Left Flank

Brookings Institution has a compromise plan for Myanmar:

Supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader and Nobel laureate who remains under house arrest, have called on the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to take the lead in fixing Myanmar. It is ludicrous, however, to expect these two countries to play leadership roles in any process of dialogue as long as they cling to their dogmatic policies toward the military rulers of Myanmar. It is also wildly unrealistic to expect the United Nations to leverage any meaningful policy changes.

The best hope for efforts that might lead to tangible improvements in the daily lives of the citizens of Myanmar is probably ASEAN. The 10 ASEAN member countries adopted a new charter last year, which is due to be ratified by November 2008. The charter has a weak human-rights provision, but it will provide a stronger basis for dialogue with the Myanmar government in this sensitive area.

Observers rightly complain about the military regime's inflexibility, but much of the opposition is equally inflexible. A fresh policy debate could identify approaches more likely to lead to positive change for the long-suffering people of Myanmar. Five principles could improve the odds of success under the next administration.

1. First, refer to the country as Myanmar instead of Burma. Governments have the prerogative to change their names. The ASEAN members and other Asian nations stopped using Burma long ago. By insisting on calling the country Burma, the U.S. government is openly insulting the military regime and disrespecting the views of Myanmar's Asian neighbors.
2. Follow ASEAN's lead. One way is to sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the foundation for ASEAN's relations with other countries. Others include visibly supporting ratification of the ASEAN charter and strongly supporting the ASEAN Regional Forum as the first place for the international community to discuss the difficulties associated with Myanmar.
3. Accept that the military will play a critical role in Myanmar for another generation or two. The successor to aging Gen. Than Shwe will have more political space for reform if he does not feel threatened by external powers.
4. Support preparations for eventual policy reforms. Technical skills to plan and implement sound policies are appallingly thin in Myanmar. They can be improved through ASEAN-based training programs and scholarships for study in the United States and elsewhere.
5. Stop blocking the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank from working in Myanmar if it takes meaningful steps to meet ASEAN standards of transparency and governance.

Much more can be done, under the radar, through private sector and people-to-people activities, to nudge Myanmar toward a brighter future. At the level of government policy, quietly supporting Asian initiatives is more likely to advance broader U.S. objectives in Asia than waving our big stick and speaking loudly

I'm sure this plan will please no one. And, it doesn't address the geopolitical influence of PRC and India.

It's hard to take ASEAN seriously when all of the good news is a dream.

Some sense of community does exist among the elites of most member states, and there are many examples of cooperation that would not have been possible without Asean's existence. Once the Burmese begin to reform their economy, membership of Asean will be a help, just as it has been for Vietnam.

But Asean's pretense that it is more important than it actually is only invites bigger countries to exploit the organization's divisions. One day, Asean could have sufficient coherence to deal with China, India and the United States on roughly equal terms. But the group's 40th year has shown how not to get there.

Seriously, Beijing is the reason for ASEAN, and it's not a good thing when China is the winner at an ASEAN summit. Also, the last time I checked Thailand was run by a junta, so how does a Thai secretary-general help in the PR department? I can see the fork coming down!

Regarding US relations with marginal players in East and South Asia, such as the Koreas, Taiwan, and the ASEAN states, according to PINR's Mohan Malik, the centrality of Indo-PRC rivalry should be considered:

An internal study on India undertaken in mid-2005 (with inputs from China's South Asia watchers such as Cheng Ruisheng, Ma Jiali, Sun Shihai, Rong Ying, Shen Dingli, among others) at the behest of the Chinese leadership's «Foreign Affairs Cell» recommended that Beijing take all measures to maintain its current strategic leverage (in terms of territory, membership of the exclusive Permanent Five and Nuclear Five clubs); diplomatic advantages (special relationships, membership of regional and international organizations); and economic lead over India. Although the evidence is inconclusive, the most plausible deduction is that this internal re-assessment of India lies behind the recent hardening of China's stance on the territorial dispute and a whole range of other issues in China-India relations.

The Chinese are concerned that the U.S.-India nuclear deal and related agreements would bring about a major shift in the power balance in South Asia that is currently tilted in China's favor. The recent strengthening of China's strategic presence in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and overtures to the Maldives should, therefore, be seen against this backdrop. Despite protestations to the contrary from India and the United States that New Delhi is unwilling and unlikely to play the role of a closely aligned U.S. surrogate such as Japan or Britain, China's Asia strategy is based upon the premise that maritime powers such as the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India would eventually form an informal quadrilateral alliance to countervail continental China.

As a commentary in Huanqiu Shibao noted:

«The fact is that Japan, Australia, and India are respectively located at China's northeast, southeast, and southwest, and all are Asian powers, while U.S. power in the Pacific is still unchallengeable. Hence, should the «alliance of values» concentrating military and ideological flavors in one body take shape, it will have a very great impact on China's security environment.»

From Beijing's perspective, the responsibility for this «negative development» lies solely at New Delhi's door. In their writings, Chinese analysts seem upset over their southern neighbor's all-consuming passion to become «a big power,» and see the nuclear deal as its key to unlocking the door leading to the big league in world politics.

As a Renmin Ribao commentary noted in August:

The U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement has strong symbolic significance for India in achieving its dream of a powerful nation?In recent years, it introduced and implemented a 'Look-East' policy and joined most regional organizations in the East Asian region?In fact, the purpose of the United States to sign a civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement with India is to enclose India into its global partners' camp, so as to balance the forces of Asia [read, China]. This fits in exactly with India's wishes.

