Left Flank

Myanmar's junta-controlled press has taken pages from the Iraqi and North Korean styles of editorializing, and given the world tears of joy to go along with the blood.

«Recent protests in the country were created by the loudmouthed bully, using the exiled dissidents and traitors together with communists, internal and external anti-government destructionists,» said a commentary Sunday in the Myanmar Ahlin daily.

(...)

The author, who called himself Maung Pwint Lin - roughly meaning Mr. Frankly Speaking - said that the United States had tried to revive the mass uprisings of 1988 in Myanmar in connivance with «exiled dissidents and internal ax-handles» in order to install a puppet government. Ax-handle is jargon used by the junta to mean traitors or puppets.

The newspaper commentary said that the majority of people in Myanmar had opposed the recent demonstrations.

Don't mistake laughter for support, Yangon!

Amnesty International’s Response to Burmese Repression (Requires Real Player)

TNR's Joshua Kurlantzick has two prescriptions for Myanmar: smart sanctions and people power.

Myanmar's problems seem to be a form of Dutch disease. After independence, civilian rulers implemented a government-directed socialist economic plan. In 1962, rival elites staged a coup, and Myanmar hasn't know civilian rule again since. So, Kurlantzick's smarter sanction's plan seems well-designed to inflict harm on those who have ruined the Burmese economy most.

With a North Korean-like regime that doesn't care about the world, but is dependent on it for critical items, you have to hit them where they hurt. Long reported to be ailing, Than Shwe flies out of the country for medical care in neighboring Southeast Asian nations. His family also frequently heads outside the country, likely for shopping trips--during the September protests, the senior general parked his family in Bangkok. Burmese businesspeople with alleged close links to the generals also reportedly have extensive bank accounts in neighboring states.

So, smarter sanctions could include efforts to prevent certain top generals from accessing nearby health care and luxury shopping. They also could crack down on bank accounts in Southeast Asia linked to the junta, depriving the junta of the money they need to continue living lavishly in their new jungle capital, Naypyidaw.

Unlike broader sanctions, smarter sanctions might enjoy the support of critical countries in the region. Speaking with some regional diplomats this week in Southeast Asia, several worried that cutting off access to the junta's health care would be viewed as unnecessarily harsh. «Why not just go the old way, and assassinate him?» one asked me. Still, even in the countries around Burma, the level of frustration is rising. And China was willing to work with the U.S. before in toughening financial controls on Kim Jong-Il--Macau is a special administrative region of China--and might be willing to do so again. Individual Southeast Asian nations, meanwhile, could back smarter sanctions without all having to agree amongst themselves. To take broader measures, all countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have to agree--unlikely, given that ASEAN itself contains regimes, like Laos and Vietnam, which are hardly examples of protecting human rights.

Targeted sanctions also might help unite Burmese themselves. Inside Burma, many opposition activists, including Suu Kyi, support tough Western sanctions. But other Burmese I've spoken with criticize the sanctions as making Burma's humanitarian emergency worse. Smarter sanctions, though, probably would spark no such divide. And before the junta can arrest even more of the opposition, the world needs to wise up.

That's fine as far as ridding Myanmar of its junta is concerned, but creating self-government is trickier. And, all Kurlantzick can do is argue, that the Burmese are not incapable of pulling it off.

...the Burma exception argument falls apart on examination. The idea that Burma's ethnic divisions would preclude democracy is only convincing if you ignore the history of its giant neighbor, India. The ethnic violence in postcolonial India was worse than that in Burma, yet the country has held together to build a powerful democracy. Similarly, Indonesia, a vast archipelago of ethnic groups, has managed to form the most vibrant democracy in the region by embracing federalism. Even Cambodia, another diverse society plagued by civil war, now has a stable, if flawed, democracy in place. True, Burma suffered under the British, but it was not a «peculiarly debilitating colonial legacy,» as Thant Myint-U claims. India, Malaysia, Kenya, and other colonies suffered without losing all prospects for democratization.

The second point in the Burma exception argument--that no opposition network exists--dissolves after a glimpse at Burmese history, not to mention the last few weeks. During the 1988 protests, the country witnessed a vast flowering of unions, print publications, and other organizations. Even during the bleakest times, Burmese continued debating the nation's fate, though more quietly: Several years ago, I sat in the corner of a noodle shop in Rangoon and listened to a local publisher and his friends hash out politics. And, just this week, numerous Burmese found creative ways to get photos and stories about the crackdown to news outlets around the world. As for religious groups, the power and organization of the Buddhist monks was on full display during last month's marches. In fact, unlike many other authoritarian states, Burma has a recent history of democratic rule, memories of which would aid a transition back to democracy. Between independence in 1948 and the military coup in 1962, Burma enjoyed a democratic government and a period of strong economic growth. Even more recently, in 1990, the Burmese people participated in a real election, in which the junta's proxy party was defeated by the opposition National League for Democracy. (The junta simply refused to turn over power.)

