Left Flank

That sentiment, that we broke Iraq, and we owe it to the Iraqi people, to ensure them a mended country, looks even more threadbare the more Max Boot protests.

The Iraq war was not sold on the basis of protecting US interests in the region. It was sold on protecting us from a massively over-stated threat, and then to allow for a post-Saddam democracy of sorts. If the Iraqis ask us to leave, we have no business staying. And posts like Boot's today can only reinforce suspicions that the real motive for invading Iraq was rather different - not incidentally - from that given at the time.

Of course, it's politics as usual in Baghdad, and not even PM Nuri al-Maliki is any better than an Alaskan senator.

Juan Cole argues that Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki faces political pressure from Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr and Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani to get US troops out of Iraq. As for the impact upon the US presidential race, Cole is certain, Senator Obama comes out stronger.

The major debate that the Republicans were looking forward to having
revolved around the success of the troop escalation of 2007-2008, now
mostly over. They want to argue that the escalation showed that Iraq is
not an unwinnable war and that counter-insurgency techniques could tamp
down violence. Therefore, there was no reason for the next president to
withdraw US troops. Moreover, McCain argued, if the US withdrew from
Iraq, «al-Qaeda» would take over the country and use it as a base to
attack the American mainland. A timetable for withdrawal was both
unnecessarily defeatist and also highly unwise, they were saying. They
completely ignored the political yields expected of the troop
escalation, most of which have not materialized, concentrating only on
death statistics.

The idea that a tiny fringe terrorist group
not popular with even Sunni Arab Iraqis could take over a largely
Shiite country with a large Kurdish minority was always daft and that
McCain alleged it is already reason to question whether he has the
judgment to be president.

Matthew Yglesias underscores the «logic of a timetable»:

The Iraqi government, it seems clear, would like some continued support
from US combat forces. And the United States, for good reason, doesn't
want its forces running around Iraq engaged in combat while being
subject to Iraqi law rather than the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
At the same time, the Iraqi government wants to be the government of a
real sovereign country which is incompatible with a foreign army
running around the country engaged in active combat and not subject to
Iraqi law. One easy way to thread the needle of continued US combat
engagement in Iraq while maintaining a meaningful sense of Iraqi
sovereignty is to make the US presence temporary in a definitive
way. Which is to say -- setting a timetable for withdrawal. That should
buy the United States an added degree of public support within which to
conduct some additional operations and leave the best possible
situation behind.

I rarely blog about Iraq, but, as in 2003 with its moderate defense of the original invasion—"the least bad of the limited range of available options"— The Economist's appraisal is reasonable. (Although, admittedly, I do believe I accepted the utility of the invasion based not on President Bush's or Secretary of State Powell's support, but because The Economist offered a more reasonable recommendation. The shame of the ensuing debacle has only been exacerbated for me, when I realize The Economist assumed too graciously the Bush administration deserved the effort).

To that extent, Iraq is still far from normality. But if the calm survives, politics will at least have a chance. Mr Maliki's next job is therefore to go ahead with the provincial elections due before the end of the year. A good showing by the Sunnis, too few of whom voted in 2005, could bring them back into the political mainstream, enabling them to wield serious power in their own provinces at least. The elections can also provide a useful alternative path to power for the Sadrists, if they really have given up violence and decide to take part.

George Bush meanwhile has a further part to play, which consists mainly of not doing things that might tempt him. He should not, for example, attack Iran. One of the impressive things about Iraq's present government is its refusal to take sides between America and its next-door neighbour. It needs good relations with both if it is to prosper. Mr Bush has also to find a way to leave to his successor the business of negotiating a new agreement on the status of American forces in Iraq. This may become a toxic issue in Iraq's elections as the existing UN mandate expires. Mr Maliki is said to want a guarantee that America will defend its borders. His opponents accuse America of seeking permanent bases in Iraq, turning it into a vassal. It would be wrong for a lame duck in Washington to tie the hands of the next administration on such matters.

In highlighting the improved conditions in Iraq we do not mean to justify The Economist's support of the invasion of 2003. Too many lives have been shattered for that. History will still record that the invasion and occupation have been a debacle. Iraqis even now live under daily threat of violent death: hundreds are killed each month. They remain woefully short of the necessities of life, such as jobs, clean water and electricity. Iraq's government is gaining confidence faster than competence. It is still fractious, and in many places corrupt.

Nor does it follow that a turn for the better necessarily validates John McCain's insistence on America staying indefinitely. A safer Iraq might make Barack Obama's plan to pull out most American troops within 16 months more feasible, though at the moment a precipitate withdrawal looks foolish. But to guard the fragile improvements, the key for America must be flexibility. Both candidates have to keep their options open. If America's next president gets Iraq wrong because he has boxed himself in during the campaign, all the recent gains may be squandered and Iraq will slide swiftly back into misery and despair. That would be to fail twice over.

Of course, I could be too optimistic again (about either party's candidate), and perhaps the problem is endemic to American political culture. Don't say I didn't learn something from this mess, which is more than I can say for the Bush administration.

Continue the interview with Part 2.

I want to believe the trends are good, and Reihan Salam is right.

But Maliki did something unexpected: He fired those who refused to fight and pressed on with the offensive, in Basra and also in Sadr City, where a second front opened up. A tenuous ceasefire took hold in Basra, and ISF forces have cleared the streets of the militias, using tactics drawn from the surge. This was done with a strikingly small number of American and British troops, though coalition assistance proved crucial. And now, as The New York Times reported yesterday, something resembling normal life is taking hold. In particular, the vigilantes who use violence to enforce their allegedly Islamic ethical code have been driven out, and you can once again hear music playing in the streets.

Though these gains may be temporary, there has also been a more lasting change: The Sadrists have been marginalized. Even the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has been reluctant to make political interventions in recent years, pointedly condemned Sadr for refusing to disarm. Leading Sunni faction have also returned to the fold. The Kurds, who have their own problems with Sadr, are also on board. Maliki, suprisingly enough, increasingly looks like the leader of all Iraqis.

So what does this mean for our debate over Iraq? Advocates of withdrawal will insist that Maliki's forces are just as penetrated by the Iranians as the Sadrist militias. But as noted above, this reflects a simple misunderstanding of Iranian influence. The fighting in Basra and Sadr City hasn't simply pitted one set of Iranian-backed militas (one in ISF uniforms) against another, and it's clear that the forces that controlled Basra weren't popular at all: The city really was, as Maliki argued, in the grip of criminal gangs who terrorized the population.

Alternatively, proponents of withdrawal will argue that Maliki's Charge of the Knights would have failed without substantial American assistance, which is true -- but it's also true that the ISF has become an increasingly effective fighting force. Moreover, the successes of the last month demonstrate that Maliki's government isn't the Vichy government the most strident anti-war voices have suggested. Rather, it is a government that actually represents the interests of Iraq's vast majority.

The smartest case for withdrawal would acknowledge this new reality, and claim that it demonstrates that coalition forces are superfluous and can thus be safely withdrawn. It's true that Maliki's government now has momentum, and would have a fighting chance to survive if U.S. forces are rapidly withdrawn. But the government's chances would be far stronger with a continued American presence backing its efforts up. Unfortunately, few Americans understand what Maliki has accomplished, and how much international assistance he needs to beat back foreign elements that aim to undermine Iraq's fragile democracy -- which is, as far as neighboring governments are concerned (particularly those that begin with an "I" and end with an "n"), a profoundly subversive influence.

But, in no way will I accept any Bush administration official telling me this was the plan all along. Getting it right, by doing the right thing, the first time is the only way to go.