Left Flank

With the recent disclosures about DPRK-Syria cooperation at al-Kibar, context is a rare commodity, and The Economist delivers.

Judging by its past behaviour, North Korea would do pretty much anything for cash; there are suspicions that it helped the Khan network supply nuclear material to Libya. That said, providing engineers and designs for Syria's reactor may chiefly have been meant to tweak America's nose, says Michael Green, a former Bush administration official now at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington, DC.

The Bush administration and North Korea fell out badly in 2002 over charges that Kim Jong Il's regime had secretly been trying to enrich uranium (also a potential bomb ingredient) while plutonium production was frozen by a previous agreement. The following year North Korea privately threatened to expand its «deterrent», test it (which it later did) and even sell it. With little to export beyond counterfeit currency, drugs and crises, says Mr Green, North Korea used Syria to up the ante—and the expected compensation for later agreeing to desist.

Now America and Mr Kim are negotiating again as part of a six-party deal (also including South Korea, Japan, China and Russia) to tempt him to give up his bombs. Senior American officials last week acknowledged that they had debated whether to try a combination of diplomacy and threats to end the Syrian project. For Israel, however, the Syrian reactor was an existential threat-in-the-making. There was no green light from the United States, the officials said: «none was asked for, none was given.»

Hoping to avoid retaliation, and to head off the risk of a wider Middle East war, Israel wanted the intelligence that led to the bombing kept secret. Worried that wider disclosure would sink the six-party effort too, America briefed only a score of senior members of Congress at the time.

But now the administration needs Congress's support for a controversial deal that could fall significantly short of the prize that the six-party negotiations were supposed to deliver: that, in return for oodles of energy aid and a lifting of some key sanctions, North Korea would first provide a full and accurate accounting of its nuclear past and later dismantle all its nuclear programmes. Instead it has merely declared a rather modest stockpile of plutonium and dug its heels in. Trying to move talks forward, American diplomats have struck a tentative deal that would allow North Korea to «acknowledge» American «concerns» about uranium and proliferation activities, in return for better verification of Yongbyon's plutonium haul. But the backtracking led Congress to demand the facts on Syria first.

George Bush said this week that by going public, America wanted to press North Korea's (notoriously impervious) Kim Jong Il into fuller disclosure, and send a message to proliferators everywhere. But the Syrian pictures may just as easily lead Congress to demand that America adopt a tougher stance in the six-party talks.

Another casualty could be the NPT itself. The IAEA's boss, Mohamed ElBaradei, says inspectors should have been given information about the Syrian reactor sooner by America and Israel. Yet Syria, had it not chosen to deny all, could have claimed that technically it was doing nothing wrong. Building a nuclear reactor is not against NPT rules, unless done with weapons intent—and that is hard, if not impossible, for inspectors to prove, says Henry Sokolski of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre in Washington. However, under a 1992 rule accepted by Syria, it should have alerted the IAEA to its reactor plans before construction started. North Korea, Iran and now Syria. The NPT seems there for the breaking.

Firstly, comes NPT reform and a proper way to share intelligence. And then, the US can deal with its armistice with the DPRK. In that order!

I'm still decelerating from a guest lecture by Johan Galtung, "Peace in the Global Era and Perspectives of the Unification on the Korean Peninsula", I attended this afternoon at Dong-A University. As usual I forgot my camera, because I honestly thought the panel discussion would be an examination of Galtung's work by South Korean professors applied to the North Korean problem, not a guest lecture. OK, he's not Beckham, but now I can but a face to articles I have read in IR grad classes. And, his treatment of the North Korean problem was inspiring.

Galtung deviated from the script immediately. Kudos to the Dong-A professor who suddenly was forced into the role of translator. The younger South Korean and Galtung exchanged some tense words, and Galtung often had to repeat for him, but the man did an admirable job. Well, his boss, the dean, who is "friends" with Galtung, was sitting right there at the table, too. But, that was nothing compared to the fireworks later, when another professor lit into Galtung for his arguments. The dean had to wave him off! More later...

