Left Flank

Matthew Lee pursues the question of which countries can aid Myanmar, by what the UN calls the "right to protect" (R2P). The Burmese case doesn't fall into the four categories, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, that would trigger R2P. That would rule out UN action. Mark Leon Goldberg, however, advocates a less rigorous criterion: "...the international community is permitted to violate the sovereignty of a country when that country is unwilling or unable to prevent mass atrocities from being visited upon its own citizens."

Although western-donated aid is mostly stymied by Burmese authorities, Chinese and Indian-donated aid has reached Myanmar, according to Lee's reporting. Spencer Ackerman confirms this willful obstructionism, and pleads for a solution, even by force. I think Lee is onto a pertinent issue: not R2P, but how states disburse aid.

...developments this week lead Inner City Press to wonder why China does not develop and publicize its own humanitarian machinery, its own Chinese Bernard Kouchner. It could fly aid into Yangon, and film itself doing it. It could say, "we don't need these Western NGOs, we'll do it ourselves." Supposedly China hired a U.S. public relations firm to burnish its image. Where are they? Then again, the Chinese mission has not done an on-camera stakeout interview outside the Council since October 2007.

On the other hand, or foot, at the Security Council stakeout after China's Amb. Liu said that China flew into Yangon "tents and money," one wag muttered, "And guns." Still another said that the French oil industry active in Myanmar ought to be delivering aid. We will continue to explore these issues.

There's a difference between France's hunger for limelight and PRC's quiet approach. Could this be the foundation of a Bolton-PRC alliance against UN empowerment explicit in R2P? I'm not comfortable with the notion of world government, but that doesn't rule out governance. There needs to be accountability somewhere, whether it's Beijing's responsibility or aid NGOs.

Both conservatives and progressives are criticizing the Bush administration for its continued support of Pakistan's embattled president, Pervez Musharraf, and the same could be directed at Republican presidential candidate, John McCain.

Cato Institute advises the Bush administration to stop the personal touch.

Politically, the United States will have to branch out to civilian leaders other than Musharraf in order to maintain some semblance of political stability. Militarily, to prevent the army's gradual erosion, the United States must continue giving aid to Islamabad with strict oversight and the assurance that such funding is being used against insurgents and not against long-time rival India.

The Center for American Progress is slightly less diplomatic.

The Bush administration continues to demonstrate a shocking tone deafness and incompetence when it comes to U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Just recently, the White House press secretary stated that it was too early to tell whether elections had weakened Musharraf's power. In even more disturbing remarks, she continued: "I think what President Musharraf has shown is an ability to provide for the country a chance to be confident in their government."

Furthermore, sources in Islamabad tell us that the administration is asking the PPP to explore forming a coalition government with PML-Q rather than to reach out to former prime minister Sharif's PML-N. In short, the Bush administration may be trying to keep Musharraf in the game and sideline Sharif. The Bush administration has been nervous about Sharif because of his historical closeness to the religious parties in Pakistan, yet sidelining the PML-N could be potentially destabilizing for Pakistan as it controls the heartland of Pakistan through control of the Provincial Assembly in Punjab.

The Bush administration needs to let Pakistan's political parties do their own parliamentary horse-trading without U.S. pressure, but we worry that the administration has refused to learn the lessons of its failed policies in Pakistan. Its efforts to negotiate a deal between President Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto prior to her assassination served to delegitimize her for many Pakistanis, making her a greater target for anti-American extremists in Pakistan.

The administration's consistent over-reliance on President Musharraf emboldened an authoritarian figure who has weakened the nation's independent judiciary and media, making the United States appear to be a force against democracy and the Pakistani people. What's more, U.S. policy has done little to counter the strengthening militant groups in Pakistan. If anything, the administration's ham-handed policies have only inflamed a fragile political and security environment in the country.

Meanwhile, Juan Cole warns that a McCain administration will do no better with Pakistan (as well as defending Democratic presidential candidate, Barack Obama).

And, let's just consider the shaky dictator Pervez Musharraf, who just suffered a sharp rebuke from the Pakistani electorate, as I wrote about today in Salon.com. McCain appears never to have met a rightwing dictator he didn't like. McCain defends the dictator. Here is what McCain said about Musharraf late last December:

"Prior to Musharraf, Pakistan was a failed state," McCain said. "They had corrupt governments and they would rotate back and forth and there was corruption, and Musharraf basically restored order. So you're going to hear a lot of criticism about Musharraf that he hasn't done everything we wanted him to do, but he did agree to step down as head of the military and he did get the elections."

