Left Flank

Is proximity a more important factor than acclimation for Olympic athletes seeking a training advantage? Of course, humans aren't horses (and some Swiftians would find that fact depressing), but then all those concerns about smoggy, humid air transcend species boundaries.

As of Thursday, 15 foreign countries had decided to send a total of 499 athletes to South Korea. The teams are to train in some dozen disciplines in Seoul, North Chungcheong Province and Jeju. Egypt has agreed with the Korea Olympic Committee to send about 40 athletes to South Korea in March. Bulgaria and Algeria are considering setting up training camps for all members of their Olympic teams here.

A total of 11 local governments are trying to attract foreign Olympic teams. The Korea Tourism Organization has published a guidebook on training camps and mailed copies to the national Olympic committees in foreign countries.

Japan has reportedly attracted about 20 foreign Olympic teams. According to the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, 150 Swedish athletes in 19 events will train in the city of Fûkûøká. Osaka has agreed with the British swimming team to supply a long-term training camp. Hokkaido, where the G8 summit for 2008 will be held, has invited the ambassadors from the G8 countries, and Hokkaido Governor Harumi Takahashi handed them promotional pamphlets.

"Yellowy" Seoul, I guess, would count as a suitable substitute for Beijing in the spring and early summer.

I've never been a fan of Tibetan Buddhism or the Dalai Lama, but I like how he makes Beijing look silly (even if that makes dealing with it difficult for the US).

China has condemned the Dalai Lama's latest proposals, saying similar remarks earlier this month "violate religious rituals and historic conventions".

Critics say that is ironic coming from an atheistic government long accused of suppressing Tibetan Buddhism.

The Dalai Lama has floated numerous proposals for his succession, including one for Tibetans somehow to hold a referendum on abolishing his office altogether. But, Beijing, like a conspirator trapped in a bad plot, is stuck holding onto tradition.

Ambassador Christopher Hill discusses his last gig in Beijing, and there's not much controversial to add - except about his love for the Red Sox - until the last few minutes. Hill endorses the argument, that the Koreans did not play a role in their own division. And then, he talks briefly about why the US has abandoned its previous diplomatic strategy, CVID or bust.

Two major events concerning the Korean peninsula hit the public in the last few days, the Second DPRK-ROK Summit and the latest installment of the Six Party talks in Beijing. As usual the ball is in Pyongyang's end of the court, and even I won't place bets, at least not on one prediction.

In Pyongyang, not even ROK President Roh Moo-hyun can get respect (and, who's really complaining?). During the course of the media bomb, I was concerned about the inordinate attention on economic issues. Seeing Chung Mong-koo in Pyongyang on South Korean TV made me wonder if the entire reason the ROK Supreme Court exonerated him was, so he could grab his share of loot from the North Koreans.

Among the top three business topics expected for discussion - natural resource developments, roadway and railway distribution system expansions and dockyard construction - Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group is said to be interested in building railroad cars through its shipping affiliate Glovis, and also measure the feasibility of SOC businesses, while POSCO showed interest in forestation.

Although company officials said forestation is just a possibility, as the steel maker has shown its interest in securing carbon credit overseas, industry insiders say the opportunity will be advantageous for POSCO if cooperation comes through.

And as speculations rose that SK Group may be considering communication and energy projects in the North, company officials said plans are open for review if the right offer is made.

LG and Samsung, which are said to be mulling over their specialty areas of electronics, seem to be in the same scouting stages as others.

I think the first piece I wrote on Korea was about Samsung turning the DPRK into a giant industrial park. If Graph 5 of the «Declaration for Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity» are any indication, it seems Chairman Chung's time was wasted.

From what can be gleaned of their substance, talks between the two leaders on October 3rd only emphasised the distance still to travel. Mr Kim may be willing to squeeze the outside world for aid?but on his terms. So Mr Roh?s offer of what amounted to a Marshall Plan to transform North Korea?s economy in pursuit of Chinese-style liberalisation met with blank dismissal. Mr Kim does not even like a showcase industrial park at Kaesong, where South Korean manufacturers employ cheap North Korean labour, to be described as a model of successful ?reform?. Once again, Mr Kim showed how he puts his own survival over that of the North Koreans he brutalises.

