Left Flank

I have a small problem with foreign policy analysis of the sort Mathew Yglesias and Reihan Salam are doing in this fast-talking, book-plugging bhTV diavlog—old school! Instead of taking American capabilities and interests first, both go through a shopping list of «problems». It's a recipe for over-extension. There might be this underhanded attempt to backdoor multilateralism, by saying, «Hey, we can't do it all!» But, there's already a principled argument for that, since multilateralism eases burdens and undercuts foreign criticism that the US is too unilateral, and thus fosters American interests. Also, America thrives when trade thrives, too, and security fosters business. I prefer to examine American military assets—air, sea, land, and near-earth orbit—and ask, «What can America do, and in the most efficient and cost-effective way?»

Success breeds more success, or so hopes US Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Gates announced his new Army team:

The nomination of Petraeus to the Central Command post, which was vacated last month when Adm. William «Fox» Fallon abruptly resigned, was not unexpected. It was originally thought Petraeus would become the commander of US European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO troops in Brussels. But after Admiral Fallon resigned, over his increasingly public views on Iran that appeared to be at odds with the White House, speculation centered on Petraeus to replace him.

The decision to send Petraeus to Central Command and Odierno back to Baghdad hints that there is a shallow bench of officers suited for the job in Iraq. Gates acknowledged that there are only a «handful of generals» who have the experience necessary, but also said the vacancy left by Fallon's resignation left him few options. «So I'm faced with a critical combatant command where a commander is needed and a commander who knows what's going on in the region,» he said.

(…)

Odierno had already been nominated to become vice chief of the Army. That nomination will be withdrawn and Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli will be nominated in his place. General Chiarelli, who had been on the short list to replace Petraeus in Iraq, has been Gates's senior military aide for more than a year.

Intel Dump's Phillip Carter calls this all «musical chairs», especially the part about Odierno and Chiarelli.

I'm a bit surprised to see him moved into the vice chief of staff job, because I thought he was a shoe-in to take the top Iraq job that Odierno just got. But these are both four-star jobs and both important. And, there's definitely some institutional politics going on here. Unlike some of the other generals, Chiarelli remains relatively untainted by the Bush administration and the war in Iraq, because he served as a relatively apolitical corps commander and division commander. So putting him in at Vice means that the Army might get to keep him in a Democratic administration. Look for Chiarelli to be the next MNF-I or CENTCOM commander in January 2009 -- or to join the Joint Chiefs, either as chairman of the Joint Chiefs or chief of staff of the Army.

Thomas P.M. Barnett makes two arguments about Petraeus' promotion: that more responsibility will lead to more flexibility on Iran; that he's a better match for a President Obama than for a President McCain. What if a Vice-President Clinton is as forceful an «advisor» as the current vice-president?

Overall, all three decisions are prudent. It's what Uncle Jimbo likes. However, as Noah Schachtman summarizes, these Army nominations leave a trail of disgruntled old-schoolers in their wake.

I put this story about Dubai wanting to go nuclear (and then, retracting it) into deep freeze until I was reading Frantz and Collins on A.Q. Khan today about Dubai's role in the Pakistani pipeline.

Dubai is one of the seven principalities that form the United Arab Emirates: a sleepy port until a construction boom started in the 1960s, by the 1980s Dubai was a bustling free-trade zone without tariffs or taxes and little in the way of government regulation. Foreign businessmen had been drawn by the freewheeling, explosive economy. Among them was Mohammed Farooq, a stocky Indian who had set up a small import-export business in the Jebel Ali Free Zone. Like Lerch, Farooq was a veteran of the nuclear black market—he had met the engineer in South Africa years before, and they had also crossed paths over the years in their dealings with Khan. Lerch now contacted Farooq and found a willing local partner. Lerch also recruited another alumnus of the Pakistani network, Heinz Mebus. Mebus had worked at Siemens and spoke better English than Lerch, prompting later speculation that he had been the one to write the four-point proposal for Iran on some of his old stationery.

