Left Flank

Peter at The Duck reminds readers of the larger cycle leading to higher food prices worldwide.

To recap, this implicates:

• Global Warming causing a drought
• High oil prices, raising costs for farmers, shippers, and sellers
• Ethanol and bio-fuels (meant to reduce the first two) sucking corn off the market
• Farm subsidies distorting food prices
• Lack of open markets
• Development in large countries (China, India) leading to increased meat consumption
• Integrated global commodities markets, allowing for speculation

Add in Australia's water pricing policies.

So, I assume the solution will be just as complicated. That hasn't stopped Tyler Cowen form trying to advocate one: «...governments are making matters worse by constraining what farmers can store and export.»

Yet, Dani Rodrik comes along and complicates the picture again.

I am puzzled more generally by how the commentary on the world food crisis misses this basic point. It's all about how the price rise is an unmitigated disaster for the world's poor, with nary a comment on the fact that some of the beneficiaries are also among the world's poorest. (Some of you will say that all the price increase is absorbed by margins, with little of it showing at the farm gate--but I doubt that is true.) The panic on the part of governments is understandable. They are much more sensitive to the urban poor, who can create greater havoc than the rural poor. But what about the rest of us?

Timor-Leste, the world's last state, could be unraveling. Timor-Leste's president, José Ramos-Horta, according to a government website, "…is no longer in a coma after receiving surgery in the Royal Darwin Hospital. The doctors have taken out the rest of the bullets lodged in his spine." Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão escaped unharmed from a separate attack on his motorcade. His alleged murderer, "the Major", a former MP commander, Alfredo Reinado is also dead.

Reinado was gunned down outside President Jose Ramos-Horta's compound during what authorities claim was an assassination attempt on the country's President and its Prime Minister, Xanana Gusmão. Reinado's comrades angrily deny this and say their commander had been invited into town for a meeting when he was attacked, and that Ramos-Horta was caught in the ensuing gunfight…

Many Timorese were astonished by the news, for "the Major" — as Reinado was known locally — was considered a clever and cunning tactician who would rarely put himself in danger. In May 2006, half the Timorese army was dismissed following a strike protesting discrimination against soldiers from the west of the country. The government had used the army to crush the strike with great brutality: at least five men died and many more were wounded. Reinado led his men into the mountains in disgust. He had since eluded capture, using his intimate knowledge of the mountain and bush tracks of his eastern homeland, while a network of loyal villagers with mobile phones kept him apprised of the movements of United Nations Police and the troops of the Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF).

A failed ISF attempt to capture him at the village of Same last year killed five of his men; ever since, Reinado appeared increasingly paranoid…

The Economist characterizes Timor-Leste as "in a mess", and considers the assassination attempts "…a serious setback for a country still struggling, with the help of the UN, to build its institutions." Yet, a January 2008 International Crisis Group report blames both the government, characterized as "autocratic" and the UN for problems in the security sector.

The problems run deep. Neither the UN administration nor successive Timorese governments did enough to build a national consensus about security needs and the kind of forces required to meet them. There is no national security policy, and there are important gaps in security-related legislation. The police suffer from low status and an excess of political interference. The army still trades on its heroism in resisting the Indonesian occupation but has not yet found a new role and has been plagued by regional (east-west) rivalry. There is a lack of transparency and orderly arrangements in political control as well as parliamentary and judicial oversight with respect to both forces.

The government that took office in August 2007 has an opportunity – while international troops maintain basic security and the UN offers assistance – to conduct a genuine reform of the security sector, drawing on the experiences of other post-conflict countries. But international goodwill is not inexhaustible – there are already signs of donor fatigue – so it needs to act fast.

For its part, the international community must do a better job of coordinating its support to the security sector and responding to a Timorese-owned reform process. For example, the UN police who screen and mentor the local force should be better trained and supervised, and more responsive to feedback from their Timorese colleagues. The departure of the lead UN official on security sector reform at the end of 2007 means that this issue, already sidelined during the 2007 elections, risks further delay.

Another layer of future discord is added by the presence of Australian troops (catalogued here by the Australian Department of Defense).

How can someone believe that a few more hundred of incompetent Australian military and federal police officers, known by their lack of respect for Timorese institutions, target of complaints and criminal processes for disrespecting and disobedience to the Timorese judiciary, will address whatever problem there is?

Generally, there are a mixture of opinions in the above-quoted blog, indicating a plurality of local sentiments.

Indeed, Australia's foreign minister, Stephen Smith, has taken a hard stance against Dili's policy toward Reinado, signaling a willingness to use force. How this hardline stance matches an unstable environment where public opinion is fractious is crucial.

