Left Flank

The consistent chest-thumping, conveniently nostalgic security meme fixating on «cold war» dominating the question of dealing with Russia in the wake of its «August war» with Georgia annoys me to no end. After a period in 1991-2001 when both Democrats and Republicans bungled devising a post-Cold War security policy, and then a diet-busting feeding frenzy from 9/11 to now, Russia is not a signal for permanent war.

After offering how much Russian corporations and its military lost in its August war, Anders Aslund argues for a post-Cold War economic attack on Moscow.

First, the EU should adopt a common energy policy, imposing the rules of the energy charter - such as transparency, equal investment rights and third-party access to pipelines - on Russia. A united EU has bargaining power as all Russian pipelines outside the former Soviet Union go to Europe.

Second, the European Commission should force Gazprom to unbundle production and transportation to break up its monopolies. Why does the EC pursue antitrust suits against Microsoft but not Gazprom? It would have to divest its pipeline network outside Russia's borders, abandon blatant price discrimination and end its planned construction of the Nord Stream and South Stream gas pipelines.

Third, the west should investigate Russian top officials and their trading companies for money-laundering.

Fourth, Russia's big state companies habitually woo politicians in other countries. Gerhard Schröder, the former German chancellor, is just Gazprom's most prominent catch. Western ethical rules for contacts with Russian state companies need to be tightened and the EU should establish American rules for the disclosure of income anybody earns from lobbying. Unethical behaviour is best fought with increased transparency.

Finally, if western intelligence agencies possess evidence of any corruption by Mr Putin or his cronies they should publish it. Nothing would undermine him more in Russian eyes than verified facts about corruption. Russia and its leaders are quite vulnerable, but to be effective the west needs to unite.

Well, screw that. Washington would have none of that, unless it's in the lead - and that means war.

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Dominique Moisi argues that Russia's recent invasion of Georgia is imperialistic, not cold war, behavior.

The current crisis in the Caucasus does not mark the return of the Cold War, nor is it likely to mark the start of open warfare between Russia and the West; it is, more simply, the return of the traditional imperialism practiced by the Russian Empire more than a century ago.

China is, with the exception of Tibet, a satisfied and confident status-quo empire. Russia by contrast is a revisionist imperialist power, whose lack of self-confidence is returning to haunt the world.

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And, nominations for top prize for inconsiderateness: Moscow, after marring the opening of the Olympics, asks for Beijing's blessing in the Caucasus.

«Russia's main aim is to get support from the [Shanghai Cooperation O]rganization for its military action and approval in one form or another for recognizing South Ossetian independence,» an analyst in Moscow for the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, Yevgeny Volk, said. «It is clear that Russia is using it as a counterweight to the West in the conflict and its recognition of South Ossetia.»

While Russia wants diplomatic recognition from members of the group, Mr. Volk said such a decision for countries like China and India, which have separatist regions of their own, would amount to «chopping the branch they sit on.»

The Shanghai organization in recent months has condemned an attempt by Taiwan to seek greater international recognition and unrest in Tibet.

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Jaime Metzl sums up neatly what I've felt for a while, but with both the Beijing Olympics and the Georgian-Russian episode all the more urgently, in one metaphor: it's another «Sputnik moment.

The Beijing Olympics could be remembered as a new «Sputnik moment» for the US, inspiring the country to meaningfully face the music of a changing world. But America can make it so only by recognizing the great challenges it faces and taking bold steps towards addressing them, at home and with allies abroad.

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FT's Chrystia Freeland and Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff of the German Marshall Fund on the Online Newshour highlights an aspect of the situation in Georgia, that money has as much to do with the tanks rolling through South Ossetia as does realist ideology.

Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff: So there's no way to work around Russia. At the same time, we have to change their strategic calculus in acting.

(...)

Chrystia Freeland: Well, I think Thomas was absolutely right to emphasize the WTO. And while it is certainly true that the petro-power of Russia today makes it a very different player, a very different actor from the Russia of the late '80s and the early '90s, which was really impoverished, I do think that Russia's integration into the global economy is also a potentially very powerful point of leverage.

One of the Russian oligarchs recently said to me that the tragedy of Putin is he wants to rule like Stalin but live like Abramovich, the wealthy Russian businessman who now lives in London and owns a soccer team and has sort of a fabulous, plutocratic lifestyle.

And I think that's a really good way of understanding a large part of the Russian elite right now. They want to flex their muscles like neo-imperialists, but they also want admission to all of the Western clubs, including the nightclubs and the fabulous homes on the French Riviera.

Those are some things that we can start taking away. And we can start saying, «If you are going to behave like an authoritarian state, we are not going to accept your leaders and your elites.»

Gwen Ifill: Does the -- let me just follow up with you on that. Does the United States' democracy agenda, which allied itself so closely with Georgia, for instance, does it make it more difficult for these conversations to happen for threats even to have any weight?