As these examples suggest, the central problem with the Burma exception argument is that it lays the blame for Burma's problems squarely with the people, when, in fact, the problem is the junta. Contrary to Thant Myint-U's argument that the junta is less repressive than former nearby dictatorships, it is far more brutal. In Thailand, for example, after a crackdown on demonstrators in 1992 in Bangkok, the military heads willingly sat down with the protest leaders at an audience in front of the king and then gave way to civilian rule. The Indonesian dictator Suharto paved the way for democracy by stepping down after massive civilian protests in 1998. In Burma, the junta has created a situation in which brutality is more likely by isolating soldiers from civilians in a separate, military-only education system and by moving the capital to the middle of the jungle. You are a lot more likely to shoot at people you've never had any contact with.

Another factor that the Burma exception argument doesn't consider is the halfhearted and frequently craven policies of the international community. For decades since the 1962 coup, democratic nations could not decide whether to isolate or embrace the Burmese military. The United States and Great Britain courted the generals until the late '80s--Queen Elizabeth served tea to crazed former junta chief Ne Win--and then sanctioned them in the '90s. Burma's closest neighbors, dependent on the country's oil, timber, and gas, recently have been unwavering in their support; India, seeking to counterbalance China's power in the area, has reached out to the generals, selling them arms. And China is the regime's major aid provider and has blocked tougher U.N. actions on Burma. The unwillingness of these nations to stand up to the junta has demoralized Burma's reformers.

That's a lot of problems for one nation to deal with, and probably more than the international community can focus on with any degree of commitment for any period of time.

It's all a question of priorities.

As an antidote for the rampant romanticization of the Burmese riots in Yangon and else where in Myanmar, Power and Interest News Report offers a report about the economic factors behind the Myanmar protests.

The last major uprising in Myanmar occurred in 1988. The underlying cause of the revolt was economic and resulted in violent repression by the military. The outcome of the current protest could be similar. Regardless, due to the decades of military involvement in the economy, dependency on resource exports and a high rate of corruption that pervades the country, the necessary economic improvements will not come easily. Even with peaceful political change, without significant international oversight, the overwhelming precedence of military intervention and control in the country will likely return Myanmar to state-sponsored economic mismanagement.

But China is a much more attractive bogeyman!

In an article where the International Herald Tribune gets it (and then goes too far), Michael Green, a former Bush administration official and current quote factory, has his own simple formula.

«The more authoritarian the regime, the more vulnerable it is to mobilized dissent when they try to raise energy prices,» Green said.

«When democratic institutions are stronger, governments have been better able to manage energy demands. That's the lesson from Indonesia.»

The list of miracles democracy can perform increases by the day!

Pendagon wins the contest for apt sentiments:

Our hearts are with those who struggle in Burma because they must, because you will never be wholly owned as long as you continue to struggle. It's easy for me to say that, though, isn't it? Which is why writing this is hard; my awe of those who put their lives on the line is humbling. May we all have the courage of our convictions as those who struggle against the military dictatorship do.

And, here, I was going to stop. Discussing what is admirable, though, should not detract from criticizing what, as it were, is making Sisyphus push that rock up that hill. There's a reason why Myanmar is a problem, and it's not because any one country has not gotten tough, or not because of a dearth of sanctions laws, or lack of publicity. It's because the world can never agree what needs to be done, and is more concerned for its own national concerns.

Ed Morrissey attacks sanctions, justifiably:

Sanctions alone have never collapsed a tyranny. Usually it just results in misery for the people who already suffer under the oppressive tyrants, a dynamic which the UN tried to avoid in Iraq by establishing the Oil-for-Food program. That turned into a massive corruption scandal that wound up enriching the tyrant that sanctions supposedly targeted. Even without the corruption, the sanctions lost popularity in just a couple of years, with some nations arguing that they killed 5,000 Iraqi children a month. The world has almost as little tenacity for sanctions as they do for military action.

The notion that worldwide condemnation would change the direction of the military junta seems mostly naive.

In another post, he attacks the shame weapon:

This process enables people to change action for rhetoric. We do that often enough already. In the case of Burma, even the testimony of diplomats attesting to dozens dead in the streets hasn't convinced China, Thailand, or India to cut off Burma and close down trade with them. Are we to believe that a strongly-worded letter from the State Department recapping what everyone already knows about the Burmese military dictatorship will exceed the power of those images?

Reliance on challenge documents just lets everyone off the hook. It seeks to embarrass governments that have no accountability to their people. Shame doesn't work in that setting, and for those who think that is the ultimate in diplomatic offensives, it keeps other solutions off the table. That's the harm.

Shame seeks to use group dynamics, to modify the behavior of a subgroup, in this case, the Burmese junta. Unfortunately, there are processes already at work, political and economic. Social psychological forces count for little at the global level. But, sanctions, are more a domestic palliative, for the governments giving them than for the junta receiving them, than a sharp tool, as Morrissey argues.

Again, Michael J.W. Sticking's raises the specter of genocide to advocate sanctions.

