Left Flank

Jamestown Foundation calls it a "new starting point" for PRC and ROK, with diplomats shuttling already between PRC President Hu Jintao, ROK President-elect Lee Myung-bak, and Kim Jong-il. Scott Snyder lays out future bilateral relations as a contest between Seoul's efforts to keep business and trade in proportion and Beijing's efforts to "cast its shadow" over the Lee administration's relations with DPRK and Japan. But, Lee appears determined to privilege security relations with Washington and Tokyo at the expense of Beijing.

Lee's willingness to speak publicly about North Korean human rights shortcomings suggests that Lee is less likely to go out of his way to avoid offending North Korea's leaders—and for that matter raise themes that his Chinese counterpart may not find helpful. For instance, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman was pressed to respond to Lee's comments on North Korean human rights in a press conference the day after Lee Myung-bak's election. Another sensitive factor that may influence the pace and direction of developments in inter-Korean relations is that Lee's Grand National Party has never participated in inter-Korean dialogue activities organized by previous South Korean governments and was even excluded from some «non-governmental» exchanges by the North, so the official inter-Korean relationship itself will be under new management. These factors suggest the possibility that a downturn in inter-Korean relations might sidetrack progress in implementing the Six-Party Agreements, resulting in renewed tensions and renewed pressure on China to exert pressure on North Korea. Based on these concerns, China has pursued an intensive dialogue in an apparent effort to keep the new South Korean president from making a rapid shift away from the current track of engagement efforts with North Korea.

Secondly, Lee Myung-bak has clearly indicated that his top priority in foreign policy is to improve strategic relations with the United States, while efforts to improve Sino-South Korean relations will focus primarily on upgrading economic cooperation. Although Chinese Party School specialist Zhang Liangui argues that «the development of economic ties is bound to bring closer Sino-ROK political, cultural, and even military exchanges and cooperation,» Lee's top priority remains the reinvigoration of U.S.-ROK security ties (Shanghai Dongfang Zaobao, December 20, 2007).

Third, Lee Myung-bak's visible efforts to improve relations with Japan have caught Chinese attention, especially since an improved South Korea-Japan relationship may lead to strengthened trilateral coordination among the United States, Japan and South Korea (South China Morning Post, January 30). Although this sort of coordination was promoted in the late 1990s as a response to ongoing concerns about North Korea, the resurgence of bilateral textbook, territorial, and historical and political disputes between South Korea and Japan made continuation of such trilateral coordination both unstable and perhaps unsustainable. Now that the Beijing-led Six-Party Talks have been established, Chinese analysts may consider renewed U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination efforts as incompatible with those talks since it may be perceived by North Korea as threatening. Such security coordination also invites concerns in China that it might be used to encircle China or to strengthen coordination in response to any potential cross-Strait crisis. Chinese scholars have unofficially discouraged South Korean counterparts from renewing such coordination even though a purely North Korea-focused precedent exists from the late 1990s. South Korea's outgoing Foreign Minister Song Min-soon has also warned that re-establishment of trilateral policy coordination might have unanticipated negative effects.

Lee's emphasis on human rights is both convenient and well-received, although, until the Roh administration is sent packing, incidents like on February 8 are still likely to be common.

South Korea returned a group of North Koreans to the communist nation after they strayed into southern waters on fishing boats earlier this month, the Defense Ministry said Saturday.

The 22 people drifted into the South off the divided peninsula's west coast in two motorless boats Feb. 8 and were repatriated later in the day because they wanted to go home, the ministry said in a statement, released amid media speculation the North Koreans attempted to defect.

The Chosun Ilbo newspaper reported the weather on Feb. 8 was not bad enough for the boats to stray, suggesting the group intended to defect to the South and were returned against their wishes.

The report also noted the government did not make any public statements about the incident at the time, even though it normally does so.

Obviously, I'm elated about the prospects of improved trilateral relations between Japan, ROK, and US, especially since Six-Party negotiations offer scant hope for improvement in this year.

The Economist manages to string together three stories about the Japan-US alliance, and to be wrong:

• The 2-11-08 arrest of an American soldier for rape.
• The election of Fûkûdá Yoshihiko as Iwakuni mayor.
• Another Soviet  Russian Tupolev 95 "Bear" bomber incident.

