Left Flank

Amnesty International’s Response to Burmese Repression (Requires Real Player)

TNR's Joshua Kurlantzick has two prescriptions for Myanmar: smart sanctions and people power.

Myanmar's problems seem to be a form of Dutch disease. After independence, civilian rulers implemented a government-directed socialist economic plan. In 1962, rival elites staged a coup, and Myanmar hasn't know civilian rule again since. So, Kurlantzick's smarter sanction's plan seems well-designed to inflict harm on those who have ruined the Burmese economy most.

With a North Korean-like regime that doesn't care about the world, but is dependent on it for critical items, you have to hit them where they hurt. Long reported to be ailing, Than Shwe flies out of the country for medical care in neighboring Southeast Asian nations. His family also frequently heads outside the country, likely for shopping trips--during the September protests, the senior general parked his family in Bangkok. Burmese businesspeople with alleged close links to the generals also reportedly have extensive bank accounts in neighboring states.

So, smarter sanctions could include efforts to prevent certain top generals from accessing nearby health care and luxury shopping. They also could crack down on bank accounts in Southeast Asia linked to the junta, depriving the junta of the money they need to continue living lavishly in their new jungle capital, Naypyidaw.

Unlike broader sanctions, smarter sanctions might enjoy the support of critical countries in the region. Speaking with some regional diplomats this week in Southeast Asia, several worried that cutting off access to the junta's health care would be viewed as unnecessarily harsh. «Why not just go the old way, and assassinate him?» one asked me. Still, even in the countries around Burma, the level of frustration is rising. And China was willing to work with the U.S. before in toughening financial controls on Kim Jong-Il--Macau is a special administrative region of China--and might be willing to do so again. Individual Southeast Asian nations, meanwhile, could back smarter sanctions without all having to agree amongst themselves. To take broader measures, all countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have to agree--unlikely, given that ASEAN itself contains regimes, like Laos and Vietnam, which are hardly examples of protecting human rights.

Targeted sanctions also might help unite Burmese themselves. Inside Burma, many opposition activists, including Suu Kyi, support tough Western sanctions. But other Burmese I've spoken with criticize the sanctions as making Burma's humanitarian emergency worse. Smarter sanctions, though, probably would spark no such divide. And before the junta can arrest even more of the opposition, the world needs to wise up.

That's fine as far as ridding Myanmar of its junta is concerned, but creating self-government is trickier. And, all Kurlantzick can do is argue, that the Burmese are not incapable of pulling it off.

...the Burma exception argument falls apart on examination. The idea that Burma's ethnic divisions would preclude democracy is only convincing if you ignore the history of its giant neighbor, India. The ethnic violence in postcolonial India was worse than that in Burma, yet the country has held together to build a powerful democracy. Similarly, Indonesia, a vast archipelago of ethnic groups, has managed to form the most vibrant democracy in the region by embracing federalism. Even Cambodia, another diverse society plagued by civil war, now has a stable, if flawed, democracy in place. True, Burma suffered under the British, but it was not a «peculiarly debilitating colonial legacy,» as Thant Myint-U claims. India, Malaysia, Kenya, and other colonies suffered without losing all prospects for democratization.

The second point in the Burma exception argument--that no opposition network exists--dissolves after a glimpse at Burmese history, not to mention the last few weeks. During the 1988 protests, the country witnessed a vast flowering of unions, print publications, and other organizations. Even during the bleakest times, Burmese continued debating the nation's fate, though more quietly: Several years ago, I sat in the corner of a noodle shop in Rangoon and listened to a local publisher and his friends hash out politics. And, just this week, numerous Burmese found creative ways to get photos and stories about the crackdown to news outlets around the world. As for religious groups, the power and organization of the Buddhist monks was on full display during last month's marches. In fact, unlike many other authoritarian states, Burma has a recent history of democratic rule, memories of which would aid a transition back to democracy. Between independence in 1948 and the military coup in 1962, Burma enjoyed a democratic government and a period of strong economic growth. Even more recently, in 1990, the Burmese people participated in a real election, in which the junta's proxy party was defeated by the opposition National League for Democracy. (The junta simply refused to turn over power.)

