Left Flank

Regarding US relations with marginal players in East and South Asia, such as the Koreas, Taiwan, and the ASEAN states, according to PINR's Mohan Malik, the centrality of Indo-PRC rivalry should be considered:

An internal study on India undertaken in mid-2005 (with inputs from China's South Asia watchers such as Cheng Ruisheng, Ma Jiali, Sun Shihai, Rong Ying, Shen Dingli, among others) at the behest of the Chinese leadership's «Foreign Affairs Cell» recommended that Beijing take all measures to maintain its current strategic leverage (in terms of territory, membership of the exclusive Permanent Five and Nuclear Five clubs); diplomatic advantages (special relationships, membership of regional and international organizations); and economic lead over India. Although the evidence is inconclusive, the most plausible deduction is that this internal re-assessment of India lies behind the recent hardening of China's stance on the territorial dispute and a whole range of other issues in China-India relations.

The Chinese are concerned that the U.S.-India nuclear deal and related agreements would bring about a major shift in the power balance in South Asia that is currently tilted in China's favor. The recent strengthening of China's strategic presence in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and overtures to the Maldives should, therefore, be seen against this backdrop. Despite protestations to the contrary from India and the United States that New Delhi is unwilling and unlikely to play the role of a closely aligned U.S. surrogate such as Japan or Britain, China's Asia strategy is based upon the premise that maritime powers such as the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India would eventually form an informal quadrilateral alliance to countervail continental China.

As a commentary in Huanqiu Shibao noted:

«The fact is that Japan, Australia, and India are respectively located at China's northeast, southeast, and southwest, and all are Asian powers, while U.S. power in the Pacific is still unchallengeable. Hence, should the «alliance of values» concentrating military and ideological flavors in one body take shape, it will have a very great impact on China's security environment.»

From Beijing's perspective, the responsibility for this «negative development» lies solely at New Delhi's door. In their writings, Chinese analysts seem upset over their southern neighbor's all-consuming passion to become «a big power,» and see the nuclear deal as its key to unlocking the door leading to the big league in world politics.

As a Renmin Ribao commentary noted in August:

The U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement has strong symbolic significance for India in achieving its dream of a powerful nation?In recent years, it introduced and implemented a 'Look-East' policy and joined most regional organizations in the East Asian region?In fact, the purpose of the United States to sign a civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement with India is to enclose India into its global partners' camp, so as to balance the forces of Asia [read, China]. This fits in exactly with India's wishes.

Once the nuclear deal crosses all the «big four hurdles» (opposition from pro-Chinese Communist parties in India; negotiations on I.A.E.A. safeguards; approval by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (N.S.G.); and its passage by the U.S. Congress), Beijing believes that it would end the nuclear symmetry between New Delhi and Islamabad (or, de-hyphenate the sub-continental rivals) and put India on par with nuclear China (re-hyphenate China with India).

This, from Beijing's perspective, is quite disconcerting because a major objective of China's South Asia policy has been to perpetuate parity between India and Pakistan. Add to this India's military exercises with the U.S., Japan and Australia, support for the concept of «concert of democracies,» and attempts to establish strategic ties with countries that fall within China's sphere of influence (Mongolia, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Myanmar) - all of these reinforce Beijing's fears about its containment. However, despite its strong disapproval of a pact that would narrow the power gap between India and China, Beijing would not want to take a stance that pushes India further into Washington's camp. Most likely, Beijing would use its N.S.G. membership to further its own and its allies' interests by:

Using the «double standards» argument to question Washington's commitment to non-proliferation goals in light of its decision to back India's nuclear industry while opposing the right to nuclear energy for Iran and Pakistan;

Insisting that any changes to the N.S.G. guidelines to accommodate the deal must not be «country [i.e., India]-specific» but «universal criteria-based» so that «all countries [read, Pakistan] can benefit from the peaceful use of atomic energy under the I.A.E.A. safeguards.» This formulation, outlined by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, would pave the way for the Chinese construction of the Chashma III and IV nuclear reactors in Pakistan;

Using the deal to extract major concessions from Washington, including an end to the arms embargo and the lifting of bans on high-tech dual-use technology exports to China;

Seeking new assurances that U.S.-India ties are not related to any «contain China» strategy.

The fact of the matter is that China and India are locked in a classic security dilemma: one country sees its own actions as self-defensive, but the same actions appear aggressive to the other. India feels the need to take counter-balancing measures and launch certain initiatives to stay independent of China - such as the «Look East» policy - which are perceived as challenging and threatening in China. Like China, India is actively seeking to reintegrate its periphery with the framework of regional economic cooperation. Like China, India seeks greater international status and influence commensurate with its growing economic power.

However, like any other established status quo great power, China wants to ensure that its position remains strong vis-�-vis challenger India for strategic, economic and geopolitical reasons. Through closer strategic ties with India's neighboring countries, China is warning India not to take any counter-measures to balance Beijing's growing might.

The implication from Dr. Mohan's argument is, that the Washington needs to consider decisions, that strengthen the quadrilateral relationship between Australia, India, Japan, and the US, and do not weaken containment at the weak points in the Koreas, Taiwan, and among the ASEAN states, including Myanmar. Domestic reform in Myanmar is probably impossible, since both Beijing and New Dehli view Myanmar's contiguity with Tibet troubling. But, it also means Washington should avoid actions, that alienate marginal players, like the Koreas and Taiwan, into a pro-PRC position, and instead opt for their neutrality.

Joshua Kurlantzick adds three reasons India considers the Burmese junta's suppression of anti-government riots an «internal matter»: China; natural gas; and, security problems in its own southeast. Far from supporting the protesters as it did in 1988, India is signing production-sharing contracts with the Burmese government and building roads and pipelines between Myanmar and India. 

At the same time, as India's economy booms and it watches China gobble up oil and gas deals around the globe, Indian leaders covet Burma's petroleum riches, which will become even more internationally important as mature fields in the Middle East decline. (Burma may have as much as 300 billion cubic meters of gas, and India itself has few domestic sources of petroleum.) India is building a network of road links to Burma, and trying to get Burma to agree to a pipeline to northeastern India. Showing its interest, in 2004 India hosted thuggish junta chief Than Shwe for a lavish state visit to India, the first by any Burmese leader in 12 years. «India and not China should be getting this gas. It is vital for the economy of eastern India,» Nazib Arif, the former secretary of the Indian Chamber of Commerce, said.

(...)

Yet some Indian opinion leaders are beginning to question this unthinking support. Unlike an authoritarian state like China, India will never be able to provide the same level of blanket assistance for Burma, without criticism back in Delhi, at the United Nations, and from India's new partner, the United States, which worries about Delhi's relationship with rogues like Burma and Iran. Perhaps recognizing this, the Burmese generals still have favored Chinese oil and gas companies over their Indian competitors, inking larger deals with China.

How many other nefarious (and desperate) regimes are left to grant Myanmar diplomatic cover? Meanwhile, monks are disappearing.