These are «techniques are modeled on the sanctions designed against North Korea,» sanctions which have been somewhat successful in terms of cutting off (Western) investment and other engagement with the Hermit Kingdom. But there is only so much the U.S. and Europe can do without Chinese and Indian support. As long as the totalitarians in Burma have China and India to prop up their regime, efforts to «speed their demise» may not be all that effective.

Still, it's something -- and something (Bosnia) is better than nothing (Rwanda). With military action not feasible, the crisis in Burma forces the U.S. and Europe to pursue other means, notably diplomacy (through the U.N.), tougher sanctions, pressure on China and India, and, presumably (hopefully), secret efforts in support of the protesters and their cause.

Sticking's wants to use shame to persuade India and China to pressure Myanmar, as well as implementing sanctions against the junta itself. Firstly, the Burmese people need closer integration with global markets, not less. Sanctions both inflict pain, but, as in the case of the DPRK, actually empower a sadistic state apparatus to mismanage its state and economy without the scrutiny of markets. Doing just something takes a backseat to doing something in a coordinated way. The UN and all major players have to agree, and that has not happened. And, it never will.

Tokyo's concern for journalist Nagai Kenji is an example. Any reaction short of parking a destroyer in the Indian Ocean is just perfunctory, and no other player would join Japan. So, instead of an honest reaction, Tokyo will lodge complaints. Netizens will raise awareness of Myanmar's plight with their invective, to a certain extent. There's not enough journalist or oil deposits in the world the Burmese junta could kill or spike, to alienate every country in the world with sufficient sadism and ineptitude for the world to park its armed forces around the Burmese borders.

Another pet peeve is the name game. Is it Myanmar, or Burma? I think it's just childish not to use Myanmar, to spite the junta. But, there is the issue of comprehension. So, I've chosen to use 'Myanmar' as the name of the country and 'Burmese' for the majority ethnic group living in Myanmar. The other alternative sounds like a butchered pronunciation of 'mayonnaise'.

As Yangon's streets seemingly stand poised for more riots, and the UN envoy is doing the rounds of both the junta and the opposition, it's good to recall, that his job is to manage conflict, not solve the crisis. There's no certainty, that with all the good will and negotiations, both sides could hammer out a compromise. And, it's equally unclear whether the opposition could rule Myanmar.

Of course, Burmese could just flee. That would incite instant global anger if thousands of immigrants hit foreign shores

Sisyphus might just be Burmese.

As pundits justifiably single out China for opprobrium, no one is pointing a finger at India, the Bush administration's new friend in South Asia. In the end, though, India's geo-strategic designs in its northeastern frontier are as compelling as China's southern concerns.

India has expressed concern over the developments in Myanmar and urged its government to be more inclusive and broad based. «India is concerned at and is closely monitoring the Myanmar situation. It is our hope that all sides will resolve their issues peacefully through dialogue. India has always believed that Myanmar?s process of political reform and national reconciliation should be more inclusive and broad-based,» External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Navtej Sarna said.

The developments in Myanmar have the potential to upset India's security calculations in the northeast, besides delaying its attempt to find a firmer foothold in the hydrocarbon sector. Other initiatives that could take a back seat if the situation worsens are a breakthrough in getting an alternate terrestrial route to the northeast via Myanmar and bilateral and multilateral negotiations to promote greater economic cooperation.

The uncertainty in getting offshore exploration blocks ended last week with the signing of production sharing contracts for three deep-water exploration blocks. In addition, India is part of a consortium looking for gas in two more blocks. More business would depend on India engaging more intimately with the current regime, including a second line of credit of $ 20 million to refurbish a refinery.

Not much solidarity with Buddhist monks (and non-Buddhists, too!) here! And, at least Beijing contemplates the possibility of opposition rule; New Dehli is so far from calling for an opposition government, it fears anything but a strong central government. Even Michael Goldfarb's tribute to Mia Farrow and condemnation of Moscow is all a bit hollow. After all, if pundits of any ideological stripe are determined to frame Beijing's ascendance in Asia as a new cold war, will they lecture the US if it arm-twists South America again? The sin, Goldfarb, and Sullivan, all bloated rhetoric about revolutions aside, seem to be imputing, is that Beijing and New Dehli are doing (in a dark-side-of-the-Force way), but Washington, and all American do-gooders, can only watch impotently. But, if we could, by golly, we'd be Skywalker! I'd prefer to be Indian, if that's all America has to show.

Reading the statements offered by various Burmese and world leaders, one problem, aside from the fundamental geo-strategic predicament of Myanmar and Chinese and Indian indifference, is the lack of agreement about what to do. Actually, I think the EU's comprehensive recommendations point to the immediate tactic: beef up ASEAN. The troubled IGO is Southeast Asia's best hope against Chinese and Indian encroachment and internal rebellion in its member-states. But, the US spends about as little time supporting it, and about as much time enfeebling it as China.

But, first, a common statement from the world would really make the Burmese junta listen. Washington could lead that effort.