As these examples suggest, the central problem with the Burma exception argument is that it lays the blame for Burma's problems squarely with the people, when, in fact, the problem is the junta. Contrary to Thant Myint-U's argument that the junta is less repressive than former nearby dictatorships, it is far more brutal. In Thailand, for example, after a crackdown on demonstrators in 1992 in Bangkok, the military heads willingly sat down with the protest leaders at an audience in front of the king and then gave way to civilian rule. The Indonesian dictator Suharto paved the way for democracy by stepping down after massive civilian protests in 1998. In Burma, the junta has created a situation in which brutality is more likely by isolating soldiers from civilians in a separate, military-only education system and by moving the capital to the middle of the jungle. You are a lot more likely to shoot at people you've never had any contact with.

Another factor that the Burma exception argument doesn't consider is the halfhearted and frequently craven policies of the international community. For decades since the 1962 coup, democratic nations could not decide whether to isolate or embrace the Burmese military. The United States and Great Britain courted the generals until the late '80s--Queen Elizabeth served tea to crazed former junta chief Ne Win--and then sanctioned them in the '90s. Burma's closest neighbors, dependent on the country's oil, timber, and gas, recently have been unwavering in their support; India, seeking to counterbalance China's power in the area, has reached out to the generals, selling them arms. And China is the regime's major aid provider and has blocked tougher U.N. actions on Burma. The unwillingness of these nations to stand up to the junta has demoralized Burma's reformers.

That's a lot of problems for one nation to deal with, and probably more than the international community can focus on with any degree of commitment for any period of time.

It's all a question of priorities.

Implausibly, from a country like the Philippines, comes not one, but two suggestions about how to improve Myanmar's plight.

Firstly, RP President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo believes «woman power» will do the trick, and puts in a good word for perennially detained Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

But, yesterday Fr. Robert Reyes extolled the «activism» of the Philippines' catholic hierarchy, and recommended that Myanmar's «quiet» Buddhist monks » '...work against oppression and violence' «

Quoting a story from the Ucan Catholic news service, Reyes said a Burmese Catholic nun tried to organize her fellow religious but no one responded because they were «afraid to tell the truth.»

According to the report, the nun said in a text message to her friends in Manila that she hoped Church leaders in the Philippines and other countries would lead the universal Church «in prayer and in action, since the Church in Myanmar is so afraid.» «Our Catholic Church is so quiet. Our people do nothing but pray individually, privately,» the nun reportedly said.

The Catholic bishops' conference in Burma issued a statement on Sept. 26 saying that it had been praying for peace and urging the people to offer prayers and sacrifice for the peaceful resolution of the situation in the country.

The Burmese bishops' conference said that while its priests and religious were not involved in party politics and in the recent protests, Catholics were «free to act as they deem fit.»

Reyes said Filipinos were molded by an «active Christian ethic against corruption and oppression.»

?People, I think, in the Philippines, being Christian, have that Christian ethic against corruption and oppression. That is an active ethic. There is a tendency in Buddhism to look at salvation from within,» he said.

Reyes said monastic communities in general exude a «very passive ethic» by their emphasis on «withdrawal from the world.»

?(But) it's not enough to say «Let us pray.» You (just) don't pray against injustice. You work against injustice. You work against oppression and violence,» he said. But now that the Burmese Buddhist monks and nuns have found their voice and actually initiated the pro-democracy protests, Reyes said the world should not forget them.

If only Myanmar could be like the Philippines!

But, Joshua Kurlantzick at TNR argues it is not enough, as police in Yangon fired shots over protesting monks' heads and arrested over 300.

The reason, as in 1988, is China.

Many Western powers believe that China, the most important foreign actor in Burma, can be convinced to withdraw its blanket backing for the junta. In a British cable earlier this year obtained by The New Republic, British diplomats argue «China is closer than any other country to Burma's military regime ... China's interests had changed in Burma. They [are] investing heavily and want to see a return on their investment ... There may be an opportunity to persuade China that it is in their interest to see a stable and developing Burma.» Indeed, some of this week's Burma protests have signaled popular anger at China as well, with demonstrators pointedly going by the Chinese embassy; several Burmese previously told me of kidnappings of Chinese businesspeople in the north of the country. Recently, according to AFP, senior Chinese official Tang Jiaxuan offered a gentle rebuke to the Burmese junta, telling its foreign minister that «China sincerely hopes that Myanmar can bring stability back to its domestic situation.»

