Left Flank

I don't understand the significance of this report by the left-leaning Asahi about the emergency scrambling by SDF jets on September 11 and 23, 2007 in response to PRC bombers near the Shirakaba/Chunxiao gas fields in the East China Sea. Is it a bipartisan reminder of the perfidy of Beijing meant to sour the latest Sino-Japanese summit?

Or, is it a piece of the "bluster and fear" Japan Observer (and the comments section is must-read, too) claims is the Japanese right's only strength?

One problem with this approach is that unless Japan rids itself of its security relationship with the US in near future, Japan's conservatives are dependent on the US government's sharing their views on Asia. Japan alone is not in a position to force China to change on any of the issues identified by Mr. Komori as problematic. Any confrontational approach would have to occur in sync with the US, with the US taking the lead. As we have seen in regard to both North Korea and Taiwan under the Bush administration, there is no guarantee that Washington will be on the side of Japanese conservatives even under a bellicose Republican administration. (On the economic front, though, perhaps Mr. Komori and his ilk should hope for a Democratic victory.)

Despite their lack of a concrete and constructive foreign policy agenda — no, the arc of freedom and prosperity does not count — the conservatives will undoubtedly step up their pressure on Mr. Fukuda on foreign policy in the New Year.

Just another little taste of how exciting 2008 could become...

Joshua Kurlantzick adds three reasons India considers the Burmese junta's suppression of anti-government riots an «internal matter (link removed)»: China; natural gas; and, security problems in its own southeast. Far from supporting the protesters as it did in 1988, India is signing production-sharing contracts with the Burmese government and building roads and pipelines between Myanmar and India. 

At the same time, as India's economy booms and it watches China gobble up oil and gas deals around the globe, Indian leaders covet Burma's petroleum riches, which will become even more internationally important as mature fields in the Middle East decline. (Burma may have as much as 300 billion cubic meters of gas, and India itself has few domestic sources of petroleum.) India is building a network of road links to Burma, and trying to get Burma to agree to a pipeline to northeastern India. Showing its interest, in 2004 India hosted thuggish junta chief Than Shwe for a lavish state visit to India, the first by any Burmese leader in 12 years. «India and not China should be getting this gas. It is vital for the economy of eastern India,» Nazib Arif, the former secretary of the Indian Chamber of Commerce, said.

(...)

Yet some Indian opinion leaders are beginning to question this unthinking support. Unlike an authoritarian state like China, India will never be able to provide the same level of blanket assistance for Burma, without criticism back in Delhi, at the United Nations, and from India's new partner, the United States, which worries about Delhi's relationship with rogues like Burma and Iran. Perhaps recognizing this, the Burmese generals still have favored Chinese oil and gas companies over their Indian competitors, inking larger deals with China.

How many other nefarious (and desperate) regimes are left to grant Myanmar diplomatic cover? Meanwhile, monks are disappearing.