At some point, Lerch or Mebus ran the Iranian deal past Khan, who had access to the centrifuges and components that were a key part of the transaction. As a fellow Muslim who was well-known for his role in building the Islamic bomb. Khan's involvement also served to quell any worries the Iranians still had about a sting operation. Although the Pakistani scientist was willing to participate, he did not want to travel to Dubai for the meeting. Instead, he agreed to provide two centrifuges and some components. At the time, Kahuta was developing a more advanced centrifuge, known as the P-2, so all Khan had to do was dip into his stockpile of P-1s waiting to be melted down and ship them to Dubai. He still operated with complete immunity, without any real oversight, so the goods could be sent out of the country merely on his signature.

Later Khan would rationalize his participation in the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran in a variety of ways. Chiefly, he would argue that providing an atomic weapon to another Muslim country was a way to shift some of the West's scrutiny away from Pakistan. In private, he told friends that he had been encouraged to assist Iran by Pakistani military leaders who were interested in expanding ties with Tehran against the West and Israel. At the time of the first deal, President Zia did not trust the Americans despite the hundreds of millions of dollars in annual aid, any more than he trusted the Soviets occupying the country next door. The secure future that Zia envisioned for Pakistan rested on a new alliance stretching west to unite the west to unite the region's non-Arab Muslims in Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey. This was, in Zia's mind, a formation capable of resisting outsiders and posing a formidable counterweight to India. He had ordered his plan put down in writing and called it the Strategic Regional Consensus.

Perhaps this is just sin by association or coincidence, but Khan went on to own a company (and a private apartment) in Dubai. Dubai became instrumental for Khan's efforts to help not only Iran, but also Iraq and Libya, get the bomb. Do we add Dubai to this list (if not directly, but like the younger apprentice following the master)?

Rovin: «Of course, this all falls under the category of diplomacy, which (according to the left) the Bush Administration has no interest in pursuing.»

What else could all this be? Is it the past repeating itself?

On May 23, 1997, Mohammad Khatami's unexpected election as Iran's president sparked hopes within the Clinton administration of Iran-US rapprochement. Khatami stoked these hopes even further when he sat down on January 7, 1998 with CNN's Christiane Amanpour for an interview, in which he said all the right things to facilitate dialogue. What ensued was years of carefully crafted secret messages and gestures initiated by both states, as all the while events threatened to derail any progress towards reconciliation.

The Clinton administration used a variety of tools to express its wishes. In October, 1997, it removed Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) from the official list of terrorist groups.  In 1998, Vice-President Al Gore, Jr. sent a message to Iran through the Saudis. In May, 1998, the US granted waivers to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act to European companies. In December, 1998, President Clinton removed Iran from the list of terrorist states exporting narcotics. On April 12, 1999, President Clinton made remarks at a formal White House dinner about seeking an «accommodation» with Iran. Even when the Saudis gave the Clinton administration proof of Iranian complicity in the bombing of the Khobar Towers, the Clinton administration refused to announce its findings.These diplomatic maneuvers are just a sampling of the many tactics the Clinton administration, which early in its first term had put Iran on the official list of terrorist states.

it seems the Bush administration is traveling the same road with Syria, from «Axis of Evil» now to conferences, that the Clinton administration pursued with Iran in the late 1990s. The Clinton administration tried «Dual Containment», and on numerous occasions considered military strikes. The tactics don't change, only the players.

What got me thinking about this was Ed Morrissey's conjectural piece (and Ken Pollack's book on Iran):

It seems odd to include Syria in this conference, given current circumstances. The US just green-lighted an attack on a rogue nuclear facility in Syria, and Syria just assassinated another Lebanese politician in a car-bomb attack. Bashar Assad doesn't seem particularly interested in getting along with his neighbors, even the Muslim nations on his border. After the Israeli raid, Assad could get motivated by self-preservation, but his support for Hamas and Hezbollah doesn't give much confidence that Syria will add any productive energy to this effort.

Of course, too, the analogy to the Clinton administration and Iran might turn into template for a conference with Iran and Iraq in the wake of this conference.

What exactly happened at Dayr az-Zwar, regardless of «what» was recovered or not, becomes even more interesting, but possibly little more than prologue. It all also makes the Six-Party talks timeline seem wholly normal by comparison. The only palpable difference is the public disagreements between administration hawks and State department diplomats played out on the world stage.

Yes, this is diplomacy! Finally, in the eleventh hour the Bush administration is getting serious.

(Oh, and the comments sections at CQ have some choice speculation.)