Left Flank

Yesterday was Liberation Day in ROK. That I have mixed feelings about the day is an understatement.

On one hand, Liberation Day (or V-J day in the States) is an odd national holiday on the face of it. The day celebrates the surrender of the Japanese to the US and its WW2 allies, which as a result, liberated the Japanese colony of Chosen from Japanese rule. The Koreans did not liberate themselves, and many actively collaborated with the Japanese or joined the Communists in China.

Korea was not liberated truly from foreign intervention in August 1945 since Korea came under the spheres of influence by another two foreign powers (the US and the USSR). Moreover, Korea was not handed over to the Koreans to rule, but it was divided in half.

Much misconceptions exist about this transitional period, from 1945 to 1948. For example, a common belief is that the division of Korea was agreed upon by the allies at the Potsdam Conference, but during Cairo and Potsdam Conference discussions on the future of Korea, no mention was made specifically about a division of Korea, only that Korea would be granted independence in due course following the war. Without a clear agreed plan and with the Pacific War coming to end hastily, and Soviet troops nearing Korea and Japan, with US forces far away in the Pacific, the US came up with a unilateral and quickly-drawn proposal to divide Korea in half into two occupying zones (as Imperial Russia and Japan had proposed many years before when their ambitions on Korea clashed) so that the US would at least get a foothold in Korea even though it was not feasible to reach Korea in time to challenge the Soviet occupation of whole Korea. The US was surprised that the Soviets complied to this proposal and stopped at the 38th parallel. If a proposal for joint occupation of whole Korea was made, as in Austria, it would have expedited decolonialization of Korea and would have left Korea in one piece to chart its future. But that was not the case.

The US side maintains that the zonal occupation proposal was a temporary measure, a military one and not a political one, but history tells us that that fateful decision sealed a series of events that made the division of Korea permanent: different approaches to decolonialization and demilitarization of Japanese forces in Korea, the trusteeship confusion and debacle, deep polarization of political forces in respective zones, political assassinations and violent purges, uprisings and beginnings of civil war, border clashes that led to all-out war, foreign military interventions, precarious armistice with lack of peace treaty, security-first policies and political repression .......

One minor quibble: At Teheran, all parties agreed upon the principle of Korean independence. FDR at Yalta recommended dividing the Korean peninsula into trustee zones, administered by the US, USSR, and China, to prepare Korea for independence.
One major quibble: There were at least two Korean governments-in-exile, with many leaders self-exiled to other states. Inter-factional and personal squabbles between prominent Korean leaders, even those of the same hue, developed before the Japanese had even consolidated control of the peninsula. Also, both American and Soviet forces arrived on the peninsula after the formation of the Korean People's Republic on September 6, 1945, whose cabinet included both Communist and conservative leaders.

As Carter Eckert and Ki-baik Lee argue, «Koreans in 1945 were not merely pawns in a great power game: just as Koreans actions were affected by the presence of two foreign armies, so too were the Americans and Soviets influenced and constrained by the Korean milieu.» (p. 335) Generally, the Soviets allowed the KPR to do its work within its zone; Americans refused to recognize the KPR outright. Although both governments were committed to reconciliation of the trustee zones, local forces co-opting native, and antagonistic, political parties undermined the KPR and the zones devolved into states. Fratricidal enmity between politicians ensued, resulting in murder, exile, and marginalization. The enmity between Kim Il-sung and lee Syng-man predated the KPR and never abated.

Using the American and Soviet occupations as a justification for their own fratricidal enmity is a Korean specialty. The plain fact is, that Korean and foreigner contributed to the tragedy of division.

Yet, this continual revisionism only distracts from the present-day reality of a national holiday that oddly always uncovers the impotence of Korean nationalism, not its triumph. Worst of all, it's the time for presidential pardons, when eminent criminals and traffic violators get off easy. It's no surprise, that on July 17, Constitution Day, Seoul de-emphasized that national holiday by requiring South Koreans to work. Fratricidal enmity and government ineptitude are stronger than law in Korea still.

