The Long View on a "Short" History of North Korean Nukes
In what promises to be a thought-provoking essay on the North Korean nuclear program, Eli Lewine posts the first part of «A Short History of the North Korean Nuclear Program». If I'm reading correctly, here's the three most suspicious culprits so far:
- An NSC decision in 1953 to leak the intended use of nuclear weapons, if DPRK-US negotiations at Panmunjom did not move forward
- Both the Soviet Union and President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program for allowing the DPRK to research nuclear energy
- The first Bush administration's failure to follow up the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991 with further negotiations
So, Pyongyang was not as irrational as some would believe. One aspect of this «History» that I do find compelling is the role the negotiations at Panmunjom played in setting the parameters of the relationship between Pyongyang and the US, and really the world. Instead of being a two-year sideshow to the tactical military main show outside, Panmunjom offers in vitro the way Pyongyang learned how to deal with its adversaries.





