Left Flank

I have a small problem with foreign policy analysis of the sort Mathew Yglesias and Reihan Salam are doing in this fast-talking, book-plugging bhTV diavlog—old school! Instead of taking American capabilities and interests first, both go through a shopping list of «problems». It's a recipe for over-extension. There might be this underhanded attempt to backdoor multilateralism, by saying, «Hey, we can't do it all!» But, there's already a principled argument for that, since multilateralism eases burdens and undercuts foreign criticism that the US is too unilateral, and thus fosters American interests. Also, America thrives when trade thrives, too, and security fosters business. I prefer to examine American military assets—air, sea, land, and near-earth orbit—and ask, «What can America do, and in the most efficient and cost-effective way?»

Michael T. Klare first warned about "conflict over valuable resources" in Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict in 2001, and he has now updated that geo-economic argument.

The great risk is that this struggle will someday breach the boundaries of economic and diplomatic competition and enter the military realm. This will not be because any of the states involved make a deliberate decision to provoke a conflict with a competitor--the leaders of all these countries know that the price of violence is far too high to pay for any conceivable return. The problem, instead, is that all are engaging in behaviors that make the outbreak of inadvertent escalation ever more likely. These include, for example, the deployment of growing numbers of American, Russian and Chinese military instructors and advisers in areas of instability where there is every risk that these outsiders will someday be caught up in local conflicts on opposite sides.

This risk is made all the greater because intensified production of oil, natural gas, uranium and minerals is itself a source of instability, acting as a magnet for arms deliveries and outside intervention. The nations involved are largely poor, so whoever controls the resources controls the one sure source of abundant wealth. This is an invitation for the monopolization of power by greedy elites who use control over military and police to suppress rivals. The result, more often than not, is a wealthy strata of crony capitalists kept in power by brutal security forces and surrounded by disaffected and impoverished masses, often belonging to a different ethnic group--a recipe for unrest and insurgency. This is the situation today in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, in Darfur and southern Sudan, in the uranium-producing areas of Niger, in Zimbabwe, in the Cabinda province of Angola (where most of that country's oil lies) and in numerous other areas suffering from what's been called the "resource curse."

The danger, of course, is that the great powers will be sucked into these internal conflicts. This is not a far-fetched scenario; the United States, Russia and China are already providing arms and military-support services to factions in many of these disputes. The United States is arming government forces in Nigeria and Angola, China is aiding government forces in Sudan and Zimbabwe, and so on. An even more dangerous situation prevails in Georgia, where the United States is backing the pro-Western government of President Mikhail Saakashvili with arms and military support while Russia is backing the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia plays an important strategic role for both countries because it harbors the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a US-backed conduit carrying Caspian Sea oil to markets in the West. There are US and Russian military advisers/instructors in both areas, in some cases within visual range of each other. It is not difficult, therefore, to conjure up scenarios in which a future blow-up between Georgian and separatist forces could lead, willy-nilly, to a clash between American and Russian soldiers, sparking a much greater crisis.

What makes the 2008 version "new", though is, that Klare has dropped his 2001 call for a "global authority", an extension of the International Energy Agency, to coordinate research on alternative fuels and protect current resources. Instead, Klare tepidly advocates "...rather than engage in militarized competition with China, we should cooperate with Beijing in developing alternative energy sources and more efficient transportation systems." Klare reprises Alfred Thayer Mahan, to underscore the US Navy's redeployment from its Cold War Rimland strategy to routes near Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Malacca Strait, and bases in Iraq. Finally, Klare raises the issue of the military industrial complex: military spending to compete with PRC and Russia will dry up funds for research into alternative sources of energy. But, that funding also perversely ensures the US will seek conflict.