Actually, I would argue that The Economist is trying to trivialize the first item to emphasize the salience of the latter two. To be fair, Japundit's Edward Ohmura is right about the the US Marines' track record in Okinawa. But, that doesn't mean the Japan-US alliance is just as important as it ever was, and the Fûkûdá national government is lucky that Iwakuni understands that.

The Economist neglects to mention, as Japan Observer points above, that Tokyo threatened to withhold funds if Iwakuni voted against the Okinawa relocation plan allowing the US Marines to stay. Voters in Iwakuni clearly made the decision out of self-interest, not for the love of the alliance.

This raises two points. The Japan-US alliance is "corrosive". It has undermined the budget process between Tokyo and the cities.

Secondly, Russia in the Far East is not the threat it was, and Guam is just as good as Okinawa for the USAF. But, what is not good for the alliance is the disrespect for Japan's sovereignty manifested in the Iwakuni mayoral election. I agree with Japan Observer, that the US needs to formulate a contemporary Far East strategy (and not this kind of plan), and do its diplomatic best to sell it to its allies in the region before it loses them.

Resurrection has come for Japan-RP free trade in the form of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement, or JPEPA.

It looks as if anti-FTA forces struck too soon, and now even President Gloria Arroyo-Macapagal's support can't dent its aura. Senate President Manuel Villar cannot amend the treaty into palatable bites. Senators Santiago's measured support and Roxas' flip for JPEPA also seem to seal the deal.

At the risk of sounding trite and pedantic at the same time (because economics is about as much fun as calculus and dental surgery combined), but, notwithstanding, that bilateral deals often do proceed advances in multilateral trade rounds, bilateral FTAs are little more than shining a light on the private sector and its lobbies for brief moments. Voters can see how the feeding frenzy that usually ensues hidden in yawn-inducing plain view in government offices and outside of chambers. So, JPEPA is a rare chance for voters to take a little revenge, but not much. That said, it's not an economic victory, but rather GAM's swansong.

Is proximity a more important factor than acclimation for Olympic athletes seeking a training advantage? Of course, humans aren't horses (and some Swiftians would find that fact depressing), but then all those concerns about smoggy, humid air transcend species boundaries.

As of Thursday, 15 foreign countries had decided to send a total of 499 athletes to South Korea. The teams are to train in some dozen disciplines in Seoul, North Chungcheong Province and Jeju. Egypt has agreed with the Korea Olympic Committee to send about 40 athletes to South Korea in March. Bulgaria and Algeria are considering setting up training camps for all members of their Olympic teams here.

A total of 11 local governments are trying to attract foreign Olympic teams. The Korea Tourism Organization has published a guidebook on training camps and mailed copies to the national Olympic committees in foreign countries.

Japan has reportedly attracted about 20 foreign Olympic teams. According to the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, 150 Swedish athletes in 19 events will train in the city of Fûkûøká. Osaka has agreed with the British swimming team to supply a long-term training camp. Hokkaido, where the G8 summit for 2008 will be held, has invited the ambassadors from the G8 countries, and Hokkaido Governor Harumi Takahashi handed them promotional pamphlets.

"Yellowy" Seoul, I guess, would count as a suitable substitute for Beijing in the spring and early summer.

On one hand, I'd think Ko San, ROK's first astronaut could find better things to do than mix dirt in space. On the other hand, there is a certain diplomatic symbolism involved by both mixing North and South Korean dirt (in a Russian spacecraft), and using Japanese technology for other experiments.

"We still think this is one country. So I'm going to bring the soil of North and South (Korea). I'm going to mix them up in space," he said. The 31-year-old scientist will leave Earth in April aboard a Russian Soyuz rocket and spend 10 days conducting experiments at the International Space Station.

(…)

The Ministry of Science and Technology said Wednesday that Ko will use equipment developed by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in his experiments at the International Space Station.

Japan and Korea will sign a declaration agreeing to cooperate in space exploration in Seoul on Thursday. Korea will use JAXA's portable device for measuring space radiation and an HDTV camera for Ko's space experiments.