After a late start (15 minutes), and the dean's fulsome praise (which bordered on lavish), Galtung quickly laid out his five-point lecture. He began with his distinction between negative and positive peace, and applied it the Korean peninsula. The goal of resolving the Korean armistice precedes political unification. After characterizing the North Korean state as "fundamentalist Confucian", Galtung then argued that unification only necessitated the free flow of people, goods and services, and information and ideas between the two Korean states, not the dissolution of ROK and DPRK into a single Korean state. Galtung buttressed this point by that of three other scenarios, conquest, collapse, or peaceful dissolution, the first two were violent, and the last has never occurred in human history. Galtung termed this "national reconciliation without the unification of two states". Galtung subsequently considered confederation as a starting political point, but unnecessary.

Topically, Galtung predicted that DPRK, following Hu Jintao's lead in this 17th Party Congress address would adopt Chinese economic reforms, and experience double-digit economic growth in the next ten years. The stumbling point before now was the Chinese emphasis on "jungle capitalism" and the Juche emphasis on distribution. But with Hu's embrace of distribution, Kim Jong-il can now embrace the PRC model. So, let's put a marker on that prediction.

Also, Galtung examined the Six-Party dynamics, as the historical result of a century's worth of diplomacy beginning with the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905. With DPRK and PRC on one side, and Japan and US on the other, ROK has vacillated between the two sides. Under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, Seoul favored the DPRK-PRC axis, but Lee Myung-bak looks fit to swing back to the Japan-US side. Galtung predicted this latest swing would fail, and ROK would swing back again in the future. But, as an honest broker between the US and DPRK, ROK can take a step toward positive peace. Galtung criticized the decision not to award both Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung the Nobel Peace Prize for the June, 2000 Summit. For Galtung, ROK has to act a third-party mediator, or escrow account, as he used for an example, between DPRK and US.

The US wants denuclearization; DPRK wants normalization. Both states should give the instruments of both processes to Seoul, after which Seoul can decide to verify both simultaneously. Or, another organization, such as the UN Security Council (minus the US), the IAEA, or the remaining four parties in the Six-Party process can also be alternative mediators. Galtung emphasized, though, that ROK's role was insignificant in the regional and global contest between DPRK and US, if it did not operate even-handedly between DPRK and US. Galtung remained hopeful, that, if ROK and DPRK can become diplomatic equals, the human rights situation will improve, but that the US, and those still desiring collapse or conquest, are "arrogant". "Peace is a relation," Galtung stated.

It was during the Q&A, that Professor X launched into an emotional tirade (in English) about North Korean human rights abuses. He also correctly lectured about the persecution of religious denominations in the DPRK, including the Confucian religion Galtung had argued typified the North Korean state. Although I agreed, this man was rude. The dean prompted him to repeat his comments in Korean for the audience, but then had to quiet the man repeatedly afterwards. Galtung repeated his argument and agreed with the professor, that the North Korean regime is "terrible". At this point, he emphasized again, that peace is relational.

I asked about the South African and Libyan cases as models for denuclearization, which Galtung acknowledged as examples of successes. I also argued that political unification is impossible geopolitically on a peninsula. Here Galtung emphasized, that "unification is not important", but the free flow of people and goods is. He also advocated an "East Asian Community", to integrate the Korean peninsula into a regional and global framework.

Galtung's emphasis on reconciliation without unification is a thousand times more agreeable to me than an internecine conflict over how to unifiy the peninsula into one state. The tension in the auditorium, full of students, who honestly were more concerned with verifying their attendance than listening, rose and hit newer levels every time Galtung slighted ROK, or dissed unification. I don't believe these students knew who the man was, or respected his career. I think the only South Korean who admired him was the dean. Unfortunately, whatever Galtung argued was binned as another foreigners' lack of appreciation for the present situation, not as an application of Galtung's peace studies to a current crisis. As the one professor demonstrated, engaging with arguments dispassionately might be utopian in an emotionally-charged political situation where even students feel Koreans own the debate.

Dread of a DPRK collapse at Belmont prompts Westhawk to rally the six nations for an intervention.

I have described reasons why China, South Korea, and the U.S. could get sucked into the North Korean tar pit in spite of the risks and costs of doing so. With all sides having strategic interests in the problem and obvious reasons for wishing to minimize their own costs and risks, it would seem to make sense for China, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and others to cooperate now on planning for a post-Kim North Korea.

