Left Flank

Continue the interview with Part 2.

I want to believe the trends are good, and Reihan Salam is right.

But Maliki did something unexpected: He fired those who refused to fight and pressed on with the offensive, in Basra and also in Sadr City, where a second front opened up. A tenuous ceasefire took hold in Basra, and ISF forces have cleared the streets of the militias, using tactics drawn from the surge. This was done with a strikingly small number of American and British troops, though coalition assistance proved crucial. And now, as The New York Times reported yesterday, something resembling normal life is taking hold. In particular, the vigilantes who use violence to enforce their allegedly Islamic ethical code have been driven out, and you can once again hear music playing in the streets.

Though these gains may be temporary, there has also been a more lasting change: The Sadrists have been marginalized. Even the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has been reluctant to make political interventions in recent years, pointedly condemned Sadr for refusing to disarm. Leading Sunni faction have also returned to the fold. The Kurds, who have their own problems with Sadr, are also on board. Maliki, suprisingly enough, increasingly looks like the leader of all Iraqis.

So what does this mean for our debate over Iraq? Advocates of withdrawal will insist that Maliki's forces are just as penetrated by the Iranians as the Sadrist militias. But as noted above, this reflects a simple misunderstanding of Iranian influence. The fighting in Basra and Sadr City hasn't simply pitted one set of Iranian-backed militas (one in ISF uniforms) against another, and it's clear that the forces that controlled Basra weren't popular at all: The city really was, as Maliki argued, in the grip of criminal gangs who terrorized the population.

Alternatively, proponents of withdrawal will argue that Maliki's Charge of the Knights would have failed without substantial American assistance, which is true -- but it's also true that the ISF has become an increasingly effective fighting force. Moreover, the successes of the last month demonstrate that Maliki's government isn't the Vichy government the most strident anti-war voices have suggested. Rather, it is a government that actually represents the interests of Iraq's vast majority.

The smartest case for withdrawal would acknowledge this new reality, and claim that it demonstrates that coalition forces are superfluous and can thus be safely withdrawn. It's true that Maliki's government now has momentum, and would have a fighting chance to survive if U.S. forces are rapidly withdrawn. But the government's chances would be far stronger with a continued American presence backing its efforts up. Unfortunately, few Americans understand what Maliki has accomplished, and how much international assistance he needs to beat back foreign elements that aim to undermine Iraq's fragile democracy -- which is, as far as neighboring governments are concerned (particularly those that begin with an "I" and end with an "n"), a profoundly subversive influence.

But, in no way will I accept any Bush administration official telling me this was the plan all along. Getting it right, by doing the right thing, the first time is the only way to go.

After reading O'Sullivan's Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (2003) about a year ago, but this was the first time I've listened to her, particularly about the Iraq War. O'Sullivan disagrees with a Democratic proposal to withdraw precipitously, because withdrawal will cause Iraqi politicians to retreat into their partisan communities and eschew the sort of nationalizing reforms Baghdad needs to enact.

Of course, that's if one argues Iraq should, or can, achieve centralized, as opposed to a federal, government.

I have a small problem with foreign policy analysis of the sort Mathew Yglesias and Reihan Salam are doing in this fast-talking, book-plugging bhTV diavlog—old school! Instead of taking American capabilities and interests first, both go through a shopping list of «problems». It's a recipe for over-extension. There might be this underhanded attempt to backdoor multilateralism, by saying, «Hey, we can't do it all!» But, there's already a principled argument for that, since multilateralism eases burdens and undercuts foreign criticism that the US is too unilateral, and thus fosters American interests. Also, America thrives when trade thrives, too, and security fosters business. I prefer to examine American military assets—air, sea, land, and near-earth orbit—and ask, «What can America do, and in the most efficient and cost-effective way?»

The NYT's David Barstow decries public diplomacy with a conflict of interest from the Defense Department.

To the public, these men are members of a familiar fraternity, presented tens of thousands of times on television and radio as «military analysts» whose long service has equipped them to give authoritative and unfettered judgments about the most pressing issues of the post-Sept. 11 world.

Hidden behind that appearance of objectivity, though, is a Pentagon information apparatus that has used those analysts in a campaign to generate favorable news coverage of the administration's wartime performance, an examination by The New York Times has found.

The effort, which began with the buildup to the Iraq war and continues to this day, has sought to exploit ideological and military allegiances, and also a powerful financial dynamic: Most of the analysts have ties to military contractors vested in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air.

Those business relationships are hardly ever disclosed to the viewers, and sometimes not even to the networks themselves. But collectively, the men on the plane and several dozen other military analysts represent more than 150 military contractors either as lobbyists, senior executives, board members or consultants. The companies include defense heavyweights, but also scores of smaller companies, all part of a vast assemblage of contractors scrambling for hundreds of billions in military business generated by the administration's war on terror. It is a furious competition, one in which inside information and easy access to senior officials are highly prized.

Records and interviews show how the Bush administration has used its control over access and information in an effort to transform the analysts into a kind of media Trojan horse — an instrument intended to shape terrorism coverage from inside the major TV and radio networks.