Yet beyond these words, China has done little. It still has not thrown its support for tougher U.N. action against Burma. Unlike in North Korea, where China cut off some types of aid when trying to pressure Pyongyang to come to the bargaining table, Beijing has taken no such apparent actions towards the Burmese. Meanwhile, placing so much trust in China conceals the fact that there are still steps other nations can take on Burma. India and Thailand could at least demonstrate greater concern for the protestors, signaling to the Burmese junta there might be some consequences from neighbors if they crack down. The U.S. could appoint a special coordinator on Burma, thus placing more pressure on the U.N.'s coordinator and on China. While meeting with Chinese officials the White House also could more publicly call for specific actions from Beijing on Burma.

Apparently convinced they'd risk no serious sanction, in September 1988 the Burmese military stepped in, staging a kind of auto-coup. In the course of suppressing protests, Burmese troops killed as many as three-thousand people. Today, similar fears are rising. More soldiers reportedly are taking positions in Rangoon, and the regime reportedly is recruiting criminals, possibly to infiltrate protests and cause havoc, a tactic utilized in 1988. Burmese opposition radio has reported rumors that senior junta leader Than Shwe has ordered that authorities can use violence to squash demonstrations. Twenty years on, 1988 looks nearer than ever.

After calling attention to Beijing's footprint in Myanmar, the Christian Science Monitor calls on China to do the right thing:

China does itself no favors by associating itself - and thus implicitly equating itself - with such a regime. There is a clear difference between the many regimes in the world that deny their citizens democracy and the smaller number that deny their citizens everything. China belongs in the first category, while Burma belongs in the second. Regimes such as China's may deserve sustained criticism, but regimes such as Burma's deserve immediate intervention.

China has already gained global plaudits and prestige by withdrawing its blanket diplomatic support for North Korea. It is high time to do the same with Burma. Such a move would mute external criticism, not embolden it. (And Burma's lucrative natural resources will still be there for China to tap into when the junta eventually falls from power.)

Until Chinese leaders start distinguishing their own relatively successful regime from the unmitigated disaster that is Burma's, the human-rights protesters on their doorsteps can hardly be blamed for not discerning the difference.

There is that hopefulness that floats on the air in these events. That spirit is Clarissa Pinkola Estes, even composing a rhapsody to Aung Sang Suu Kyi.

Though some accuse the monks of being pawns of extremist groups, and some others accuse the monks of being hypocritical because some of their leaders sometimes ceremonially «sit in golden chairs» (each temple often has chairs given by the populace that are anywhere from simple to fancy) it is unlikely that such accusation hold much sway. More sturdy is that this could be China?s chance, despite multiple motives, to show how humane they can be by staying the Burmese government?s violent reactions to the protesters. It could be a chance for the United States to stand up for a people who dearly seem to want a rock-solid democracy instead of a mock democracy?as their government keeps averring they have a stepped plan for a democracy? some day. It would be a chance for the Burmese government to take down its armored bunker mentality and become a governing body instead of an exploitative one.

But, Myanmar's rulers have two other powerful weapons, 400,000 soldiers and one idea.

The Myanmar junta blames foreign economic sanctions for the nation?s poverty, and foreign meddling for the persistence of political opposition, including the current demonstrations.

The junta is led by a tough and taciturn military man, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, 74, a frequent, stolid, uniformed presence on the front pages of government-controlled newspapers.

(...)

General Than Shwe gave a taste of his worldview at a national day celebration in March in which he said, «Judging from lessons of history, it is certain that powerful countries wishing to impose their influence on our nation will make any attempt in various ways to undermine national unity.»

He vowed to «crush, hand in hand with the entire people, every danger of internal and external destructive elements obstructing the stability and development of the state.»

Against all that, China, soldiers, and xenophobia, the monks have an uphill battle.