When confronted with such perspicacious insight as both Ampontan and the Asahi Daily display about an «infuriated South Korea», I'm reminded that by intimate acquaintance and hard lessons, that there is no such entity as «South Korea».
Adrian Buzo, in The Making of Modern Korea (2002), puts it rather prosaically, but depressingly well:

In avery important sense, then, Korean polity and culture is the sum of its individual communities, spreading outwards like innumerable, intersecting ripples on a pond to form the common historical entity we call Korea (pp. 3-4).

The waters are a little choppy right now.

US President George W. Bush's visit to Seoul these past two days is either a draw for conservative and progressive factions, or a nasty wake-up call for the future of ROK-US relations.

Both the Christian Science Monitor and the Online Newshour highlight the breadth of democratic opinion displayed in Seoul. On the other hand, it's not all about South Koreans' opinions.

In South Korea, Bush can expect protests during his visit, though Green says it would be simplistic to view those as anti-American. Bush had to postpone a visit scheduled for earlier this year because of massive protests against the Korean government's decision to allow import of US beef. But Green says the demonstrations are directed more at the reforms brought in by President Lee Myung Bak.

Noting South Korea's phenomenal transition after the Korean War to political stability and a high-tech economy, Green says that even protests for Bush's visit «are a good-news story because it shows the vibrancy of Korean democracy.»

Still, Bush will confront lingering South Korean resistance to US beef. Relations were irritated further when a US government geographic agency recently redesignated the small Dokdo islands claimed by both Japan and South Korea from «Korean» to «disputed.»

Bush has since rescinded the change, but not before seeing resentment rekindled in Seoul.

Such squalls might be more easily dismissed if the US were on stronger footing to assert its leadership, says Michigan's Mr. Lieberthal. «We are less well-positioned to go forward in Asia than we should be,» he says, pointing not just to America's perceived diplomatic weakness but to domestic conditions on the economy, infrastructure, healthcare that will require a domestic focus at a time of Asia's advance.

How much worse could it be after eight years?

Japan Probe's James capsulizes recent stories surrounding Japan-ROK (well, South Korean) disputes over Liancourt Rocks Tsushima(?)! And, there's a history of this lunacy?

I also found a Robert Neff piece about Tsushima which, while also mentioning assorted South Korean nuisances, points out the positive side of Japan-ROK economic diplomacy.

The relationship between Korea and Tsushima literally goes back hundreds of years.

Homer B. Hulbert, one of the early Western missionaries to Korea, claimed that Tsushima was dependent on the ancient Korean kingdom of Silla. «It is important to notice that the island of Tsushima, whether actually conquered by Silla or not, became a dependency of that kingdom,» because of its poor soil and inability to feed its own inhabitants and was annually aided by the Silla government.

Later, after the Imjin War, the Lords of Tsushima were the only ones allowed to conduct trade between Korea and Japan until just prior to Korea's opening to the West. Envoys sent to Japan also passed through Tsushima on their way to the Japanese capital.

This close relationship has led to the establishment of the annual Arirang Festival -- an event that involves the island's residents dressing up in Korean traditional clothing and hosting a parade attended by large numbers of Koreans. I was surprised several years ago to see Korean and Japanese flags prominently displayed and shown the same respect at the island's airport.

Many of the residents do speak a little Korean. In fact the last time I visited the island I noticed that most of the public servants studied some Korean. However, even though I speak Korean fairly well, most of the residents would not speak Korean with me. Considering almost no one speaks English -- including at the tourist hotel -- it made communication very difficult.

See! There's a Japan-ROK tradition of ESL illiteracy through which a lasting diplomatic alliance is possible! As Ampontan chides ROK Ambassador to Japan Kwon Chul-hyun for his provocative rants against his Japanese fantasy, it's not the Japanese antagonizing the South Koreans that's the reality at all

I had to piece the story of the ambassador together out of three different reports. One I read this morning in today's edition of the Nishinippon Shimbun.

Their account of the story was curious. They mentioned that Mr. Kwon called Japan an island country—which they said was a subtle Korean insult—but left out the part about the inherent Japanese desire to invade the continent.

Surely they knew about it and snipped it on purpose. Why? To prevent a heated reaction from their readers and avoid creating a bad impression of Koreans, obviously.

