Left Flank

Here's a decidedly minority opinion about the consequences of Pyongyang's latest Six-Party reactions (via Observing Japan's «Bush tries to reassure Japan»:).

...it can be argued that the Six Party process, whatever its outcome, is helping to 'socialise' the Pyongyang regime, bringing it closer to the international community and making it slightly less likely that North Korea would ever use its weapons.

I have one problem with this intriguing notion. It works if Pyongyang has truly decided to change its ways. Yet, if consensus within the Six-Party process breaks down, then Pyongyang could reassert itself by resuming a divide-and-conquer strategy, with at least Beijing and Moscow in its corner. And, also, if the US is not sincere about the Six-Party process (which is different from what Roggeveen argues contra OFK), then, again, consensus and pressure on Pyongyang might fracture.

The problem I see with the DPRK nuclear issue is, that it is rarely a front-burner issue. A.Q, Khan's «Pakistani Pipeline» might have supplied enriched uranium technology. Beijing's diplomatic and economic influence on Pyongyang trumps American and South Korean efforts. Unification is politically more immediate in most South Koreans' minds. Japanese conservatives want the abductions issue resolved.

Pyongyang survives because its opponents don't.

TNR's J. Peter Scoblic attacks the cynical conservative argument against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

While pressuring the nuclear states to disarm, the NPT's most significant accomplishment has been to reassure non-nuclear states that they don't need the bomb, and in the past four decades more countries have given up nuclear weapons programs than have started them. In hindsight, the NPT seems like a diplomatic no-brainer.

But in 1968, it wasn't. Conservatives like Senator Barry Goldwater and right-wing organs like National Review railed against the NPT because it didn't fit into their binary, us-versus-them view of U.S. foreign policy. Conservatives distrusted international entanglements, and they feared that participating in a global security compact would simply embroil the United States in the problems of others. More specifically, they saw the Cold War as a battle between good and evil, and not only did negotiating the NPT require talking directly with the Soviet Union, they feared the treaty would undercut the fight against communism by forbidding us from giving nuclear weapons to our allies.

The Johnson administration had considered these arguments but ultimately decided that the proliferation of nuclear weapons had changed the way the world operated, undermining a zero-sum worldview in which a gain for us was automatically a loss for our enemies and vice-versa. Whatever the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons had made security interdependent--not only between the superpowers, but among all nations. As a presidentially appointed commission reported, «the Soviet Union, because of its growing vulnerability to proliferation among its neighbors, probably shares with us a strong interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons.»

The treaty, then, was more than just a good deal for the nuclear-weapons powers; it was a manifestation of a growing emphasis on collective security--like the United Nations, but more effective, because the United States and the Soviet Union were working with, and not against, each other despite their rivalry. It marked a different way of conducting international diplomacy.

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Sometimes a line is actually a series of concentric circles. DPRK and nuclear non-proliferation are two such issues, related but not overlapping. The 2008 American general elections only make this even more confusing.

Republican frontrunner John McCain's non-proliferation speech is a muddle. "[H]is proposals – many of which might sound good – don't match up with other things he has said on nuclear weapons, on Russia, on Iran and suggests he doesn't really get the complexity of these issues." It's hard to cobble together issues requiring coherence in an election season with disparate constituencies to placate, and non-proliferation seemingly has fallen regrettably into that default. The DPRK-related stuff shows the marks.

There are two DPRK-related issues: nukes and ending the Korean War. Liberals follow Pyongyang's line, that the two overlap, only the order is reversed in each case. Pyongyang wants recognition in return for which it promises to give up its nuclear programs; American liberals want at least the plutonium program and will then reward Pyongyang with diplomatic recognition. Conservatives just want to end Kim Jong-il's tyranny.

First (and just one example), the «less safe» call discounts or is oblivious to North Korea's highly enriched uranium program that put North Korea in breach of the 1994 Agreed Framework, or the fact that the Clinton administration swept that mess under the rug. For the record, any uranium program absolutely violated the 1994 agreement.