Yet a joint agreement was announced on October 4th, something Mr Roh will be able to take home with relief. Gone were his hopes for great involvement in the North, but there was agreement to allow freight trains into Kaesong. There was a recommitment to help families divided by the civil war to meet (though a word from Mr Kim is all it would take to solve that sad problem). Talks will be sought with America and China to put a formal end to the civil war (though peace on the peninsula, these countries are likely to argue, can only come after its denuclearisation). Steps were promised (as, fruitlessly, they were at the 2000 summit) to reduce military tensions: defence ministers would meet, while a disputed western maritime area would see its fisheries jointly mined.

And, it's even more disconcerting to read DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Choi Su-hon at the UN say, that «...there was no need for the UN as a go-between in inter-Korean affairs, as inter-Korean dialogue is 'going well.'» I hope dialogue is much more multi-voiced, and includes as many «go-between's» as possible.

Vice Minister Choi also called the latest agreement in Beijing, agreeing to the disablement of Yongbyon by the end of the year, a «courageous decision». It remains for Pyongyang to manifest its courage. But, there are plenty of other ways the enthusiasm could get punctured.

At the request of the other five parties to the nuclear deal, the United States will lead disablement activities and provide initial funding. It will lead an expert group to North Korea, probably next week, to prepare for disablement.

North Korea also reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how, the statement issued in Beijing added.

But the statement skirted the issue of when the country would be removed from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list, one of Pyongyang's key demands, saying only Washington would fulfill its commitments to begin that process in parallel with action on the ground.

Last week, Bush authorized $25 million in aid for the North, which would cover the cost of up to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

China and South Korea have delivered initial fuel shipments and Russia is expected to do so too. But Japan has indicated it will not participate unless North Korea addresses the issue of Japanese citizens the North abducted in the 1970s and 1980s.

And, to be fair, there is substantive opposition to the entire process.

Nowhere, however, in the new agreement was what Reagan-era diplomats called a «third basket» ? a set of exchanges and commitments regarding how the communist regime treats its citizens, a feature of the Helsinki accords first signed in 1975 by 35 nations, including America and the Soviet Union.

A third-basket negotiation was the hope of a left-right coalition of human rights and religious leaders who on May 25 warned Secretary of State Rice that it «would oppose the provision of significant financial assistance to North Korea without progress on human rights issues.» The coalition included Human Rights Watch, the Southern Baptist Convention, the National Association of Evangelicals, Freedom House, and the George Soros-funded Open Society Institute.

One of the organizers of the coalition on North Korean Human Rights, Michael Horowitz, yesterday said the denuclearization agreement would lead to war. «This policy has increased the risk of war on the Korean peninsula. If we give Kim Jong Il money for his weapons programs, the future will bring more weapons not fewer weapons,» Mr. Horowitz said. «I fear that if this deal goes through, Kim Jong Il will seek to blackmail the world in less than two years with what may be the world's largest chemical and biological stockpile and missiles capable of delivering them.» Mr. Horowitz pointed out that when North Korea tested missiles last July, both Democrats and Republicans called for a military strike.

«It is sad and ironic that President Bush, the most forceful advocate of North Korean human rights, has signed off on a policy approach that seeks to legitimize and finance the Kim Jong Il regime in exchange for mere weapons promises on its part.»

Mr. Bush yesterday praised the agreement and said North Korea would provide a «complete and correct» accounting of «all its nuclear programs, nuclear weapons programs, materials, and any proliferation activity.» Mr. Bush also said the new agreement would «help secure the future peace and prosperity of the Northeast Asian region.»

Mr. Lefkowitz yesterday said human rights and national security are two complementary objectives in the administration's North Korea policy. «It is a false choice to say the United States policy should focus either on nuclear security or human rights; indeed, the two go hand and hand. We have very serious imminent interests in North Korea disarming,» he said.