Remember that the next time you read a rant from a Western journalist, or a disaffected foreigner writing in the English-language press in Japan, or some blog, that would have you believe the press in this country often whips the insular, narrow-minded populace into a nationalist fervor.

Baloney. It just doesn't happen, and anyone who spends any amount of time here and is intellectually honest knows that.

It does happen in other East Asian countries, however. But none of them is an island.

The Fukuda administration is just as beset with political trials as the Lee administration in Seoul, so where does the onus lie for this flagrant outburst of febrile macho nationalism?

Both the conservative Chosun Daily and progressive Hankyoreh want foreign policy «coordination» on separate issues, the Mt. Geumgang shooting «event», Liancourt Rocks, and six-party talks. Which is to say, President Lee Myung-bak can't put his departmental ducks in a row.

One problem is that government agencies are taking uncoordinated steps. Kwon's remarks on linking Dokdo with the six-party talks had never been coordinated by the government. And the ministries of Unification and Foreign Affairs are also causing confusion by making quite different announcements over the shooting at Mt. Kumgang.

Hankyoreh calls it «flip-flopping».

Experts attribute the flip-flopping to a lack of a government-wide consensus on foreign affairs and security policy and the Blue House's inability to coordinate the opinions of government officials. In particular, they say the government committed a serious mistake in allowing high-ranking officials to make conflicting statements after the National Security Council meeting.

From a public policy perspective, how the various ROK ministries do or don't get along is very compelling. This all demonstrates why the liberal emphasis on bureaucracies and personalities within states are more meaningful than a state's rational interest, as realism asserts. Call it a labor of love, or wasting time. No one outside of Seoul cares what the Lee administration does, or doesn't do. All this policy dithering only marginalizes ROK diplomatically even more than it already is.

It wouldn't be the Korean peninsula if every incident didn't have at least three sides, North, conservative and progressive.

South Korean conservatives, under the care of «Dr.» Lee Myung-bak continue to preach and practice reasonableness and patience.

If the [CCTV]footage were turned over to the South, it would be possible to verify the North Korean story that Park walked a distance of 3.3 km in about 25 minutes. Whether Pyongyang will do so remains to be seen.

An Asan staffer said, «We have yet to confirm who is managing the CCTV and whether it is actually operating.» The CCTV footage, if it exists, could offer decisive evidence since there is only one South Korean witness to the incident and the two Koreas are making conflicting claims.

Progressives just see a string of novice political mistakes that improve their chances of returning to power.

The Lee administration seems to have set itself up for a fall. Since Lee’s inauguration, his aides have been none too happy about the National Intelligence Service’s intervening in inter-Korean relations as they had during the inter-Korean summit in October 2007. President Lee was reported to have instructed the NIS to focus on collecting information on the North, instead of taking the initiative in the inter-Korean dialogue behind the scenes as it has done in the past. Thus, the NIS has abandoned efforts to establish a channel for inter-Korean relations.

The North, too, has made drastic changes in the officials in charge of negotiating with the South. A government official said that a considerable number of related high-ranking officials in the North have been replaced this year due to corruption.

In the past problems have been resolved by South and North Korean authorities through official channels. For the past four months, however, the North has rejected all forms of official contact and demands that the June 15 and October 4 joint declarations be implemented as a pre-cursor to resumption of inter-Korean dialogue.

The deterioration in inter-Korean relations has made dealing with the shooting incident more complicated, and the shooting, in turn, has worsened ties between Seoul and Pyongyang.

This means that it will take more time to resolve difficult problems through official channels, or that there may be limitations in getting problems solved.

As for DPRK, I have to take issue with Gord Sellar:

Because to imagine this is some kind of highly-ornate chess move in a Communist plot against Lee Myung Bak’s government is to succumb to the same bloody idiocy, the same moronic paranoia that Park Chung Hee used to stay on top for almost two decades, that Chun Doo Hwan used to justify prolonged dictatorship and slaughter of civilians, the same over-the-top crap that people should have — and many already have — gotten over long ago. Hell, it’s the same tactic that now provides us with terror alert levels, so that, you know, we can not just be terrified when terrorists act, but also have that warm, fuzzy creeping feeling of terror all year long!

