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In George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith experiences an epiphany during a war rally when he realizes, that «…the speaker had switched from one line to the other actually in midsentence, not only without a pause, but without even breaking the syntax…. Oceania was at war with Eastasia: Oceania had always been at war with Eastasia. A large part of the political literature of five years was now completely obsolete.»i During the commotion, Smith receives a copy of an illegal, secret tome, «The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism«, written by a member of the Brotherhood, Emmanuel Goldstein. Nestled in an armchair, Smith reads about the geopolitical reality underlying the continuous wars in a chapter entitled, «War is Peace». Three super-states, Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia are locked in a cycle of warfare for control of cheap labor in a western Asian and African shatter zone and to mobilize their respective citizens in perpetual mobilization.

Lost In Eurasian Land Lust: A Critique of Zbigniew Brzezinski's The Grand Chessboard - Get more documents

Matthew Yglesias and Chris Bowers have excellent reasons why America should not have a manned space program.

Matt's rationale against a manned space program: "Unmanned missions are, at the moment, the ones really pushing the frontiers of our knowledge and that's going to continue to be the case for the foreseeable future. That's where we ought to be focusing our energies."

Chris' rationales against a manned space program: "Space exploration is not an issue with clear partisan divisions. Some conservatives view it as a wasteful government expenditure that is better handled through private enterprise, while some progressives view it through a utilitarian lens in that it does not provide much direct benefit to humanity."

I have another reason: without international cooperation on terrestrial weapons programs, space exploration will create an exponentially more dangerous space and terrestrial environment for military and civilian participants and the average layperson.

Confusingly, pundits, politicians, and experts cannot even use clear terminology. The Russians and Chinese propose a space treaty? No, it's an anti-missile, or an anti-satellite treaty. The satellites and missiles are landing and falling on earth! Please stop calling it "outer space"! We have no idea what "outer space" is, so stop trying to appropriate the word, like you know something other than how to use clubs and knives!

Speaking of which, it seems the Bush administration has not progressed past the point of cowboy instincts.

This logic — «hey, why not?» — is always suspect. It reverses the burden of proof, placing the emphasis on those who oppose the intercept.

Yet, this is an «extraordinary» measure (General Cartwright's phrase) against a «small» risk (his phrase again). Justifying requires demonstrating not just that one risk is greater than another, but that one has high confidence that estimates of the risks are accurate and complete.

Holding aside my general worry that this Administration is not to be trusted with sharp objects, there are specific reasons to be skeptical of both the accuracy and the completeness of this Administration's calculations. I strongly suspect that they are systematically discounting two types of hard-to-quantify risks — the possibility of error within the estimates and the political costs to conducting an anti-satellite intercept.

Since I'm not a wonk, let me stick to political costs.

This move by Russia mirrors a similar move by the United States in 2006 when it presented to the Conference on Disarmament a draft treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Conference now has two draft treaties on the table (and is unable to begin work on either). The current plan to break the deadlock in the CD involves four elements: Negotiations on a treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons and substantive discussions on three other issues - preventing an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament, and assurances to non-nuclear weapons States that they will not be attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons.

The introduction by Russia and China of a draft treaty to keep weapons out of space does not alter one iota the current plan to break the deadlock in the CD. Foreign Minister Lavrov made it quite clear when presenting the draft text that it had, as he put it, a "research mandate" and that it would "not add any complications to achieving a compromise on the programme of work of the Conference." In his message to the Conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi expressed the hope that the CD would "start substantive discussion and reach consensus on [the draft treaty] as soon as possible." Russia and China are not, as has been erroneously reported, calling for immediate negotiations on this draft treaty. Rather, they are proposing that it serve as a focal point for substantive discussions, with a view to negotiations sometime in the future. This is entirely consistent with the current plan to break the deadlock in the CD.