Although strict defenders of national sovereignty will object to the idea of a group of countries scheming over the collapse of another, the case of North Korea is too dangerous to ignore. Cooperative planning now might prevent a chaotic response later.

But even if these countries provide a smooth response to the collapse of the Kim regime, the strategic conflicts described above will still occur. A coordinated international relief expedition could provide humanitarian relief to North Korea, maintain order, prevent a refugee crisis, control the WMD stockpiles, and begin reconstruction. Yet it will take another level of diplomacy to prevent strategic conflict in the region, even after all of this important work is done.

And, US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill (for the conservative rebuttal, read OFK) responded to US Senator Joseph Biden's query about a Northeast Asian security arrangement with a feeble affirmation.

In contrast, I side with the Chinese.

Chinese analysts widely assert that the North Korean system remains stable and they are confident that it will remain so for at least several years absent the sudden death of Kim Jong Il or external interference aimed at destabilizing the regime. In the long run, however, sustainable development through economic reform remains an essential prerequisite for stability, and North Korea's ability to move down that path is not yet assured.

No amount of wishful thinking will change this.

«I want to tell him try living in the prison camp for just an hour.»

Shin Dong-hyuk taunts the Dear Leader just by telling his life's story to reporters in Seoul.

His narrative reads like a dystopian novel.

It's not all about wonky reports and news updates.

Two major events concerning the Korean peninsula hit the public in the last few days, the Second DPRK-ROK Summit and the latest installment of the Six Party talks in Beijing. As usual the ball is in Pyongyang's end of the court, and even I won't place bets, at least not on one prediction.

In Pyongyang, not even ROK President Roh Moo-hyun can get respect (and, who's really complaining?). During the course of the media bomb, I was concerned about the inordinate attention on economic issues. Seeing Chung Mong-koo in Pyongyang on South Korean TV made me wonder if the entire reason the ROK Supreme Court exonerated him was, so he could grab his share of loot from the North Koreans.

Among the top three business topics expected for discussion - natural resource developments, roadway and railway distribution system expansions and dockyard construction - Hyundai-Kia Automotive Group is said to be interested in building railroad cars through its shipping affiliate Glovis, and also measure the feasibility of SOC businesses, while POSCO showed interest in forestation.

Although company officials said forestation is just a possibility, as the steel maker has shown its interest in securing carbon credit overseas, industry insiders say the opportunity will be advantageous for POSCO if cooperation comes through.

And as speculations rose that SK Group may be considering communication and energy projects in the North, company officials said plans are open for review if the right offer is made.

LG and Samsung, which are said to be mulling over their specialty areas of electronics, seem to be in the same scouting stages as others.

I think the first piece I wrote on Korea was about Samsung turning the DPRK into a giant industrial park. If Graph 5 of the «Declaration for Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity» are any indication, it seems Chairman Chung's time was wasted.

From what can be gleaned of their substance, talks between the two leaders on October 3rd only emphasised the distance still to travel. Mr Kim may be willing to squeeze the outside world for aid?but on his terms. So Mr Roh?s offer of what amounted to a Marshall Plan to transform North Korea?s economy in pursuit of Chinese-style liberalisation met with blank dismissal. Mr Kim does not even like a showcase industrial park at Kaesong, where South Korean manufacturers employ cheap North Korean labour, to be described as a model of successful ?reform?. Once again, Mr Kim showed how he puts his own survival over that of the North Koreans he brutalises.

Yet a joint agreement was announced on October 4th, something Mr Roh will be able to take home with relief. Gone were his hopes for great involvement in the North, but there was agreement to allow freight trains into Kaesong. There was a recommitment to help families divided by the civil war to meet (though a word from Mr Kim is all it would take to solve that sad problem). Talks will be sought with America and China to put a formal end to the civil war (though peace on the peninsula, these countries are likely to argue, can only come after its denuclearisation). Steps were promised (as, fruitlessly, they were at the 2000 summit) to reduce military tensions: defence ministers would meet, while a disputed western maritime area would see its fisheries jointly mined.

And, it's even more disconcerting to read DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Choi Su-hon at the UN say, that «...there was no need for the UN as a go-between in inter-Korean affairs, as inter-Korean dialogue is 'going well.'» I hope dialogue is much more multi-voiced, and includes as many «go-between's» as possible.