Second, ejecting the Bush administration's current policy of appeasement and going back to something that actually hurt Kim Jong-il's regime is ringing endorsement of John McCain's North Korea policy. Reinforcing that sentiment are statements made by McCain in 2006 (when Bush wasn't in Legacy Mode), a summary of his position from the Council on Foreign Relations, and information from his campaign website.

The problem with the DNC position is that you'd have to either delusional or ignorant of the history of relevant issues to believe that any real progress is being made right now. Under the 13 February 2007 agreement (DOC), North Korea was supposed to submit, «a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement,» over a year ago, and even the extended deadline is nearly six months over due. The Bush administration is now backsliding on those requirements. And the DNC somehow thinks that's the path to take? Appeasement would make American «safe»?

The Bush administration has tacked toward the liberals politically after putting everything on regime change early.

The missing link is an international component. All the afore-mentioned groups downplay how US non-proliferation policy from the 1970s to now has offered little more than inter-agency quarrels, between successive American administrations and the IAEA, and between various tribes of the American government, to compete for non-proliferation policy and short-term strategic goals. Non-proliferation has always lost. DPRK slipped through the cracks as a direct result of American negligence to shut down the AQ Khan network in its infancy. Tackling the issue now requires more multilateral consistency and effort than McCain (and here I disagree with Blake Hounshell) can conceivably tolerate or imagine. Related to this is the resolution to the question of American strategic interests in East Asia. However, these interests shouldn't conflict with the multilateral goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, which is where the US has been historically and hypocritically negligent.

Image by peace chicken via Flickr

There has already been much discussion about the remaining mysteries surrounding the Syrian plutonium-generation reactor. My own guess (and it is just a guess) is that the Syrian reactor was the fruit of a three-way partnership composed of Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Iran provided the money, idea, and leadership. Iran ordered Syria to provide the site and some of the labor. North Korea provided the expertise, for which Iran paid (directly or indirectly) in cash.

But where Westhawk is even more helpful is the other half of his post: , the NPT system is broken, so he asks, «What will replace the broken NPT-IAEA system?» I would argue that the system is fundamentally sound, if only nuclear powers with intelligence assets would share information and let the IAEA do its job.

The challenge of proliferation control lies not in the lack of proven techniques but in the absence of moral suasion and sustained diplomacy by the world leaders. The American government subsidized the spread of nuclear knowledge through the Atoms for Peace program to counter Soviet influence, and at virtually every critical juncture since then successive administrations have set aside long-term proliferation goals in favor of short-term strategic priorities. (Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets, and How We Could Have Stopped Him, p. 1844, Palm e-book)

Collins and Frantz advocate the following proposals to fix the system:

• a moratorium on enriched uranium;
• revision of the NPT, including eliminating the right to opt-out and a UN commitment to sanction violators;
• the reduction of nuclear arsenals and a moratorium on the creation of a new generation of weapons;
• restrictions on sales of nuclear technology;
• monitoring of civilian nuclear industries;
• intelligence-sharing

With the exception of sanctions, which are generally a worse remedy than the problems they seek to cure, this is a sane international nuclear policy

Matthew Yglesias and Chris Bowers have excellent reasons why America should not have a manned space program.

Matt's rationale against a manned space program: "Unmanned missions are, at the moment, the ones really pushing the frontiers of our knowledge and that's going to continue to be the case for the foreseeable future. That's where we ought to be focusing our energies."

Chris' rationales against a manned space program: "Space exploration is not an issue with clear partisan divisions. Some conservatives view it as a wasteful government expenditure that is better handled through private enterprise, while some progressives view it through a utilitarian lens in that it does not provide much direct benefit to humanity."

I have another reason: without international cooperation on terrestrial weapons programs, space exploration will create an exponentially more dangerous space and terrestrial environment for military and civilian participants and the average layperson.