I'm uneasy about Klare's retreat. Certainly, PRC is a formidable competitor—CIA Director Michael Hayden's comment is encouraging—for resources and diplomatic influence, and the Washington should engage it. However, bilateral relationships can degenerate into animosity. In the wake of Iraq, the US needs to simplify its relationship with the world to facilitate better ties with the rest of the states it has marginalized in the last eight years. In other words, it needs a policy, not a monkey on its back. Global cooperation on energy spurring global growth, backed by American naval power, is as good as any power point presentation could offer. The monster of military procurement needs to be shoved into a cave where it can scare pirates and dictators but not impede commerce. Klare can only follow the last eight years' nightmare of nationalism with a stronger dose of responsible internationalism.

Putting the al-Kibar «reactor» disclosures into a geostrategic framework is necessary. Stratfor's George Friedman discusses a possible Israel-Syria agreement:

Iran will not be happy about all this. Tehran has invested a fair amount of resources in bulking up Hezbollah, and will not be pleased to see the militia shift from Syrian management to Syrian control. But in the end, what can Iran do? It cannot support Hezbollah directly, and even if it were to attempt to undermine Damascus, those Syrians most susceptible to Tehran's Shiite-flavored entreaties are the Alawites themselves.

The other player that at the very least would be uneasy about all of this is the United States. The American view of Syria remains extremely negative, still driven by the sense that the Syrians continue to empower militants in Iraq. Certainly that aid — and that negative U.S. feeling — is not as intense as it was two years ago, but the Americans might not feel that this is the right time for such a deal. Thus, the release of the information on the Syrian reactor might well have been an attempt to throw a spoke in the wheel of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations.

This interpretation is further reinforced by independent analyses of those videos from al-Kibar.

Professor William Beeman at the University of Minnesota passed along a note today from «a colleague with a U.S. security clearance» about the mysterious Syrian site targeted in a Sept. 6 Israeli airstrike.

The note raises more questions about the evidence shown last week by U.S. intelligence officials to lawmakers in the House and Senate.

1. Satellite photos of the alleged reactor building show no air defenses or anti-aircraft batteries such as the ones found around the Natanz nuclear site in central Iran.
2. The satellite images do not show any military checkpoints on roads near the building.
3. Where are the power lines? The photos show neither electricity lines or substations.
4. Here is a link to a photo of the North Korean facility that the Syrian site was based on. Look at all the buildings surrounding it. The Syrian site was just one building.

The author of the note pinpoints irregularities about the photographs. Beeman's source alleges that the CIA «enhanced» some of the images.

Gee, I feel so empowered to be a minor dupe in a diplomatic ploy!

The NYT's David Barstow decries public diplomacy with a conflict of interest from the Defense Department.

To the public, these men are members of a familiar fraternity, presented tens of thousands of times on television and radio as «military analysts» whose long service has equipped them to give authoritative and unfettered judgments about the most pressing issues of the post-Sept. 11 world.

Hidden behind that appearance of objectivity, though, is a Pentagon information apparatus that has used those analysts in a campaign to generate favorable news coverage of the administration's wartime performance, an examination by The New York Times has found.

The effort, which began with the buildup to the Iraq war and continues to this day, has sought to exploit ideological and military allegiances, and also a powerful financial dynamic: Most of the analysts have ties to military contractors vested in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air.

Those business relationships are hardly ever disclosed to the viewers, and sometimes not even to the networks themselves. But collectively, the men on the plane and several dozen other military analysts represent more than 150 military contractors either as lobbyists, senior executives, board members or consultants. The companies include defense heavyweights, but also scores of smaller companies, all part of a vast assemblage of contractors scrambling for hundreds of billions in military business generated by the administration's war on terror. It is a furious competition, one in which inside information and easy access to senior officials are highly prized.

Records and interviews show how the Bush administration has used its control over access and information in an effort to transform the analysts into a kind of media Trojan horse — an instrument intended to shape terrorism coverage from inside the major TV and radio networks.

Analysts have been wooed in hundreds of private briefings with senior military leaders, including officials with significant influence over contracting and budget matters, records show. They have been taken on tours of Iraq and given access to classified intelligence. They have been briefed by officials from the White House, State Department and Justice Department, including Mr. Cheney, Alberto R. Gonzales and Stephen J. Hadley.