I'll eat any creature—and almost any «food» with roots and leaves. After all these years in Busan eating raw sea creatures with only soju and hot chili pepper paste to protect me, my only fear is pulling a tapeworm the length of my intestines out of my belly button. So, I have no love for whale-watchers. Yet, too, I don't want my favorite snacks to disappear in sludge and over-harvesting by shortsighted middlemen and corrupt politicians!

Anyway, I think the Australians and Japanese should fight fair!

Garrett DeOrio and ken Worsley both eulogize 2007 and make predictions for 2008 in Seijigiri #38: A Review of Politics in Japan in 2007. I hope 2008 offers TPR a larger audience for what is a very stimulating medium on a topic few westerners understand, or get an opportunity to tackle given language and cultural obstacles.

What really caugh my attention, though, were three discussions in this panoramic hour-long chat: DPRK and the abduction issue; Sino-Japanese disagreements about gas exploration; and, comfort women.

On the DPRK issue, both DeOrio and Worsley knock the ham-fisted Abe administration for marginalizing Japan diplomatically within the Six-Party format by pushing the abduction issue too far, and nearly causing a breech with the US. I think Pyongyang has managed to divide all parties in the talks very effectively, so Japan's situation is not unique, just the circumstances are special. The key is Seoul's decision, under the new Lee administration, on which partner to choose. If not Pyongyang, ROK could follow with Beijing or the US, at which point Japan should fall in line. The key to a solution lies with numbers, not principle.

On the gas exploration issue, it's interesting that the two divided about China, and it's sort of an indication of how no one knows how to deal with Beijing. One one hand, it's argued that Japan should improve its diplomatic game by playing the middle with Australia between the US and China, to create a regional, multilateral framework for dealing with a panoply of issues. On the other hand, Beijing prefers to take its diplomacy bilaterally. I think an international settlement on the driling would be a pleasant surprise, but that not being likely, I think Japan might have to back down, unless there's a Chinese economic downturn.

Finally, on comfort women, the Abe administration made itself look silly by denying the claims of comfort women. I think historical arguments are both unfair to japanese voters born after WW2 (and the US and Canadian resolutions transparently laughable), and proxies for the sort of Sino-Japanese issues like gas exploration. It's like code that reveals where the power is flowing between Japan and whomever is using WW2 history to criticize it. With that said, how the Abe administration framed the comfort women issue about as incompetently as possible. It's the leading reason Japan doesn't deserve diplomatic rewards, like a UNSC seat, because it simply is not competent enough.

A lot more stuff in the discussion, so listen and comment...

At the moment, Australia's new PM, Kevin Rudd, has limited his conceivable plans for East Asia to the naming of a Chinese-Australian female minister for climate change (splitting the environment portfolio with former Midnight Oil lead singer, Peter Garrett). But, speculation has raced around the blogosphere about more substantive changes.

Overall, E.J. Dionne, Jr. argues that Rudd is a trend-setter:

Rudd's balancing act provides a model for center-left parties that also points to the tensions they confront once in power. Rudd won as a self-described "economic conservative" who would tightly manage the nation's budget. But he also won thanks to an activated trade union movement fighting for its life in seeking to overthrow Howard's workplace rules.   

IHT's Raymond Bonner believes Australia under Rudd will continue to improve relations with Beijing. Yet, with the same resume in hand and a 2004 interview, Kerim Friedman and David on Formosa (via The View from Taiwan) have a polite disagreement about PM Kevin Rudd's future significance for Taiwan.

Emily O'Keefe (via TPR) argues that PM Rudd will challenge Japan to update Australian-Japan relations.

While fundamental policies should remain the same, Rudd will have a deeper understanding of Australia's relationship with the U.S. and Japan, and will look to use this to develop more constructive political and economic relations with China, Drysdale said.

But one area that Drysdale predicts will be affected by the change in government is Japan and Australia's free-trade negotiations.

"I think Rudd will pursue this more vigorously than Howard," he said.

Not only will Rudd refuse any deal that does not reduce agricultural trade barriers, he will be looking for a "much broader than traditional" agreement that would further Australia's interests on a multilateral level, he said.

"There is a clear understanding in the Rudd policy group that what Australia needs out of the negotiation of a new agreement with Japan is something more innovative . . . consistent with opening up the region and in multilateral negotiations over time," he said.

On India, Labor's uranium policy looks set to scuttle a smooth relationship with India. Yet, Japan Observer is optimistic about the prospects for an Australian-Japanese alliance to coax US re-engagement in the region.