There's much more in this blog, so make it a priority!

After more than a century of relative stagnation, the economies of India and China have been growing at remarkably high rates over the past 25 years. In 1820 the two countries contributed nearly half of the world's income; by 1950, with the industrialized West having pulled away, their share had fallen to less than one-tenth. Today it is just less than one-fifth, and projections suggest that by 2025 it will rise to one-third. (In 2008 the World Bank is expected to issue revised numbers about cost of living in China and India, which may somewhat reduce these estimated income shares, both current and future).

That's a safe place to start.

What explains this strikingly rapid growth? The answer that continues to dominate public discussion in the United States runs along the following lines: decades of socialist controls and regulations stifled enterprise in India and China and led them to a dead end. A mix of market reforms and global integration finally unleashed their entrepreneurial energies. As these giants shook off their «socialist slumber,» they entered the «flattened» playing field of global capitalism. The result has been high economic growth in both countries and correspondingly large declines in poverty.

While India's performance has been substantial, China's has been truly dramatic. The particularly dramatic Chinese performance (like the earlier economic «miracles» in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) suggests, in the dominant narrative, that authoritarianism may be better than democracy for development—at least in its early stages. Regional economic decentralization provided local autonomy and incentives, and, even without democracy, led to broad-based local development. But the narrative warns that global capitalism has brought rising inequality, more in China than in India. The idea is that this may portend serious trouble for Chinese political stability, as China does not have the capability of democratic India to let off the steam of inequality-induced discontent.

But then the comments section goes downhill from there.

Of course, someone, like Wang Yong, will always say, "Why worry?"

The prospect of rapid development will be built on the country's weakness, that is, uneven development between the coastal east and the hinterland west. That [will allow for] China's keeping advantage in labor-intensive export while seeking industrial upgrading in the east. The double engines will give Chinese economy more power.

China has a development-oriented state system. China is still a one-party constitutional system. But the ruling party is very flexible and open to the demands of an increasingly pluralistic society. Economic freedom is more [assured]. The country is moving very quickly toward rule of law as well as rule by law, and a more investor-friendly environment will be more real in next several years. The country is able to sustain political and social stability while it is experiencing tremendous transition and uneven development.

It's a miracle!

Robin Koerner rightly highlights this Le Monde editorial on the India-PRC center in Asia.

"American temptation" thus works the strategic circles of New Delhi. But it would be a hasty mistake to forget Indian diplomatic history, in which non-alignment and an obsession with "strategic autonomy" are articles of faith. Coupled to India's deep distrust of Beijing, is an equally intense allergy to any American manipulation, which might seek to recruit India into an anti-Chinese strategic coalition. New Delhi does not want to be sucked into a conflict with Beijing by mechanically playing its role in a new alliance with Washington.

India fears becoming an instrument of a super power. This fear may explain the difficulties that have accrued in the last few months to the Indo-American civil nuclear cooperation agreement, which grants a few minor favors to New Delhi.

The Communists, who form part of the coalition presently in power, headed by the Congress Party, exploit this weakness. It weighs in by threatening to bring on a political crisis if the agreement is endorsed.

The wind has turned. There is a widespread feeling that the process of opening up to the West has gone too far. So much so that the Congress government of New Delhi must chill out its pro-American inclination.

There's another implication missing: Washington must also resist the temptation to offer Delhi too much, because India has little reason to reciprocate. The US goal should be Delhi's neutrality.

The Christian Science Monitor takes a critical glance at nuclear power, including a moment's pause for proliferation.

Governments must take a gimlet-eyed look at nuclear power. They must insist that operators have strong safety plans and adequate funding for the entire life cycle of facilities, from construction to proper decommissioning and storage of hazardous waste.

Nuclear power is a friend that bears close watching.

Yet, when discussing Tata's Nano, CSM's chief concern is profitability. The upside is poignant:

In principle, though, Mr. Tata is attempting to do something akin to what Henry Ford did with his Model T. Rather than waiting for more of the population to rise economically to the point where they can buy a car, he has used his company's engineering know-how to reinvent what a car can be. He hopes to turn a profit by sheer volume, tapping into those untapped, poorer reaches of the Indian market.

It is a quintessentially Indian idea. For decades, Indian technology has been focused more on practicality than pomp, hoping its use will help the country's poor. The country's space program, for example, has long concerned itself only with helping farmers and schools through weather and communications satellites.

