Left Flank

The official death toll in Myanmar is, as of Friday, 77,738 (and approximately 56,000 missing). According to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, over 60,000 planeloads of aid have been delivered. Ban called the situation a "human tragedy".

Yet, in an interview on PBS, Secretary-General Ban, discussing the recent international debate over "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), called R2P "important", but related to criminal acts. Ban distinguished between political and humanitarian matters, and refused to consider R2P in the humanitarian context of the Burmese emergency. This contradicts what John Boonstra argues:

The debate over R2P in Burma, of course, is essentially a political one, as the issue is no longer the death and destruction caused by Nargis, but that caused by the exacerbating and obstructionist tactics of the country's ruling junta. As Gareth Evans, the author of the report establishing R2P, wisely reminds us, intervention in the case of a natural disaster is only even possible under the aegis of R2P if a government's calculated disregard for its citizens amounts to a crime against humanity. The doctrine was not intended as a shortcut for the international community to provide relief in desperate cases of natural disaster.

On PRC, Ban characterized the post-earthquake situation as "humanitarian", and then commended the Chinese government for its performance.

The R2P debate is more about UN "inside baseball" and NGO assertiveness than helping Myanmar or PRC. If any state is so deficient in its relief capabilities, western states, as expert as they consider themselves, should catch them up. But, this is all a horrendous red herring. It's development, stupid! If it were not for the fact, that developing states, like Myanmar and PRC, have burgeoning populations in disaster-prone areas, there would be less need for more relief capabilities. The UN needs to lead on sustainable, environmentally-sustainable development away from marginal areas, not create world government.

Robert Farley says it more succinctly, but invading Myanmar to help it "...a terrible idea." Mark Leon Goldberg concurs, calling intervention "...a distraction and counterproductive to first imperative of helping those in danger." The comments section on the first blog is excellent, too, and I won't waste time pasting my comments on both here.

Some color commentary:

There's no excuse for the behavior of Burma's leaders, but history offers an explanation that goes beyond sheer autocratic barbarism. As friendly as the Burmese can be to Western tourists, they have reason to be suspicious about their neighbors and outside powers -- they have been sandwiched between empires in India and China; subjugated and exploited by Great Britain; devastated by Japan (and the Allies) during World War II; and vulnerable in the second half of the 20th century to meddling by Thailand, rogue Chinese nationalists, and other factions and interests. Hand in hand with that xenophobia goes a fierce pride: For much of their history they've been not just survivors, but builders of a Burmese empire that, at its zenith in the mid-11th century, controlled a large chunk of mainland Southeast Asia.

Finally, I don't know what to make of Robert D, Kaplan's NYT op-ed. After plugging intervention, he seems to undermine his case at the end.

It seems like a simple moral decision: help the survivors of the cyclone. But liberating Iraq from an Arab Stalin also seemed simple and moral. (And it might have been, had we planned for the aftermath.) Sending in marines and sailors is the easy part; but make no mistake, the very act of our invasion could land us with the responsibility for fixing Burma afterward.

I didn't think we (is that the imperial pronoun?) were trying to fix Myanmar, just help it. Are we so deluded that we believe we can just use force with a smile?

The reason why I'm lately obsessed with disasters, like the earthquake in PRC and Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, is rewarded by Ross Douthat's post questioning liberal international hawks...

...offering a long-term agenda as a response to a question - how, when where and why the U.S. and our allies should intervene abroad - that tends to manifest itself as a series of discrete and very immediate challenges. It's all very well to say that the United States should be trying to build a world order in which great powers like Russia and China are willing to sign on whatever sort of Burmese intervention might theoretically be sanctioned under the "Responsibility to Protect" umbrella, but even if you're optimistic that such a world order is attainable - which Matt is, and I'm not - it's still far enough off that we can expect many more Burma-style (or Darfur-style, or Kosovo-style, or Rwanda-style) quandaries in the meantime. And answering the "what is to be done?" question that invariably accompanies these crises by saying that "American officials ...should keep pushing the international community to move to a world where something like the Responsibility to Protect has some force in the real world" amounts to answering it by saying "in the short term, nothing."

I have two problems.