Confusingly, pundits, politicians, and experts cannot even use clear terminology. The Russians and Chinese propose a space treaty? No, it's an anti-missile, or an anti-satellite treaty. The satellites and missiles are landing and falling on earth! Please stop calling it "outer space"! We have no idea what "outer space" is, so stop trying to appropriate the word, like you know something other than how to use clubs and knives!

Speaking of which, it seems the Bush administration has not progressed past the point of cowboy instincts.

This logic — «hey, why not?» — is always suspect. It reverses the burden of proof, placing the emphasis on those who oppose the intercept.

Yet, this is an «extraordinary» measure (General Cartwright's phrase) against a «small» risk (his phrase again). Justifying requires demonstrating not just that one risk is greater than another, but that one has high confidence that estimates of the risks are accurate and complete.

Holding aside my general worry that this Administration is not to be trusted with sharp objects, there are specific reasons to be skeptical of both the accuracy and the completeness of this Administration's calculations. I strongly suspect that they are systematically discounting two types of hard-to-quantify risks — the possibility of error within the estimates and the political costs to conducting an anti-satellite intercept.

Since I'm not a wonk, let me stick to political costs.

This move by Russia mirrors a similar move by the United States in 2006 when it presented to the Conference on Disarmament a draft treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Conference now has two draft treaties on the table (and is unable to begin work on either). The current plan to break the deadlock in the CD involves four elements: Negotiations on a treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons and substantive discussions on three other issues - preventing an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament, and assurances to non-nuclear weapons States that they will not be attacked or threatened by nuclear weapons.

The introduction by Russia and China of a draft treaty to keep weapons out of space does not alter one iota the current plan to break the deadlock in the CD. Foreign Minister Lavrov made it quite clear when presenting the draft text that it had, as he put it, a "research mandate" and that it would "not add any complications to achieving a compromise on the programme of work of the Conference." In his message to the Conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi expressed the hope that the CD would "start substantive discussion and reach consensus on [the draft treaty] as soon as possible." Russia and China are not, as has been erroneously reported, calling for immediate negotiations on this draft treaty. Rather, they are proposing that it serve as a focal point for substantive discussions, with a view to negotiations sometime in the future. This is entirely consistent with the current plan to break the deadlock in the CD.

This is why the strong negative reactions to the Sino-Russian proposal reported coming out of Washington are somewhat puzzling. After long opposition to holding even discussions on outer space in the Conference on Disarmament, the United States last year changed its position by deciding that it would "not stand in the way of consensus" to break the deadlock in the CD. This essentially means that the U.S. would allow substantive discussions on outer space to take place as long as negotiations on a treaty on fissile material could get underway. All the Sino-Russian proposal does, really, is to provide a focus for the substantive discussions on outer space. The Washington Times reported that U.S. State Department Officials thought that "Moscow and Beijing are trying to upstage Washington with their draft." In fact, the U.S. draft treaty on fissile material and the Sino-Russian draft treaty on outer space are not in opposition to one another.

But, to be fair, Beijing is very confidant in its anti-democratic pose, although its better instinct is to tread softly. Russia is just a big oaf that bullies with oil and nukes. There's a space in which PRC and US can negotiate earnestly, if both follow their better instincts, dropping the cowboy and the anti-democratic poses. And, for both, there are nasty consequences that could result from stoking populist currents in their respective populations.

China's political leadership is held hostage by both a Chinese society spinning out of its control and by a nationalistic and reactionary populace angry at old grievances and increasingly intoxicated with China's rising power. As much as China's political and military leaders would like to be reasonable and work cooperatively with the U.S. and China's neighbors, these Chinese leaders fear an emotional uprising from their own countrymen should they appear too willing to compromise with China's old enemies. During the next crisis over Taiwan, or Japan, or with the U.S. Navy, China's leaders may find themselves forced to choose between reckless escalation or an overthrow at the hands of a nationalist rebellion.

That's why this short essay from Bill Owens, a retired four-star admiral and ex-vice chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, and was chief executive of Nortel and Teledesic, is so compelling.