I like to use mnemonics, like DPRK or «Dr.» Lee Myung-bak, but they're labor-saving devices, not facts. I've passed from a state of adolescent pique that DPRK could exist, to an impishly bemused Piercean state where the existence of two Korean states and four other states leads to an even larger plurality of assertions the entire cabal cannot verify. I hope some metaphysical heads explode. Anyway, if twenty political entities assert twenty facts and commit to twenty courses of action, it's pathetic, but nothing more than human. The last solution the Koreans need is «one truth» dispensed by a «Dr.» or a dictator. Right now, the «truth» about Koreans is on full display.

After thinking about it, I think a student might have said it best, although at the time I thought the notion was daffy: the North sent a political message. Whatever that message might be is beyond me, or even those students today. Chosun Daily exhausts its wits.

This is stubbornness goes beyond the realms of reason. Heated rhetoric is nothing new from North Korea, but this tops everything we have seen before. The incident involves a North Korean soldier killing an unarmed South Korean woman by shooting her in the back. And she was dressed in civilian clothes as well. According to a formal agreement the two Koreas signed involving entry to and sojourn within the resort, North Korea is responsible for the safety of South Korean tourists. Even if a South Korean tourist violates regulations, North Korean authorities are required to stop the tourist first and then begin investigation. Yet before it took any other measures, North Korea simply pulled the trigger.

The North said a sentry fired warning shots before shooting the tourist, a 53-year-old Seoul housewife named Park Wang-ja. But a witness said only two shots were heard, and Park had two gunshot wounds. There is a strong possibility that no warning shots were fired at all. North Korea said Park left her hotel at 4:30 a.m. and walked 1.1 km to a fence enclosing the tourist beach. North Korea said Park then climbed over the fence and walked another 1.2 km until she came in front of a military guard post. After hearing a sentry tell her to stop, Park then ran back 1 km the way she came, until she was shot at 4:50 a.m. Thus the North Korean account.

If North Korea’s explanation is true, then in a span of just 20 minutes, Park would have traversed a distance of 3.3 km on ankle-deep sand. That means she traveled at a speed of 9.9 km/h. A healthy person in their 20s jogging briskly on level ground achieves no more than 8-9 km/h. So North Korea’s account makes no sense. It is hard not to be suspicious that the North is hiding the truth to cover up responsibility. The only way to get to the truth is for a South Korean fact-finding team to go Mt. Kumgang and investigate the scene. But North Korea is refusing to allow this.

Another college student on the tour has offered his account of the incident.

“Before dawn in the morning of July 11, I saw a 50-something woman in black walking toward the north and there was a fence, ” said Lee In-bok, 23, a sophomore at Kyungpook National University majoring in history, in a telephone interview with the Dong-A Ilbo. He said, “About 5-10 minutes afterwards, I heard two shootings with 10 seconds apart from the North and a scream.”

Lee, who was participating in the 2008 Mount Geumgang Life and Peace Camp for College Students, was sitting on the beach to see sunrise at the moment.

Lee said, “When she walked toward the fence, I did not take it seriously because I did not know whether the area was off-limits or there was a military watch house.”

He added, “Having heard of the shooting, I went up to a sand dune along the beach next to the fence and looked at where the gun shot came from. I found a person lying down. Three soldiers came out from bushes that were 300 meters away and touched the person with their feet to see whether she was dead or not.”

“When I first saw the scene, I thought it was a military drill or an internal problem and came back to the hotel. When I came back to the South, I heard that it was an accident,” he said. “Before the shooting, I heard some speaker sound from a village in the North, but I was not able to understand it clearly.”

Obviously, South Koreans take their «Southern» liberties far too lightly. In DPRK, a bullet is the price for making mistakes. There's also something so «Korean» about returning an accusation with a counter-accusation, as if considering the others' viewpoint is a diplomatic nuisance. And here, perhaps, that student today was right. Although it would seem, that with the Six-Party Talks continuing, Pyongyang receiving heavy fuel from Russia, and ROK President Lee MYung-bak considering inter-Korean relations and the shooting separate issues, Pyongyang can afford to be contrite. Or, contrariwise, it can now afford to be as confident and candid as it wants to be.