I'm sure no Japanese equipment will touch the sacred dirt.

Regardless of how one views it—as unconstitutional or tactically opportunistic—it's a tactical defeat for Ichiro Ozawa. So much for consensus politics!

But really, what law got passed is not worth passing (except in the most symbolic of senses).

In response to past criticism that some of the MSDF fuel provided to other ships was actually used in the war in Iraq, Japanese government officials, in writing, will ask allies to use the fuel only for the anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan.

Refueling will only be conducted after the projected routes of the receiving ships are known.

The new law also limits the MSDF's activities to providing fuel and water to other ships.

The original special measures law that led to the start of the refueling mission included such activities as transport by the Air Self-Defense Force, search-and-rescue missions and providing assistance to displaced people.

Those activities were eliminated from the new law.

The new law also has a time limit of one year. If a further extension of the refueling mission is required, the government would have to pass another special measures bill into law.

Just in time to tack to the new US administration's line.

OFK's Joshua, with some fancy keywork and must-read links, has reached the depressing conclusion Left Flank did already, but with much more rending and gnashing:

...we haven't paid enough.  On the «disablement» of the already used-up Yongbyon reactor, there seem to be legitimate technical reasons why disablement has slowed down, but North Korea is also deliberately slowing things down.

There's just enough tea leaves to invite a broad range of conjecture, but, like a Rorschach test, I think Blake Hounshell has a more useful take on Pyongyang's "temper tantrum":

Perhaps there's something more nefarious going on, but Occam's Razor suggests that an impending famine is the main reason for the North's latest tantrum. Until the country's leaders learns how to address such problems in a forthright manner, I'm afraid, this is the kind of thing we can expect.

OFK likes to examine the bureaucratic and the personal: I prefer the systemic, how states interact regardless of who or what's behind the curtain. But, Hounshell's fits with Beijing's recent "natural" admonition. Perhaps, Beijing is correcting for any rosy interpretation of the Fûkûdá visit, and there's always reminding Taiwan of its diplomatic vulnerability. Weekly Standard's Michael Goldfarb even argues Beijing sneaks a zinger at democratization on the Kenya issue, even when the ethnic fiasco has past governments' stinking paws all over it. Anyway, I think the Bush administration is just outclassed.

Related to this, both TMH and DPRK Forum are excited about "Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor", and the TMH boards are both spirited and informative. But, I would argue that Beijing's long list of policy options, the contingencies it has planned into perfunctory procedures, is irrelevant to this goal to keep DPRK as a bargaining chip in the region against the US and Japan. And, DPRK's punky determination to stay alive and muddle through (coupled with the region's need to keep giving it life support aid and rice) just makes Beijing's task easier. If it all fell apart tomorrow, kudos to those who chanted and danced to widen the cracks in the pavement, but it's more impressive how the jerry-rigging just seems to work oblivious of all the prayers directed at it. As Michael Garibaldi said, Daffy Duck is the "patron saint of frustration".

But, Jack at DPRK Forums has a better read of the inkspots for my money:

I do not have a crystal ball, so it is very hard to say what the future may bring. Whatever the case, sudden collapse will be painful and a mess. I cannot see it any other way.

Even, Andrei Lankov has to admit it:

But again: over last three years I keep saying that collapse is likely, but there is a force which is perhaps capable and willing to prevent it, and this force is China.

As Robert Koehler quoted:

Don't think Beijing will be getting into the regime change business anytime soon, though. One Chinese expert told the team, 'We don't care who is in power as long as stability is maintained.'

Any attempt at wishing that away is to invite another Iraq, an even worse miscalculation, if that's possible.

I'll eat any creature—and almost any «food» with roots and leaves. After all these years in Busan eating raw sea creatures with only soju and hot chili pepper paste to protect me, my only fear is pulling a tapeworm the length of my intestines out of my belly button. So, I have no love for whale-watchers. Yet, too, I don't want my favorite snacks to disappear in sludge and over-harvesting by shortsighted middlemen and corrupt politicians!

Anyway, I think the Australians and Japanese should