CHRYSTIA FREELAND: No, I don't think so. I think the democracy agenda is absolutely correct. I mean, I think the democracy agenda was very wrongly handled in Georgia itself and clearly in Iraq, as well, but actually a lot of this fight is about democracy.

We have been tending to see it as a question of Russia's strategic interests, Russian imperialism, but a lot of what is going on is the Russian government being concerned about its own regime and being very frightened that its efforts to build a more authoritarian state could be imperiled if ordinary Russians, especially richer, middle-class Russians, see prosperous democracies like Georgia and like Ukraine on its borders.

The rest of the discussion is moderate and revealing, instead of the straw-man realism the MSM continues to hustle.

Foreign Policy asks Clifford Kupchan, director for Europe and Eurasia at the Eurasia Group illuminates the debate about the Georgia-Russia clash.

FP: Are there any means with which Europe and the United States can punish Russia economically and politically now? Do you see that happening?

CK: We have very little leverage. The headline measures that you read about - throwing them out of the G-8, denying membership to the OECD, stopping WTO negotiations - won’t be very effective. Frankly, I don’t think the Russians really care about the G-8, and the WTO requires a bilateral agreement with Georgia, so that’s not likely.

There are steps we can take to push back, though. The Russians have a very proud elite. I think that over time the U.S. will curtail the number of bilateral meetings and some European countries will go along. «Ostracism» is too strong [a word]...[it’s more like] «selective avoidance.» No more military exercises. I think the strongest measure, which could and maybe should be on the table, is a sober discussion of the run-up to the 2014 Sochi Olympics, which are a crown jewel in Russia’s planning.

We’re still in the early days, and the Untied States will, I think, help reconstruct Georgia will help reconstruct the Georgian security forces. We don’t know what the endgame is going to be yet, so I think jumping to conclusions on what the United States can and should is premature. But are there things we will do? Yes? Are there things we can do? Yes? Can we punish Russia economically? No. Are there things that would make Russia chafe at least somewhat? Yes. That’s my best answer.

Again, the Olympics will remain a political tool, not a symbol of peace.

Another prediction concerns the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.

FP: What does this mean for the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline? Is it effectively dead now?

CK: The chances before were slim to none. Now they’re nudging toward none. From economic to producer-country to environmental reasons, there’ve been tremendous problems over a decade in getting that line built. This does drive another nail into the chances for that line.

Ironically, PRC might be a beneficiary of BTC's demise, as hydrocarbons flow either through Russian pipes, or east. Perhaps we should be asking what Beijing might have known about the preparations for this episode.

I wouldn't have thought former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger would say it, and another former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, agreed, that it is possible for the US and Russia «...to go back to Cold War period and treat each other as adversaries...» It's like listening to arthritis inflame a nonagenarian's knee joints. Or, reading about «escalation dominance».

The long-term response, as CFR's Stephen Sestanovich argues, is to restore the credibility of a united American and European diplomatic strategy, as, in the immediate term, the US reads the riot act. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in The Grand Chessboard, argues that Russia has three bad choices in the post-Cold War period, and one good one. The Bush administration pushed Russia into one of the bad choices, recreating its near-abroad Soviet empire, as a result of American support for Georgia and Ukraine. The good choice is Russia's integration within Europe. Economic integration, not military confrontation, must be the long-term message.

Two talented commentators highlight the substance of this two-pronged strategy. Firstly, not only was Georgia's leadership suckered into attacking Russian troops for territory, but it lost the battle for cyberspace. As John Robb argues, Georgia should adopt a poison pill strategy.

Georgia's mistake, and it is a common one, is that it thought that connectivity to the global system (as well as the US) was a viable defense against a hostile Russian takeover. As a result, it became a vital cog in the BTC and a willing participant in the US adventure in Iraq. That defense proved mostly hollow. In short, the only real defense against hostile takeovers by aggressive corporate states is to make the cost of the acquisition too expensive for the acquirer. The way to do this is through the development of a poison pill: the intentional disruption of Russian energy pipelines...Global guerrilla methods, particularly cyber/physical disruption, compliment interconnection as part of a Micropower defense strategy.

Secondly, Western Europe needs to remind Russia of its problems, and offer assistance. «With the exception of oil prices, Russia has nothing to offer the world※it doesn’t make anything, it can’t produce much of value, its population is growing progressively older and sicker at an increasingly rate, and its political system is really collapsing if Putin can contract it in so short a time. Russia is a dying power, and like most dying powers it is lashing out in fury at its loss of prestige and power.»

Russia's lure was a cheap «Grozny-like» way to give Putin and Medvedev a full term of office without domestic political opposition and a chance to reform the Russian political arena permanently. It's predicated on the assurance that Russia's economy is sound. Now, Georgia and other EU states need to remind Moscow of the two-way street between consumers and producers. Bluster will only provoke retrenchment behind fortress walls. Moscow must understand its best destiny lies with Europe, not its own stars.