There is also this choice Roh quote:

The talks left Roh with an impression that progress remains hindered by Kim's deep suspicions.

«North Korea still has some skepticism about the South and doesn't trust it enough,» the South Korean president was quoted as saying at a Wednesday luncheon after his first two-hour session of talks with Kim. «We need greater effort to demolish a wall of mistrust.»

Roh said the North Korean leader was suspicious about terms such as «openness» and «reform,» suggesting that he sees any rapid move toward Chinese-style economic reforms as a threat to his autocratic rule.

Mistrust also was evident in observers' reactions to the nuclear deal struck in Beijing. Many experts raised concerns over whether the deal would fully disable the North's nuclear facilities, or merely leave them easy to reassemble.

One can learn a lot through a child's eyes.

Alright, no Left Flank post would be complete without criticism of the Bush administration, even as it is praised. Ed Morrissey is refreshingly pragmatic, when he argues that «...A few million dollars to ensure security is a small price to pay, and besides, we can then ensure that the facilities really cannot be reused for a very long time.» Dilworth at KUS puts it a little more colorfully than I would, and Richardson is skeptical.

As my wife often says in these times, Korean events lurch two steps forward, and then one step back. Is this the progress, or the reaction? Let's meet again on December, 31!

Of the three most likely options - the protests gradually fading, a peaceful revolution to topple the regime and a harsh crackdown - so far the latter seems, sadly, the most likely.

The Economist's third option seems to be the verdict for Myanmar. As the Burma expert in the second Reuters video above puts it, it's a test of wills between the military and monks. The monks have, according to one report, now lost one and several others injured.

As Seth Mydans argues, Myanmar's junta has few options, as far as its «hunkered down, delusional, paranoid» mindset is concerned. But, what I think will really seal the fate of the monks, and Myanmar's population as a whole, is the disagreement displayed by Britain's Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman. Without consistently unified pressure on Beijing and Yangon, Myanmar's military is fully capable of suppressing a revolt, even if it spreads across the country, before the world loses interest in a few days. The LA Times article also points out, that this latest round of protests started with a petrol price hike. The junta's final response could very well be to rescind that hike, to divide its opposition.

I've argued before, and I think this is the problem in Myanmar most fundamentally, that «geography is destiny». There's just a conspicuous lack of hard-headedness on this issue, and Jon Swift (via Captain's Quarters) is probably right not to care. What can the US really do? Myanmar is situated between the Indian subcontinent and the troubled peninsula extending from China to Singapore. Myanmar is hardly a unified nation itself, full of restive minorities. India and Thailand on either isde of the troubled «statelet» are seemingly very quiet, possibly deferring to China. ASEAN's foreign policy sounds like Japan's Foreign Ministry. I don't foresee much help for the Burmese arriving.

Lastly (as I'm looking for a silver lining) David Lague has probably the most optimistic argument to make: China plays the field in Myanmar, is concerned about a violent upheaval, would like to be rid of the junta, and plans for a future where Myanmar is ruled by the opposition. But, that's a far cry from encouraging change. Therein lies the second problem, which I think, is most amenable here. The present is bad, but the future is unknown, and not necessarily bright for Myanmar.

But, Joshua Kurlantzick at TNR argues it is not enough, as police in Yangon fired shots over protesting monks' heads and arrested over 300.

The reason, as in 1988, is China.

Many Western powers believe that China, the most important foreign actor in Burma, can be convinced to withdraw its blanket backing for the junta. In a British cable earlier this year obtained by The New Republic, British diplomats argue «China is closer than any other country to Burma's military regime ... China's interests had changed in Burma. They [are] investing heavily and want to see a return on their investment ... There may be an opportunity to persuade China that it is in their interest to see a stable and developing Burma.» Indeed, some of this week's Burma protests have signaled popular anger at China as well, with demonstrators pointedly going by the Chinese embassy; several Burmese previously told me of kidnappings of Chinese businesspeople in the north of the country. Recently, according to AFP, senior Chinese official Tang Jiaxuan offered a gentle rebuke to the Burmese junta, telling its foreign minister that «China sincerely hopes that Myanmar can bring stability back to its domestic situation.»

