocate the following proposals to fix the system:

• a moratorium on enriched uranium;
• revision of the NPT, including eliminating the right to opt-out and a UN commitment to sanction violators;
• the reduction of nuclear arsenals and a moratorium on the creation of a new generation of weapons;
• restrictions on sales of nuclear technology;
• monitoring of civilian nuclear industries;
• intelligence-sharing

With the exception of sanctions, which are generally a worse remedy than the problems they seek to cure, this is a sane international nuclear policy

I put this story about Dubai wanting to go nuclear (and then, retracting it) into deep freeze until I was reading Frantz and Collins on A.Q. Khan today about Dubai's role in the Pakistani pipeline.

Dubai is one of the seven principalities that form the United Arab Emirates: a sleepy port until a construction boom started in the 1960s, by the 1980s Dubai was a bustling free-trade zone without tariffs or taxes and little in the way of government regulation. Foreign businessmen had been drawn by the freewheeling, explosive economy. Among them was Mohammed Farooq, a stocky Indian who had set up a small import-export business in the Jebel Ali Free Zone. Like Lerch, Farooq was a veteran of the nuclear black market—he had met the engineer in South Africa years before, and they had also crossed paths over the years in their dealings with Khan. Lerch now contacted Farooq and found a willing local partner. Lerch also recruited another alumnus of the Pakistani network, Heinz Mebus. Mebus had worked at Siemens and spoke better English than Lerch, prompting later speculation that he had been the one to write the four-point proposal for Iran on some of his old stationery.

At some point, Lerch or Mebus ran the Iranian deal past Khan, who had access to the centrifuges and components that were a key part of the transaction. As a fellow Muslim who was well-known for his role in building the Islamic bomb. Khan's involvement also served to quell any worries the Iranians still had about a sting operation. Although the Pakistani scientist was willing to participate, he did not want to travel to Dubai for the meeting. Instead, he agreed to provide two centrifuges and some components. At the time, Kahuta was developing a more advanced centrifuge, known as the P-2, so all Khan had to do was dip into his stockpile of P-1s waiting to be melted down and ship them to Dubai. He still operated with complete immunity, without any real oversight, so the goods could be sent out of the country merely on his signature.

Later Khan would rationalize his participation in the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran in a variety of ways. Chiefly, he would argue that providing an atomic weapon to another Muslim country was a way to shift some of the West's scrutiny away from Pakistan. In private, he told friends that he had been encouraged to assist Iran by Pakistani military leaders who were interested in expanding ties with Tehran against the West and Israel. At the time of the first deal, President Zia did not trust the Americans despite the hundreds of millions of dollars in annual aid, any more than he trusted the Soviets occupying the country next door. The secure future that Zia envisioned for Pakistan rested on a new alliance stretching west to unite the west to unite the region's non-Arab Muslims in Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. This was, in Zia's mind, a formation capable of resisting outsiders and posing a formidable counterweight to India. He had ordered his plan put down in writing and called it the Strategic Regional Consensus.

Perhaps this is just sin by association or coincidence, but Khan went on to own a company (and a private apartment) in Dubai. Dubai became instrumental for Khan's efforts to help not only Iran, but also Iraq and Libya, get the bomb. Do we add Dubai to this list (if not directly, but like the younger apprentice following the master)?

First up, there's Mohamed ElBaradei. If we're rehabilitating public figures who were right about Iraq, the long-serving head of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be high on the list. But, he also makes a good point on Iran: you can't bomb knowledge!

Next, there's Francis Fûkûÿámá, who in his present anti-neocon pose, is almost a realist.

But the fundamental problem remains the lopsided distribution of power in the international system. Any country in the same position as the US, even a democracy, would be tempted to exercise its hegemonic power with less and less restraint. America’s founding fathers were motivated by a similar belief that unchecked power, even when democratically legitimated, could be dangerous, which is why they created a constitutional system of internally separated powers to limit the executive.

Such a system does not exist on a global scale today, which may explain how America got into such trouble. A smoother international distribution of power, even in a global system that is less than fully democratic, would pose fewer temptations to abandon the prudent exercise of power.

Finally,and more on the national security front, a little more budget help for the US Navy: Abolish the Air Force!