With Fûkûdá Yasuo replacing Mr. Abe, and the Mandarin-speaking Mr. Rudd replacing Mr. Howard, the "deputy sheriff," the "quad" may be no more. Both Mr. Fûkûdá and Mr. Rudd seem to believe that their power is best spent promoting cooperation in Asia, not deepening security cooperation among democracies conveniently located on all sides of China.

The Economist concurs, but is more cautious about Japan's role in the new partnership:

Most of all, where Mr Abe—and Junichiro Koizumi immediately before him—believed that a stronger Japan meant, above all, one rooted in the American alliance, some of his advisers think Mr Fûkûdá should show that Japan is capable of more independent action as a way to enhance its prestige and protect its interests.

Japan, they say, should lead the creation of regional mechanisms that would ease territorial disputes, enhance military transparency and boost confidence among neighbours—think an Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Asia. Distracted elsewhere, the Bush administration has shown little interest in such ideas.

What then of the much-touted arc of freedom and prosperity? In truth, democratic values were always merely the cover for a hard-nosed desire to confront China's rise in Asia, which is Japan's abiding foreign-policy concern. The Fûkûdá doctrine could easily be adapted to address the same concern, but by aiming to entice rather than contain China.

To judge by his own foreign-policy pronouncements, Mr Rudd, a speaker of Chinese, would approve, while America can see it would be better off if its chief Asian ally had more respect, even influence, in the region. For Japan, then, the same hard-nosed goal, the same allies, but different and possibly more subtle methods—always assuming, of course, that Japan's dysfunctional politics do not sink this government before its arc has a chance to rise.

I'm afraid US engagement with any part of the world is a far-off prospect, but I agree globalization needs to balance geopolitics. So, it looks like it's up to Kevin Rudd to make it happen.

Philip Brasor writes a great piece about the conflict between the market and agricultural traditions and government trade policies. With only a change, from «rice» to «maize», a farmer in Iowa could feel a Japanese farmer's pain.

Though they paid lip service to the farmers' hard work, some of the studio participants wondered out loud if there wasn't something stone-headed about government support for rice. University of Tokyo Professor Masayoshi Honma said that the main reason the government promotes rice consumption right now is that rice is the only crop that holds up the self-sufficiency rate, as low as it is.

In response, the farmers' position in advocating the continuation of government protection through tariffs and subsidies became increasingly defensive. They said that if the Japanese rice market collapsed, the rural environment would deteriorate, small communities would disappear, and Japan's connection with its agrarian past would cease to exist. While these developments would certainly be dire, they have little to do with the problem's source, which is that Japanese people don't want to eat as much rice any more.

The government's rice protection policy was formulated during World War II, when the citizenry was starving. After the war, production increased and rice was pretty much all there was. The quality wasn't very good, but everybody ate it for breakfast, lunch and dinner. Consumption peaked in 1963, when the average Japanese person ate five bowls a day. That statistic decreased to 3 1/2 bowls by 1978 and now stands at 2 1/2.

There's a simple reason for this: more choice. Japan's standard of living is among the highest in the world. Japanese people can eat anything they want, and they famously do. There is no reason to eat as much rice as they once did, or any at all, for that matter; but as the arguments on the NHK program showed, rice has a powerful hold on the Japanese imagination.

Halfway through the three-hour marathon, the moderator put this question to the studio participants and the viewers: Should Japanese people eat more rice? Again, the voters at home overwhelmingly sided with the farmers: yes, they should. But a number of people in the studio took issue with the question itself.

«Why can't I eat anything I want?» asked one student, even though he said he ate more rice than the national average. And Honma seemed offended. «That question is pointless,» he said. Whether or not Japanese people «should» eat rice was irrelevant to the debate, since you couldn't do anything about people's preferences in a free society.

There's no PR in the world can compete against free choice and affluence.

Regarding US relations with marginal players in East and South Asia, such as the Koreas, Taiwan, and the ASEAN states, according to PINR's Mohan Malik, the centrality of Indo-PRC rivalry should be considered:

An internal study on India undertaken in mid-2005 (with inputs from China's South Asia watchers such as Cheng Ruisheng, Ma Jiali, Sun Shihai, Rong Ying, Shen Dingli, among others) at the behest of the Chinese leadership's «Foreign Affairs Cell» recommended that Beijing take all measures to maintain its current strategic leverage (in terms of territory, membership of the exclusive Permanent Five and Nuclear Five clubs); diplomatic advantages (special relationships, membership of regional and international organizations); and economic lead over India. Although the evidence is inconclusive, the most plausible deduction is that this internal re-assessment of India lies behind the recent hardening of China's stance on the territorial dispute and a whole range of other issues in China-India relations.