Firstly, interventionism, as manifest in R2P, is the flip side of gunboat diplomacy, which to work requires a substantive military threat lurking over the horizon. Many more states would be willing to call America's bluff here, and so, the risk of appearing weak increases.

Secondly, the emphasis is wrong. It's not, in these two cases, that the CCP or SPDC are despotic, or even completely incompetent. According to Art Lerner-Lam in Foreign Policy, "[t]he Chinese have a very sophisticated system of response, even relative to global standards. They rely heavily on their military, and they have a large civilian component of engineers and scientists who assist. The problem is not with the system, but with the particulars of this event." The problem, then, is, that a disaster occurred. The international community needs to ask, why did a disaster occur? The answer is not primarily military, but is extremely political.

FP: There have been a number of natural disasters in East and Southeast Asia in recent months. Is this region particularly susceptible to disasters compared with others, and will it become increasingly so in the years to come?

(Art Lerner-Lam) ALL: To answer your first question, yes. East, South, and Southeast Asia are all highly susceptible and have what we call a multi-hazard risk profile. They are subjected to typhoons, cyclones, flooding, earthquakes, landslides, and in the case of Indonesia, volcanoes. From a geographic perspective, [these regions] are very susceptible to a whole range of hazards.

Whether the risk is increasing depends on two factors. One, are the hazards themselves increasing in frequency or severity? And two, are people becoming increasingly vulnerable in terms of population density and infrastructure? In the first case, you have to be a bit careful. We are not seeing increases in geological disasters such as earthquakes; you wouldn't expect that. Those are geological processes, so the rate of occurrence should be somewhat consistent over time. But with sea-level rise, which we accrue to global warming, there is some potential for there to be an increase in cyclones.

But the changes in the natural frequency and severity of hazards are dwarfed by the changes in urbanization and construction practices. The key issues in vulnerability are related to social, economic, and political factors more than they are to the geographic factors: building cities near coastlines, improper construction, having institutions that are incapable of understanding the magnitude of a disaster and putting together a response—Myanmar being a case in point. You can attribute most of the increase in disaster losses to changes in the patterns of development.

In other words, the SPDC's human rights record and its development record are two separate issues. ANY government that allows urbanization and hyper-density in high risks areas is in a sense irresponsible, These problems are geological and climatological. The UN, or the US or France, can condemn Yangon for slaughtering Karen. But, until any government devises a way to avoid setting poorer humans atop a veritable time bomb of questionable terrestrial real estate, it needs to stop wagging fingers. There are thornier issues involved here than gunboat diplomacy. There is no way to compare PRC's response to the American response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, because no one has done well addressing the fundamental issue of why so many people would want to live in areas no sane animal would want to squat on.

Again, one can question how Beijing treats Tibetans, or the SPDC treats most of its population. But, it's convenient hypocrisy to pass moral judgment on any government whose territory includes dirt of marginal, or even, dangerous, quality, when no one is brave enough to question why unfortunate people just have to live in hëll, and on top it, have to endure a spectacle of fortunate, so-called educated people yelling over their struggling heads ignoring them.

Liberal hawks vs. neocons vs. realists...old quarrel! The relic of a pampered elite in a golden age. Move on!

Lastest news from WOLONG (Earthquake in PRC), originally uploaded by anitalee.

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Beijing's senior leadership continues to learn, on the job.

While the causes of individual building failures remain unclear, such complaints underscore widespread concerns about the quality of much of China's infrastructure amid an unparalleled but only patchily supervised national building surge. The criticism is also a potent reminder of the political risks that natural disasters – with their merciless exposure of administrative or societal failings – can pose even to rulers as firmly rooted as China's Communist party.

So far Beijing leaders have appeared well prepared to minimise such risks. Hu Jintao, China's president, and Wen Jiabao, the premier, reacted decisively and very publicly within hours of the quake on Monday. And state-controlled media have kept Mr Wen centre-stage in their coverage from the earthquake zone ever since.

«This is clearly a team that realises they cannot muck around on disaster relief,» says David Zweig, director of the Centre on China's Transnational Relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

Mr Wen's calls for local officials to redouble relief efforts have bolstered his man-of-the-people image and attracted online praise for the government, largely drowning out accusations of shoddy school construction and anger that officials failed to forecast the quake.