This is why the strong negative reactions to the Sino-Russian proposal reported coming out of Washington are somewhat puzzling. After long opposition to holding even discussions on outer space in the Conference on Disarmament, the United States last year changed its position by deciding that it would "not stand in the way of consensus" to break the deadlock in the CD. This essentially means that the U.S. would allow substantive discussions on outer space to take place as long as negotiations on a treaty on fissile material could get underway. All the Sino-Russian proposal does, really, is to provide a focus for the substantive discussions on outer space. The Washington Times reported that U.S. State Department Officials thought that "Moscow and Beijing are trying to upstage Washington with their draft." In fact, the U.S. draft treaty on fissile material and the Sino-Russian draft treaty on outer space are not in opposition to one another.

But, to be fair, Beijing is very confidant in its anti-democratic pose, although its better instinct is to tread softly. Russia is just a big oaf that bullies with oil and nukes. There's a space in which PRC and US can negotiate earnestly, if both follow their better instincts, dropping the cowboy and the anti-democratic poses. And, for both, there are nasty consequences that could result from stoking populist currents in their respective populations.

China's political leadership is held hostage by both a Chinese society spinning out of its control and by a nationalistic and reactionary populace angry at old grievances and increasingly intoxicated with China's rising power. As much as China's political and military leaders would like to be reasonable and work cooperatively with the U.S. and China's neighbors, these Chinese leaders fear an emotional uprising from their own countrymen should they appear too willing to compromise with China's old enemies. During the next crisis over Taiwan, or Japan, or with the U.S. Navy, China's leaders may find themselves forced to choose between reckless escalation or an overthrow at the hands of a nationalist rebellion.

That's why this short essay from Bill Owens, a retired four-star admiral and ex-vice chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, and was chief executive of Nortel and Teledesic, is so compelling.

Foremost, Owens uses the term, "commons", which gets to the salient economic characteristic of that vacuum beyond Earth's populist-fuelled outer atmosphere. Owens applies it to "the economy, open seas and skies, space and the internet", but let's be Owens-like, please!

Mind you, I disagree with him.

First, a no-first-use agreement on cyber attack. An agreement not to be the first to employ a cyber attack against the other country would not eliminate the capability to do it. But it would add inhibitions, set an example and secure cyberspace as the foundation of the new information age.

Second, collaborative anti-piracy operations on the seas, which are of growing importance to freedom of navigation affecting all nations. The US and China both oppose piracy but we do not co-ordinate enough. We could turn ad hoc co-ordination into real solutions, from database and information exchanges to combined exercises, patrols and counter-piracy operations.

Third, a collaborative, space-based information system to achieve global military transparency. We have a space-based surveillance system capable of tracking significant military and perhaps terrorist operations anywhere on the earth's surface. If China and the US came together to collect and provide this information globally, the world could benefit. Such collaboration would not only establish a new US-China relationship; it would also accelerate modernisation of the industrial-age militaries that make mass destruction feasible and likely.

Military co-operation could also allow both countries to reduce defence budgets and commit funds to long-term global initiatives in education, health and environmental preservation. If both militaries become locked in competition, these opportunities disappear.

Fourth, commitment to having no weapons in space and the early reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. China's recent space exploration is impressively important, in part because it could spark a new arms race in space. By committing to keep space weapons-free, China and the US can work to ensure peaceful and stable exploration.

A significant reduction of nuclear weapons (to fewer than 1,000) could preclude another arms race. It would also help reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations. A co-ordinated stand could trigger a real shift towards the renunciation of nuclear weapons, not only by Russia and the established nuclear powers, but also by unstable nations where the combination of terrorism and nuclear potency is most dangerous.

Fifth, a collaborative reduction of pollution from coal power generation. If there is a single issue in which US-China collaboration could make a world-changing difference, it is here. China and the US burn more than half the coal used today, producing most of the carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide that create global warming. Together, China and the US have the scientific and engineering base to address this environmental threat. Doing so would also alter the competitive role of oil production in international security. If the US and China were to establish a $100bn clean coal research fund, it could lead to a drop of 30 per cent in oil prices.