Analysts have been wooed in hundreds of private briefings with senior military leaders, including officials with significant influence over contracting and budget matters, records show. They have been taken on tours of Iraq and given access to classified intelligence. They have been briefed by officials from the White House, State Department and Justice Department, including Mr. Cheney, Alberto R. Gonzales and Stephen J. Hadley.

In turn, members of this group have echoed administration talking points, sometimes even when they suspected the information was false or inflated. Some analysts acknowledge they suppressed doubts because they feared jeopardizing their access.

That inside gossip is a powerful drug. But, there's another party responsible: the media. Why didn't media groups either challenge these hacks on the air, or just say no? Ratings and funding.

Actually, I don't mind public diplomacy. Governments should go panhandling. But, citizens have to challenge the drugs these hacks are selling, and the media should help at least. Or, is it too much a part of the problem? James Der Derian in «9.11: Before, After, and In Between» coined the term, MIME-NET (military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network) in 2002:

Now that Silicon Valley and Hollywood have been added to the mix, the dangers have morphed and multiplied. Think Wag the Dog meets The Matrix. Think of C.Wright Mill's power elite with much better gear to reproduce reality.

So, for the near future, I believe virtuous war as played out by the military-industrial-media-entertainment network will be our daily bread and nightly circus. Some would see us staying there, suspended perpetually, in between wars of terror and counterterror. How to break out of the often self-prophesying circles? Are there theoretical approaches that can critically respond without falling into the trap of the interwar? One that can escape the nullity of thought which equates the desire to comprehend with a willingness to condone terrorism? The use of sloppy analogies of resistance, as well as petty infighting (pace [Christopher] Hitchens, [Noam] Chomsky and their polarized supporters) on the left does not give one much hope of a unified anti-war movement.

For the moment, we need to acknowledge that the majority of Americans, whether out of patriotism, trauma or apathy, think it best to leave matters in the hands of the experts. I think for the immediate future the task will be to distinguish new from old dangers, real from virtual effects, and terror from counterterror in the network wars.

The New York Times' John F. Burns and Dexter Filkins (the 'lunatic in the parish') talk about the Iraq War (now about a 'sectarian war, not al-Qaeda') and this week's Petraeus/Crocker ('candid, conforms to what is happening') testimonies on Charlie Rose. Burns can se the first signs of a 'tipping point', but it's still, in General Petraeus' words, 'reversible'.

A remarkable «Discussion about Counterinsurgency on The Charlie Rose Show. Two scholars, Sarah Sewall and Montgomery McFate take credit for their contributions to The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, and offer further commentary on Iraq and Sudan. Both praise the US military organization's adaptation to the counterinsurgency model and caution that «the American way of war» will probably never recur. Both bemoan how American political leadership lags the military leadership's ability to understand and accept local conditions outside of American standards. Sewall for her part also cautioned about how to minimize the consequences of withdrawal in Iraq, and how little the counterinsurgency model might apply to that war. Finally, there is the hope American political and military leadership will not evaluate the counterinsurgency model based on the failures in Iraq.

A must-view interview!

If not for so many other reasons, this conversation with Hans Blix highlights how the North Korean nukes negotiations impacts the Iranian crisis. But, of course, there's what he has to say about Iraq, too.

TNR accuses the «Army» of bad faith. Michael Yon calls TNR «...a group of cowards who won't 'fess up and can't face the scorn of American combat soldiers who were injured by their collective lapse of judgment.» Ace of Spades argues likewise:

TNR, on the other hand, chose to stonewall, obfuscate, and lie. They had highly relevant information about the stories' veracity in their hands. They simply refused to report that information, for fear others might not read the transcripts as generously as they were inclined to.

Other bloggers (via ROK Drop, thanks for the original heads up) whose work I respect have also criticized TNR thoroughly. Chris Lemieux makes good points until he defends TNR's Franklin Foer. Finally, Michael Goldfarb recounts his side of the story «That Took Forever».

Really, I think everyone is right, by their own self-appointed standards. Beauchamp's «work» was forgettable, and his service to his unit neglected. The soldiers and leadership in his unit should feel uneasy about Beauchamp's decision to consider his «work' more important than his job. And, I know full well from personal experience the «Army» guards its reputation jealously, and that's not a bad thing. Finally, Goldfarb and TNR's Franklin Foer didn't hurt their reputations with their core constituencies with their «work», even if I think Goldfarb went over the top, and that Foer's conduct in the telephone interviews and his attempts to turn an editorial error into an ideological contest with Goldfarb were both outrageous. Really, Foer's conduct has made partisan mudslinging tedious. It's çráp all around, and, I'm convinced, for no benefit.

Who cares about the substance of Beauchamp's «work»!

I subscribed to TNR less than a year ago because i wanted to read a reliable national journal. I was oblivious of TNR's previous editorial scandals. I've found TNR somewhat inconsistent. and rarely am I overwhelmed, but usually disgusted, with editorials. The good stuff usually comes from a small group of columnists, like Michael Crowley, John Judis, and Josh Kurlantzick, as well as Beinart's and Goldberg's «What's Your Problem?». I had already started to reconsider my subscription renewal before the Beauchamp affair hit, and I had consciously put TNR on notice: unless there were an unbroken pattern of excellent stories by the end of January, 2008, I would have probably not renewed the su