Now, the country has a car to carry on the tradition, and its people below the famous-but-still-small upper-middle class are cheering. Says Professor Gupta: "These are the people who are really excited by it."

The image of hundreds of millions of Indians, and hundreds of millions of Southeast Asians, buying gas for their precious Nano, though, is not so precious. The "revolution" has passed India by, and now it's time to tackle the problems advocates of both petro-and-atomic-based power try to minimize: waste.

Let's be fair about the problem with humans using cheap energy.

1. Raise Hand, Now Lie!

"The Chinese authorities are really stepping up their anti-Dalai Lama rhetoric and propaganda," Anne Holmes, acting director of the Free Tibet Campaign, said in an e-mail on Sunday.

During a public meeting in December in Lithang in the Kham area of Gansu province, which is populated largely by Tibetans, residents were asked to raise their hands if they opposed the Dalai Lama's return. No one obliged, the campaign group said.

Residents were then asked to raise their hands if they did not have weapons at home. As it is illegal to possess firearms, everyone raised their hand. A photo was then taken and sent to state media, claiming residents were opposed to the Dalai Lama's return, the Free Tibet Campaign said.

2. No "Smut" in China

3. More Nuclear Secrets between Enemies

4. Just Called to Say "I Need You!"

5. You Can Never Return Home to North Korea

6. Take the Authoritarian Challenge!

7. Paul Krugman's Article about China (Not the One about Obama)

8. The Dark Side of the Rosy China Scenario

9. Baby Steps in Foreign Aid

10. Iowa Aftermath

I always assumed the Golden Rule was unexportable, but Hans Küng argues for a globalized ethics based on the Golden Rule and a modified form of the Abrahamic religions.

Likewise, Confucius was the first to formulate the Golden Rule of Reciprocity: «Never impose on others what you would not choose for yourself.» Through the spread of Chinese characters, the concept of ren and the Golden Rule spread throughout the vast Chinese-influenced area that reaches from Central Asia to Taiwan and from Korea to Singapore.

This Golden Rule, however, also appears in the Indian tradition. In Jainism, it is stated as: «A man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself would be treated.» In Buddhism: «A state that is not pleasant or delightful to me must also be so to him; and a state that is not pleasing or delightful to me, how could I inflict that upon another?» In Hinduism: «One should not behave towards others in a way which is disagreeable to oneself. This is the essence of morality.»

This «Golden Rule» can also, of course, be found in the Abrahamic religions. Rabbi Hillel (60 B.C.) said: «What is hurtful to yourself do not do to your fellow man.» Jesus worded it positively: «So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you.» Islam, too, has a similar concept: «None of you believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.»

Moreover, such commonalities go beyond the principle of humanity and the Golden Rule of Reciprocity. Four concrete ethical rules were laid down in the Buddhist canon by Patanjali, the founder of Yoga, in the Chinese tradition and, of course, in the three prophetic religions: «Do not kill,» «do not steal,» «do not bear false witness,» and «do not abuse sexuality.»

These trans-cultural ethical rules form structural elements of a common human ethic, whatever we call it, and make almost irrelevant the idea of a deep antagonism between «Asian» and «Western» values. If Asia focuses on its trans-cultural ethical core, an entirely new spirit of unity can be developed that uses soft power instead of military force and does not know enemies, but only partners and competitors. In this way, Asia could catch up with the West in terms of its cultural integration while contributing to the establishment of a genuinely peaceful new world order.

This project differs from the West's human rights movement, which is based on natural law thinking. The point is rather to integrate values, standards, and attitudes of ethical-religious traditions that, while appearing in each culture in a specific form, are common to all, and that can be supported by non-religious people as well.

The coming-out party for the son of Pakistan's slain former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, and Asif Ali Zardari, now christened for his new role as titular leader of the Pakistan people's Party (PPP), Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, demonstrates the fragility of republican institutions in Asian states. Zardari is 19 years old. Furthermore, he's not even a college graduate, or even, as he admits, knowledgeable about his own country. Zardari's father and a committee will actually run the PPP.

Matthew Yglesias points out the dynastic streak in South Asian politics. Pakistan is also prone to military coups. But, within the context of the continent - setting South Asian dynasties apart - where Japan's prime minister is the second in generations, ROK's conservative party includes the daughter of an assassinated dictator, and DPRK's regime is unabashedly communist and dynastic, perhaps it's fitting to call Asian states elective aristocracies.

The younger Zardari's rise echoes the chilling, emotionally resonant path of his mother, who was thrust into public life after her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was hanged in 1979 by order of the military ruler, General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq.

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