Obviously, the essay has the lung-cleansing scent that comes from a room full of people who can count for a living, but it indicates the path to take.

Now #4 makes me wince. I have this fantasy where NASA runs the cavalry, today's Navy and Air Force combined, which rescues space freighters and dizzy scientists on quixotic missions from, umm, unspecified dangers. The cavalry needs tactical weapons. But, strategic weapons turning satellites into debris which impedes launches and transport to and from Earth are verboten.

So, yes, I agree with Matt conditionally. If the current situation is all earthlings can devise, then unmanned missions are optimal. But, if we want to make space work for us and, as Chris prosaically argues, fulfill our humanity, then the US and China (and Russia) have to follow their better instincts. Between regressing to a 19th Century slugfest between mandarins, cossacks, and cowboys, and taming the commons, the last frontier, there's no metaphorical challenge.

I'm reluctant to praise full-bore Kosovo's independence from Serbia. I'm not alone in my skepticism of self-determination, although I'm not pleased with the company, or their reasons.

Fears that the move could inspire other separatist movements were confirmed almost immediately. On Sunday the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia announced that in the light of Kosovo's move, they would ask Russia and the UN to recognize their independence. And on Monday Chechen rebels fighting to secede from Russia hailed Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, comparing Pristina's fight against Serbia to their own struggle against Moscow.

Are we confusing self-determination with separatism? Separatist aspirations might not necessarily reflect democratic or majority impulses.

I'm even more skeptical, though, when Beijing's queasiness about self-determination is applied to Taiwan.

First, China could scale back the number of flights that its air force regularly makes over the straits. This would reduce the possibilities of an accident and could be visibly verified by the Taiwanese military and media, thereby building goodwill.

More permanently, China could announce a freeze in its military buildup across the straits from Taiwan. While the Chinese military has steadily manufactured short-range ballistic missiles, many are re-loads for existing launchers based in Fujian Province. Relocating those facilities might prove a logistical challenge, while storing reloads farther from their launch points would be rather meaningless. Declaring a freeze on the manufacture of new missiles and on the deployment of new units to launch them would make a significant contribution towards ensuring a peaceful resolution.

Additionally, China could expect a reciprocal response from Taiwan - as well as the United States, which has been steadily increasing its capabilities in the Western Pacific, including deployments of submarines and aircraft.

The peaceful emergence of Kosovo as an independent country provides an example which can contribute to a new, peaceful paradigm for China and Taiwan.

The threat to use force does not automatically ensure Taiwan's cultural and economic affinity with China, nor has it served to prevent Taiwan's steady press for independence.

Dialogue and renunciation of violence will better serve China's interests in ensuring a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status.

There's an important distinction between Taiwan and Kosovo. Taiwan is de facto independent now, in ways Kosovo can only hope it can achieve, especially with so many states opposed to its new status. PRC, Russia (probably the most egregious offender in this cabal), and Serbia could adopt non-interventionist policies, regardless of their intentions concerning self-determination, because it is good for business. Accepting the advice to "go-slow" doesn't mean we have to penalize the aggrieved, to placate the bad intentions of the imperialistic. Criticizing the aggrieved states' position, but not the offending ones', for being equally, and antagonistically, destabilizing, is self-serving and hypocritical. The international community should guarantee the economic and civil liberties of disputed territories without undermining political tempers. The only way to avoid precipitate moves toward independence is to render the tactic unnecessary, not ask Taiwan to play dead.

The Economist manages to string together three stories about the Japan-US alliance, and to be wrong:

• The 2-11-08 arrest of an American soldier for rape.
• The election of Fûkûdá Yoshihiko as Iwakuni mayor.
• Another Soviet  Russian Tupolev 95 "Bear" bomber incident.