Yet beyond these words, China has done little. It still has not thrown its support for tougher U.N. action against Burma. Unlike in North Korea, where China cut off some types of aid when trying to pressure Pyongyang to come to the bargaining table, Beijing has taken no such apparent actions towards the Burmese. Meanwhile, placing so much trust in China conceals the fact that there are still steps other nations can take on Burma. India and Thailand could at least demonstrate greater concern for the protestors, signaling to the Burmese junta there might be some consequences from neighbors if they crack down. The U.S. could appoint a special coordinator on Burma, thus placing more pressure on the U.N.'s coordinator and on China. While meeting with Chinese officials the White House also could more publicly call for specific actions from Beijing on Burma.

Apparently convinced they'd risk no serious sanction, in September 1988 the Burmese military stepped in, staging a kind of auto-coup. In the course of suppressing protests, Burmese troops killed as many as three-thousand people. Today, similar fears are rising. More soldiers reportedly are taking positions in Rangoon, and the regime reportedly is recruiting criminals, possibly to infiltrate protests and cause havoc, a tactic utilized in 1988. Burmese opposition radio has reported rumors that senior junta leader Than Shwe has ordered that authorities can use violence to squash demonstrations. Twenty years on, 1988 looks nearer than ever.

After calling attention to Beijing's footprint in Myanmar, the Christian Science Monitor calls on China to do the right thing:

China does itself no favors by associating itself - and thus implicitly equating itself - with such a regime. There is a clear difference between the many regimes in the world that deny their citizens democracy and the smaller number that deny their citizens everything. China belongs in the first category, while Burma belongs in the second. Regimes such as China's may deserve sustained criticism, but regimes such as Burma's deserve immediate intervention.

China has already gained global plaudits and prestige by withdrawing its blanket diplomatic support for North Korea. It is high time to do the same with Burma. Such a move would mute external criticism, not embolden it. (And Burma's lucrative natural resources will still be there for China to tap into when the junta eventually falls from power.)

Until Chinese leaders start distinguishing their own relatively successful regime from the unmitigated disaster that is Burma's, the human-rights protesters on their doorsteps can hardly be blamed for not discerning the difference.

There is that hopefulness that floats on the air in these events. That spirit is Clarissa Pinkola Estes, even composing a rhapsody to Aung Sang Suu Kyi.

Though some accuse the monks of being pawns of extremist groups, and some others accuse the monks of being hypocritical because some of their leaders sometimes ceremonially «sit in golden chairs» (each temple often has chairs given by the populace that are anywhere from simple to fancy) it is unlikely that such accusation hold much sway. More sturdy is that this could be China?s chance, despite multiple motives, to show how humane they can be by staying the Burmese government?s violent reactions to the protesters. It could be a chance for the United States to stand up for a people who dearly seem to want a rock-solid democracy instead of a mock democracy?as their government keeps averring they have a stepped plan for a democracy? some day. It would be a chance for the Burmese government to take down its armored bunker mentality and become a governing body instead of an exploitative one.

But, Myanmar's rulers have two other powerful weapons, 400,000 soldiers and one idea.

The Myanmar junta blames foreign economic sanctions for the nation?s poverty, and foreign meddling for the persistence of political opposition, including the current demonstrations.

The junta is led by a tough and taciturn military man, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, 74, a frequent, stolid, uniformed presence on the front pages of government-controlled newspapers.

(...)

General Than Shwe gave a taste of his worldview at a national day celebration in March in which he said, «Judging from lessons of history, it is certain that powerful countries wishing to impose their influence on our nation will make any attempt in various ways to undermine national unity.»

He vowed to «crush, hand in hand with the entire people, every danger of internal and external destructive elements obstructing the stability and development of the state.»

Against all that, China, soldiers, and xenophobia, the monks have an uphill battle.