Foremost, Owens uses the term, "commons", which gets to the salient economic characteristic of that vacuum beyond Earth's populist-fuelled outer atmosphere. Owens applies it to "the economy, open seas and skies, space and the internet", but let's be Owens-like, please!

Mind you, I disagree with him.

First, a no-first-use agreement on cyber attack. An agreement not to be the first to employ a cyber attack against the other country would not eliminate the capability to do it. But it would add inhibitions, set an example and secure cyberspace as the foundation of the new information age.

Second, collaborative anti-piracy operations on the seas, which are of growing importance to freedom of navigation affecting all nations. The US and China both oppose piracy but we do not co-ordinate enough. We could turn ad hoc co-ordination into real solutions, from database and information exchanges to combined exercises, patrols and counter-piracy operations.

Third, a collaborative, space-based information system to achieve global military transparency. We have a space-based surveillance system capable of tracking significant military and perhaps terrorist operations anywhere on the earth's surface. If China and the US came together to collect and provide this information globally, the world could benefit. Such collaboration would not only establish a new US-China relationship; it would also accelerate modernisation of the industrial-age militaries that make mass destruction feasible and likely.

Military co-operation could also allow both countries to reduce defence budgets and commit funds to long-term global initiatives in education, health and environmental preservation. If both militaries become locked in competition, these opportunities disappear.

Fourth, commitment to having no weapons in space and the early reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. China's recent space exploration is impressively important, in part because it could spark a new arms race in space. By committing to keep space weapons-free, China and the US can work to ensure peaceful and stable exploration.

A significant reduction of nuclear weapons (to fewer than 1,000) could preclude another arms race. It would also help reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations. A co-ordinated stand could trigger a real shift towards the renunciation of nuclear weapons, not only by Russia and the established nuclear powers, but also by unstable nations where the combination of terrorism and nuclear potency is most dangerous.

Fifth, a collaborative reduction of pollution from coal power generation. If there is a single issue in which US-China collaboration could make a world-changing difference, it is here. China and the US burn more than half the coal used today, producing most of the carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide that create global warming. Together, China and the US have the scientific and engineering base to address this environmental threat. Doing so would also alter the competitive role of oil production in international security. If the US and China were to establish a $100bn clean coal research fund, it could lead to a drop of 30 per cent in oil prices.

Obviously, the essay has the lung-cleansing scent that comes from a room full of people who can count for a living, but it indicates the path to take.

Now #4 makes me wince. I have this fantasy where NASA runs the cavalry, today's Navy and Air Force combined, which rescues space freighters and dizzy scientists on quixotic missions from, umm, unspecified dangers. The cavalry needs tactical weapons. But, strategic weapons turning satellites into debris which impedes launches and transport to and from Earth are verboten.

So, yes, I agree with Matt conditionally. If the current situation is all earthlings can devise, then unmanned missions are optimal. But, if we want to make space work for us and, as Chris prosaically argues, fulfill our humanity, then the US and China (and Russia) have to follow their better instincts. Between regressing to a 19th Century slugfest between mandarins, cossacks, and cowboys, and taming the commons, the last frontier, there's no metaphorical challenge.

Just call me far-sighted, but if outer space—let's not even belabor the point, that all this talk about "space" is about WMD—is left pristine, how will private enterprise ever reach farther than the lower reaches of Earth's atmosphere?

It's the nuke deal that will never die! 

So, the deal may not pass. But a paradox of the current mess is that few doubt that it※perhaps rejigged a bit※will be passed eventually. The task may fall to future governments in Delhi and Washington. If so, the terms can only get worse for India.

Although I prefer multilateral solutions in this case, Indian Communists' absolute intransigence on the 123 Agreement seems petty, and merely the worst sort of populist anti-Americanism. But, if India's government could get the IAEA's and the Nuclear Suppliers Group's approval for the bilateral deal to pass in both legislatures, why not just join the NPT?