We aren't likely to see the end of the United States Air Force anytime soon, however. The institutional structure of the Air Force would resist its absorption into the Army and the Navy; friends of the Air Force in Congress and the public would fight to prevent consolidation. Strong proponents of the «Air Force way of war» remain, and aren't convinced by «boots on the ground zealots.» The Air Force would fight very hard to stay independent.

The consolidation of the services, of course, is no panacea for military difficulties. In spite of the formal unification of Israel's military forces, for instance, the Israel Defense Forces last summer embarked on a poorly planned strategic air campaign against Hezbollah and its Lebanese supporters. Israeli air attacks destroyed Lebanese infrastructure and killed Lebanese civilians without dealing serious damage to Hezbollah.

Nevertheless, the idea of an independent air force was not handed down on Mount Sinai. We have institutions because we've built them. When these institutions outlive their usefulness or fail as experiments, we can take them apart. In a post–September 11 world, we live with threats quite different from those that the Soviet arsenal used to pose. We can and should devise uses and a bureaucratic structure for American airpower better suited to our current challenges than those set out in 1947.

I'm grading midterms, and it's Friday movie night, so I'll leave you with this reading. It's either Gallipoli or Paradise Now tonight. Any votes, leave me a comment!

If not for so many other reasons, this conversation with Hans Blix highlights how the North Korean nukes negotiations impacts the Iranian crisis. But, of course, there's what he has to say about Iraq, too.

Skepticism is greeting Israeli satellite photos of the Dayr az Zawr construction site its air force bombed on September 6. The Washington Post continues to match skepticism with misleading headlines:

Some nuclear experts urged caution in interpreting the photos, noting that the type of reactor favored by North Korea has few distinguishing characteristics visible from the air. Unlike commercial nuclear power reactors, for example, a North Korea-style reactor lacks the distinctive, dome-shaped containment vessel that prevents the release of radiation in the event of a nuclear accident.

«You can look at North Korea's [reactor] buildings, and they look like nothing,» said John E. Pike, a nuclear expert and director of GlobalSecurity.org. «They're just metal-skinned industrial buildings.» The proximity of the building to a water source also is not significant by itself, Pike said.

But Brannan, of ISIS, combed through a huge amount of satellite imagery to find a site along the Euphrates that matches a reactor's specifications as well as descriptions of the attack site. The compound's distance from populated areas was a key detail, since reactors are usually isolated from major urban populations.

The site is also close to an irrigated area, which would explain statements by some officials privy to details of the attack that the facility was located near orchards. A small airstrip about two miles away could have been used to transport personnel to the site.

Jeffrey Lewis (via FP Passport) is skeptical about that connection to water.

The problem here is that North Korea?s reactors are gas-cooled. You see, if there is a pump , the reactor can not be, as David Sanger and Mark Mazzetti reported, ?modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile of nuclear weapons.? (A careful reader in the comments points out that the pump could be for a secondary cooling tower like the one at Yongbyon, a possibility that I neglected.)

So, one of the two stories is dead wrong. It either is either water-cooled or it resembles the reactor at Yongbyon, which is gas-cooled.

Now, in addition to light-water reactors, a heavy water reactor, like Iran is building at Arak, would have pumps. No one, however, seems to be suggesting an Iran-Syria link. I am not sure why ? perhaps the pump drew H₂0 from the river.

It's clear the problem here is political-the truth might just be too inconvenient to accept.

First, it was Afghanistan as the hostage-grabbing leader in Eurasia, now there's a Japanese student in southeastern Iran.

Asked about the possibility of Iran paying a ransom or exchanging captives, Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini told a televised news conference on Monday:

«There has been news about this ... that there should be a money exchange or what, but this is illegal.»

Iran was seeking to secure the student's release and was hoping he would be freed, Hosseini said.

«We know that the gentleman is alive .... we are making certain efforts to release him.»

Last Thursday an unnamed Iranian official was quoted as saying the kidnappers had offered to exchange the student for the jailed son of their gang leader.

Southeastern Iran has been the scene of numerous clashes between the military and well-armed drug smugglers.

Other tourists, including a couple from Belgium, have been abducted recently. Some have been held for weeks as kidnappers tried to secure the release of relatives from jail.

Iran's border regions with Afghanistan and Pakistan are a major smuggling route for drugs and other contraband. More than 3,300 Iranian security personnel have died in the region fighting drug traffickers since Iran's 1979 revolution.

But, to a question the Asahi Daily also asks, what is a student volunteering to teach English and Japanese originally in Nepal doing now in Iran?