In turn, members of this group have echoed administration talking points, sometimes even when they suspected the information was false or inflated. Some analysts acknowledge they suppressed doubts because they feared jeopardizing their access.

That inside gossip is a powerful drug. But, there's another party responsible: the media. Why didn't media groups either challenge these hacks on the air, or just say no? Ratings and funding.

Actually, I don't mind public diplomacy. Governments should go panhandling. But, citizens have to challenge the drugs these hacks are selling, and the media should help at least. Or, is it too much a part of the problem? James Der Derian in «9.11: Before, After, and In Between» coined the term, MIME-NET (military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network) in 2002:

Now that Silicon Valley and Hollywood have been added to the mix, the dangers have morphed and multiplied. Think Wag the Dog meets The Matrix. Think of C.Wright Mill's power elite with much better gear to reproduce reality.

So, for the near future, I believe virtuous war as played out by the military-industrial-media-entertainment network will be our daily bread and nightly circus. Some would see us staying there, suspended perpetually, in between wars of terror and counterterror. How to break out of the often self-prophesying circles? Are there theoretical approaches that can critically respond without falling into the trap of the interwar? One that can escape the nullity of thought which equates the desire to comprehend with a willingness to condone terrorism? The use of sloppy analogies of resistance, as well as petty infighting (pace [Christopher] Hitchens, [Noam] Chomsky and their polarized supporters) on the left does not give one much hope of a unified anti-war movement.

For the moment, we need to acknowledge that the majority of Americans, whether out of patriotism, trauma or apathy, think it best to leave matters in the hands of the experts. I think for the immediate future the task will be to distinguish new from old dangers, real from virtual effects, and terror from counterterror in the network wars.

Success breeds more success, or so hopes US Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Gates announced his new Army team:

The nomination of Petraeus to the Central Command post, which was vacated last month when Adm. William «Fox» Fallon abruptly resigned, was not unexpected. It was originally thought Petraeus would become the commander of US European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO troops in Brussels. But after Admiral Fallon resigned, over his increasingly public views on Iran that appeared to be at odds with the White House, speculation centered on Petraeus to replace him.

The decision to send Petraeus to Central Command and Odierno back to Baghdad hints that there is a shallow bench of officers suited for the job in Iraq. Gates acknowledged that there are only a «handful of generals» who have the experience necessary, but also said the vacancy left by Fallon's resignation left him few options. «So I'm faced with a critical combatant command where a commander is needed and a commander who knows what's going on in the region,» he said.

(…)

Odierno had already been nominated to become vice chief of the Army. That nomination will be withdrawn and Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli will be nominated in his place. General Chiarelli, who had been on the short list to replace Petraeus in Iraq, has been Gates's senior military aide for more than a year.

Intel Dump's Phillip Carter calls this all «musical chairs», especially the part about Odierno and Chiarelli.

I'm a bit surprised to see him moved into the vice chief of staff job, because I thought he was a shoe-in to take the top Iraq job that Odierno just got. But these are both four-star jobs and both important. And, there's definitely some institutional politics going on here. Unlike some of the other generals, Chiarelli remains relatively untainted by the Bush administration and the war in Iraq, because he served as a relatively apolitical corps commander and division commander. So putting him in at Vice means that the Army might get to keep him in a Democratic administration. Look for Chiarelli to be the next MNF-I or CENTCOM commander in January 2009 -- or to join the Joint Chiefs, either as chairman of the Joint Chiefs or chief of staff of the Army.

Thomas P.M. Barnett makes two arguments about Petraeus' promotion: that more responsibility will lead to more flexibility on Iran; that he's a better match for a President Obama than for a President McCain. What if a Vice-President Clinton is as forceful an «advisor» as the current vice-president?

Overall, all three decisions are prudent. It's what Uncle Jimbo likes. However, as Noah Schachtman summarizes, these Army nominations leave a trail of disgruntled old-schoolers in their wake.

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