The Chinese are concerned that the U.S.-India nuclear deal and related agreements would bring about a major shift in the power balance in South Asia that is currently tilted in China's favor. The recent strengthening of China's strategic presence in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and overtures to the Maldives should, therefore, be seen against this backdrop. Despite protestations to the contrary from India and the United States that New Delhi is unwilling and unlikely to play the role of a closely aligned U.S. surrogate such as Japan or Britain, China's Asia strategy is based upon the premise that maritime powers such as the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India would eventually form an informal quadrilateral alliance to countervail continental China.

As a commentary in Huanqiu Shibao noted:

«The fact is that Japan, Australia, and India are respectively located at China's northeast, southeast, and southwest, and all are Asian powers, while U.S. power in the Pacific is still unchallengeable. Hence, should the «alliance of values» concentrating military and ideological flavors in one body take shape, it will have a very great impact on China's security environment.»

From Beijing's perspective, the responsibility for this «negative development» lies solely at New Delhi's door. In their writings, Chinese analysts seem upset over their southern neighbor's all-consuming passion to become «a big power,» and see the nuclear deal as its key to unlocking the door leading to the big league in world politics.

As a Renmin Ribao commentary noted in August:

The U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement has strong symbolic significance for India in achieving its dream of a powerful nation?In recent years, it introduced and implemented a 'Look-East' policy and joined most regional organizations in the East Asian region?In fact, the purpose of the United States to sign a civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement with India is to enclose India into its global partners' camp, so as to balance the forces of Asia [read, China]. This fits in exactly with India's wishes.

Once the nuclear deal crosses all the «big four hurdles» (opposition from pro-Chinese Communist parties in India; negotiations on I.A.E.A. safeguards; approval by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (N.S.G.); and its passage by the U.S. Congress), Beijing believes that it would end the nuclear symmetry between New Delhi and Islamabad (or, de-hyphenate the sub-continental rivals) and put India on par with nuclear China (re-hyphenate China with India).

This, from Beijing's perspective, is quite disconcerting because a major objective of China's South Asia policy has been to perpetuate parity between India and Pakistan. Add to this India's military exercises with the U.S., Japan and Australia, support for the concept of «concert of democracies,» and attempts to establish strategic ties with countries that fall within China's sphere of influence (Mongolia, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Myanmar) - all of these reinforce Beijing's fears about its containment. However, despite its strong disapproval of a pact that would narrow the power gap between India and China, Beijing would not want to take a stance that pushes India further into Washington's camp. Most likely, Beijing would use its N.S.G. membership to further its own and its allies' interests by:

Using the «double standards» argument to question Washington's commitment to non-proliferation goals in light of its decision to back India's nuclear industry while opposing the right to nuclear energy for Iran and Pakistan;

Insisting that any changes to the N.S.G. guidelines to accommodate the deal must not be «country [i.e., India]-specific» but «universal criteria-based» so that «all countries [read, Pakistan] can benefit from the peaceful use of atomic energy under the I.A.E.A. safeguards.» This formulation, outlined by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, would pave the way for the Chinese construction of the Chashma III and IV nuclear reactors in Pakistan;

Using the deal to extract major concessions from Washington, including an end to the arms embargo and the lifting of bans on high-tech dual-use technology exports to China;

Seeking new assurances that U.S.-India ties are not related to any «contain China» strategy.

The fact of the matter is that China and India are locked in a classic security dilemma: one country sees its own actions as self-defensive, but the same actions appear aggressive to the other. India feels the need to take counter-balancing measures and launch certain initiatives to stay independent of China - such as the «Look East» policy - which are perceived as challenging and threatening in China. Like China, India is actively seeking to reintegrate its periphery with the framework of regional economic cooperation. Like China, India seeks greater international status and influence commensurate with its growing economic power.

However, like any other established status quo great power, China wants to ensure that its position remains strong vis-�-vis challenger India for strategic, economic and geopolitical reasons. Through closer strategic ties with India's neighboring countries, China is warning India not to take any counter-measures to balance Beijing's growing might.

The implication from Dr. Mohan's argument is, that the Washington needs to consider decisions, that strengthen the quadrilateral relationship between Australia, India, Japan, and the US, and do not weaken containment at the weak points in the Koreas, Taiwan, and among the ASEAN states, including Myanmar. Domestic reform in Myanmar is probably impossible, since both Beijing and New Dehli view Myanmar's contiguity with Tibet troubling. But, it also means Washington should avoid actions, that alienate marginal players, like the Koreas and Taiwan, into a pro-PRC position, and instead opt for their neutrality.