Actually, I would argue that The Economist is trying to trivialize the first item to emphasize the salience of the latter two. To be fair, Japundit's Edward Ohmura is right about the the US Marines' track record in Okinawa. But, that doesn't mean the Japan-US alliance is just as important as it ever was, and the Fûkûdá national government is lucky that Iwakuni understands that.

The Economist neglects to mention, as Japan Observer points above, that Tokyo threatened to withhold funds if Iwakuni voted against the Okinawa relocation plan allowing the US Marines to stay. Voters in Iwakuni clearly made the decision out of self-interest, not for the love of the alliance.

This raises two points. The Japan-US alliance is "corrosive". It has undermined the budget process between Tokyo and the cities.

Secondly, Russia in the Far East is not the threat it was, and Guam is just as good as Okinawa for the USAF. But, what is not good for the alliance is the disrespect for Japan's sovereignty manifested in the Iwakuni mayoral election. I agree with Japan Observer, that the US needs to formulate a contemporary Far East strategy (and not this kind of plan), and do its diplomatic best to sell it to its allies in the region before it loses them.

Is PRC trying to duplicate America's Apollo Program or militarizing space?

China's space program lags far behind that of the U.S., of course. "They're basically recreating the Apollo missions 50 years on," says Joan Johnson-Freese, chair of the National Security Studies Department at the U.S. Naval War College and an expert on China's space development. "It's a tortoise-and-hare race. They're happy plodding along slowly and creating this perception of a space race."

But there may be more at stake than national honor. Some analysts say that China's attempts to access American space technology are less about boosting its space program than upgrading its military. China is already focusing on space as a potential battlefield. A recent Pentagon estimate of China's military capabilities said that China is investing heavily in anti-satellite weaponry. In January 2007, China demonstrated that it was able to destroy orbiting satellites when it brought down one its own weather satellites with a missile.

China clearly recognizes the significance of this capability. In 2005, a Chinese military officer wrote in the book Joint Space War Campaigns, put out by the National Defense University, that a "shock and awe strike" on satellites "will shake the structure of the opponent's operations system of organization and will create huge psychological impact on the opponent's policymakers." Such a strike could hypothetically allow China to counterbalance technologically superior U.S. forces, which rely heavily on satellites for battlefield data. China is still decades away from challenging the U.S. in space. But U.S. officials worry espionage may be bringing China a little closer to doing so here on Earth.

The charitable answer would be the former, if this Sino-Russian proposal for a "Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects" means anything good.

Washington has some fancy PR work to do, convincing the world, that non-WMD is necessary. Perhaps, the presidential candidates can offer a stance on a weapons ban?

Poland's prime minister, Donald Tusk, gets high marks for trumping Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, for rhetorical skill. Characterizing how the US and Russia are "bored with the cold atmosphere" is pithier than Putin's checklist appeal to every progressive cause in the Bush administration's doghouse.

«In effect we are being forced to retaliate,» he said in a speech to Russia's influential State Council, a gathering of political and business leaders. «Russia has, and always will have, responses to these new challenges,» he said to applause.

(…)

«Nato itself is expanding. It's approaching our borders. We drew down our bases in Cuba and in Vietnam. What did we get? New American bases in Romania, Bulgaria. A new third missile defence region in Poland.

«We are categorically being told these actions aren't directed at Russia, and therefore our concerns are completely unfounded. That's not a constructive response.

«It's already clear that a new arms race is being unleashed across the world ... It's not our fault, we didn't start it,» he said.

He claimed growing foreign interest in Russia was being fuelled by a «mounting struggle for resources», while attempts by foreign governments to interfere in Russian politics were «immoral and illegal».

«We see how under the guise of declarations for freedom and open society the sovereignty of countries and entire regions is being destroyed,» he said in a clear nod to the US campaign in Iraq. «Many conflicts, foreign policy acts and diplomatic démarches smell of oil and gas.»

There's some choice material here, but I still prefer Tusk's grasp on reality.