Victor Shih reports also on "...a quake and disaster relief work headquarters with Comrade Wen Jiabao as the head and Comrades Li Keqiang and Hui Liangyu as the deputy heads to take full charge of the current quake and disaster relief work."

Matthew Lee pursues the question of which countries can aid Myanmar, by what the UN calls the "right to protect" (R2P). The Burmese case doesn't fall into the four categories, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, that would trigger R2P. That would rule out UN action. Mark Leon Goldberg, however, advocates a less rigorous criterion: "...the international community is permitted to violate the sovereignty of a country when that country is unwilling or unable to prevent mass atrocities from being visited upon its own citizens."

Although western-donated aid is mostly stymied by Burmese authorities, Chinese and Indian-donated aid has reached Myanmar, according to Lee's reporting. Spencer Ackerman confirms this willful obstructionism, and pleads for a solution, even by force. I think Lee is onto a pertinent issue: not R2P, but how states disburse aid.

...developments this week lead Inner City Press to wonder why China does not develop and publicize its own humanitarian machinery, its own Chinese Bernard Kouchner. It could fly aid into Yangon, and film itself doing it. It could say, "we don't need these Western NGOs, we'll do it ourselves." Supposedly China hired a U.S. public relations firm to burnish its image. Where are they? Then again, the Chinese mission has not done an on-camera stakeout interview outside the Council since October 2007.

On the other hand, or foot, at the Security Council stakeout after China's Amb. Liu said that China flew into Yangon "tents and money," one wag muttered, "And guns." Still another said that the French oil industry active in Myanmar ought to be delivering aid. We will continue to explore these issues.

There's a difference between France's hunger for limelight and PRC's quiet approach. Could this be the foundation of a Bolton-PRC alliance against UN empowerment explicit in R2P? I'm not comfortable with the notion of world government, but that doesn't rule out governance. There needs to be accountability somewhere, whether it's Beijing's responsibility or aid NGOs.

Image via Wikipedia

The US needs Beijing to tackle the DPRK issue, but not how you might think.

Realizing this, the US, South Korea, and Japan should urge the one state with true leverage of Pyongyang - China - to press its own model of economic reform on the North's leadership.

Two complimentary reasons stand out for this long-term policy course. The first is that, as hinted above, without doing so, there will be little incentive for Pyongyang to cease its involvement in the trade of illicit goods. There is a much greater chance of reigning this activities in if sustainable revenue - with positive consequences for the state that do not threaten its neighbors, international security, or international markets - is a tangible reality for North Korea.

The second is that there is no alternative. A maintenance of the status quo does little to rescue North Korea's incentives to remain mired in the black market. Seeking to choke the regime, as Washington was doing until recently, can only force it into a desperate corner. Moreover, forcing a state collapse in Pyongyang is not, and probably never will be, an attractive or feasible option for a number of reasons. First and foremost, it assumes that Washington is capable of doing so, which in turn assumes that the US has any real leverage over North Korea. This is not the case so long as Beijing remains the regime's true financier and largest external source of goods. Furthermore, North Korea's neighbors have no desire to see the regime collapse anytime soon primarily because they will be the ones tasked with picking up the pieces. China, for instance, already struggles with the flow of refugees from North Korea and knows very well that in the event of a North Korean collapse, those problems will worsen exponentially and might even materialize a host of unknown (and perhaps worse) scenarios. South Korea, for its part, fears a North Korean collapse that would force it to absorb the poverty-stricken Northern state into its territorial protection - an immediate reunification that no one would have anticipated or truly planned for. The result would be a premature merging of the world's twelfth largest economy with one of the world's weakest states. Seoul is not opposed to Korean reunification in principle, but it is not willing to do so at the expense of its own economic growth, hence its emphasis on raising the standard of living in North Korea (something designed to soften the eventual blow, apart from the obvious humanitarian reasons).

This argument sounds familiar! Didn't a Heritage or AEI fellow characterize DPRK as a failed Stalinist state that needed to return to orthodoxy, by abandoning the quirky leader cult and military-first policy?

I have a small problem with foreign policy analysis of the sort Mathew Yglesias and Reihan Salam are doing in this fast-talking, book-plugging bhTV diavlog—old school! Instead of taking American ca