Vice Minister Choi also called the latest agreement in Beijing, agreeing to the disablement of Yongbyon by the end of the year, a «courageous decision». It remains for Pyongyang to manifest its courage. But, there are plenty of other ways the enthusiasm could get punctured.

At the request of the other five parties to the nuclear deal, the United States will lead disablement activities and provide initial funding. It will lead an expert group to North Korea, probably next week, to prepare for disablement.

North Korea also reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology or know-how, the statement issued in Beijing added.

But the statement skirted the issue of when the country would be removed from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list, one of Pyongyang's key demands, saying only Washington would fulfill its commitments to begin that process in parallel with action on the ground.

Last week, Bush authorized $25 million in aid for the North, which would cover the cost of up to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

China and South Korea have delivered initial fuel shipments and Russia is expected to do so too. But Japan has indicated it will not participate unless North Korea addresses the issue of Japanese citizens the North abducted in the 1970s and 1980s.

And, to be fair, there is substantive opposition to the entire process.

Nowhere, however, in the new agreement was what Reagan-era diplomats called a «third basket» ? a set of exchanges and commitments regarding how the communist regime treats its citizens, a feature of the Helsinki accords first signed in 1975 by 35 nations, including America and the Soviet Union.

A third-basket negotiation was the hope of a left-right coalition of human rights and religious leaders who on May 25 warned Secretary of State Rice that it «would oppose the provision of significant financial assistance to North Korea without progress on human rights issues.» The coalition included Human Rights Watch, the Southern Baptist Convention, the National Association of Evangelicals, Freedom House, and the George Soros-funded Open Society Institute.

One of the organizers of the coalition on North Korean Human Rights, Michael Horowitz, yesterday said the denuclearization agreement would lead to war. «This policy has increased the risk of war on the Korean peninsula. If we give Kim Jong Il money for his weapons programs, the future will bring more weapons not fewer weapons,» Mr. Horowitz said. «I fear that if this deal goes through, Kim Jong Il will seek to blackmail the world in less than two years with what may be the world's largest chemical and biological stockpile and missiles capable of delivering them.» Mr. Horowitz pointed out that when North Korea tested missiles last July, both Democrats and Republicans called for a military strike.

«It is sad and ironic that President Bush, the most forceful advocate of North Korean human rights, has signed off on a policy approach that seeks to legitimize and finance the Kim Jong Il regime in exchange for mere weapons promises on its part.»

Mr. Bush yesterday praised the agreement and said North Korea would provide a «complete and correct» accounting of «all its nuclear programs, nuclear weapons programs, materials, and any proliferation activity.» Mr. Bush also said the new agreement would «help secure the future peace and prosperity of the Northeast Asian region.»

Mr. Lefkowitz yesterday said human rights and national security are two complementary objectives in the administration's North Korea policy. «It is a false choice to say the United States policy should focus either on nuclear security or human rights; indeed, the two go hand and hand. We have very serious imminent interests in North Korea disarming,» he said.

There is also this choice Roh quote:

The talks left Roh with an impression that progress remains hindered by Kim's deep suspicions.

«North Korea still has some skepticism about the South and doesn't trust it enough,» the South Korean president was quoted as saying at a Wednesday luncheon after his first two-hour session of talks with Kim. «We need greater effort to demolish a wall of mistrust.»

Roh said the North Korean leader was suspicious about terms such as «openness» and «reform,» suggesting that he sees any rapid move toward Chinese-style economic reforms as a threat to his autocratic rule.

Mistrust also was evident in observers' reactions to the nuclear deal struck in Beijing. Many experts raised concerns over whether the deal would fully disable the North's nuclear facilities, or merely leave them easy to reassemble.

One can learn a lot through a child's eyes.

Alright, no Left Flank post would be complete without criticism of the Bush administration, even as it is praised. Ed Morrissey is refreshingly pragmatic, when he argues that «...A few million dollars to ensure security is a small price to pay, and besides, we can then ensure that the facilities really cannot be reused for a very long time.» Dilworth at KUS puts it a little more colorfully than I would, and Richardson is skeptical.

As my wife often says in these times, Korean events lurch two steps forward, and then one step back. Is this the progress, or the reaction? Let's meet again on December, 31!