Once the nuclear deal crosses all the «big four hurdles» (opposition from pro-Chinese Communist parties in India; negotiations on I.A.E.A. safeguards; approval by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (N.S.G.); and its passage by the U.S. Congress), Beijing believes that it would end the nuclear symmetry between New Delhi and Islamabad (or, de-hyphenate the sub-continental rivals) and put India on par with nuclear China (re-hyphenate China with India).

This, from Beijing's perspective, is quite disconcerting because a major objective of China's South Asia policy has been to perpetuate parity between India and Pakistan. Add to this India's military exercises with the U.S., Japan and Australia, support for the concept of «concert of democracies,» and attempts to establish strategic ties with countries that fall within China's sphere of influence (Mongolia, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Myanmar) - all of these reinforce Beijing's fears about its containment. However, despite its strong disapproval of a pact that would narrow the power gap between India and China, Beijing would not want to take a stance that pushes India further into Washington's camp. Most likely, Beijing would use its N.S.G. membership to further its own and its allies' interests by:

Using the «double standards» argument to question Washington's commitment to non-proliferation goals in light of its decision to back India's nuclear industry while opposing the right to nuclear energy for Iran and Pakistan;

Insisting that any changes to the N.S.G. guidelines to accommodate the deal must not be «country [i.e., India]-specific» but «universal criteria-based» so that «all countries [read, Pakistan] can benefit from the peaceful use of atomic energy under the I.A.E.A. safeguards.» This formulation, outlined by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, would pave the way for the Chinese construction of the Chashma III and IV nuclear reactors in Pakistan;

Using the deal to extract major concessions from Washington, including an end to the arms embargo and the lifting of bans on high-tech dual-use technology exports to China;

Seeking new assurances that U.S.-India ties are not related to any «contain China» strategy.

The fact of the matter is that China and India are locked in a classic security dilemma: one country sees its own actions as self-defensive, but the same actions appear aggressive to the other. India feels the need to take counter-balancing measures and launch certain initiatives to stay independent of China - such as the «Look East» policy - which are perceived as challenging and threatening in China. Like China, India is actively seeking to reintegrate its periphery with the framework of regional economic cooperation. Like China, India seeks greater international status and influence commensurate with its growing economic power.

However, like any other established status quo great power, China wants to ensure that its position remains strong vis-�-vis challenger India for strategic, economic and geopolitical reasons. Through closer strategic ties with India's neighboring countries, China is warning India not to take any counter-measures to balance Beijing's growing might.

The implication from Dr. Mohan's argument is, that the Washington needs to consider decisions, that strengthen the quadrilateral relationship between Australia, India, Japan, and the US, and do not weaken containment at the weak points in the Koreas, Taiwan, and among the ASEAN states, including Myanmar. Domestic reform in Myanmar is probably impossible, since both Beijing and New Dehli view Myanmar's contiguity with Tibet troubling. But, it also means Washington should avoid actions, that alienate marginal players, like the Koreas and Taiwan, into a pro-PRC position, and instead opt for their neutrality.

As pundits justifiably single out China for opprobrium, no one is pointing a finger at India, the Bush administration's new friend in South Asia. In the end, though, India's geo-strategic designs in its northeastern frontier are as compelling as China's southern concerns.

India has expressed concern over the developments in Myanmar and urged its government to be more inclusive and broad based. «India is concerned at and is closely monitoring the Myanmar situation. It is our hope that all sides will resolve their issues peacefully through dialogue. India has always believed that Myanmar?s process of political reform and national reconciliation should be more inclusive and broad-based,» External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Navtej Sarna said.

The developments in Myanmar have the potential to upset India's security calculations in the northeast, besides delaying its attempt to find a firmer foothold in the hydrocarbon sector. Other initiatives that could take a back seat if the situation worsens are a breakthrough in getting an alternate terrestrial route to the northeast via Myanmar and bilateral and multilateral negotiations to promote greater economic cooperation.

The uncertainty in getting offshore exploration blocks ended last week with the signing of production sharing contracts for three deep-water exploration blocks. In addition, India is part of a consortium looking for gas in two more blocks. More business would depend on India engaging more intimately with the current regime, including a second line of credit of $ 20 million to refurbish a refinery.

Not much solidarity with Buddhist monks (and non-Buddhists, too!) here! And, at least Beijing contemplates the possibility of opposition rule; New Dehli is so far from calling for an opposition government, it fears anything but a strong central government. Even Michael Goldfarb's tribute to Mia Farrow and condemnation of Moscow is all a bit hollow. After all, if pundits of any ideological stripe are determined to frame Beijing's ascendance in Asia as a new cold war, will they lecture the US if it arm-twists South America again? The sin, Goldfarb, and Sullivan, all bloated rhetoric about revolutions aside, seem to be imputing, is that Beijing and New Dehli are doing (in a dark-side-of-the-Force way), but Washington, and all American do-gooders, can only watch impotently. But, if we could, by golly, we'd be Skywalker! I'd prefer to be Indian, if that's all America has to show.

Reading the statements offered by various Burmese and world leaders, one problem, aside from the fundamental geo-strategic predicament of Myanmar and Chinese and Indian indifference, is the lack of agreement about what to do. Actually, I think the EU's comprehensive recommendations point to the immediate tactic: beef up ASEAN. The troubled IGO is Southeast Asia's best hope against Chinese and Indian encroachment and internal rebellion in its member-states. But, the US spends about as little time supporting it, and about as much time enfeebling it as China.

But, first, a common statement from the world would really make the Burmese junta listen. Washington could lead that effort.