Left Flank

Pendagon wins the contest for apt sentiments:

Our hearts are with those who struggle in Burma because they must, because you will never be wholly owned as long as you continue to struggle. It's easy for me to say that, though, isn't it? Which is why writing this is hard; my awe of those who put their lives on the line is humbling. May we all have the courage of our convictions as those who struggle against the military dictatorship do.

And, here, I was going to stop. Discussing what is admirable, though, should not detract from criticizing what, as it were, is making Sisyphus push that rock up that hill. There's a reason why Myanmar is a problem, and it's not because any one country has not gotten tough, or not because of a dearth of sanctions laws, or lack of publicity. It's because the world can never agree what needs to be done, and is more concerned for its own national concerns.

Ed Morrissey attacks sanctions, justifiably:

Sanctions alone have never collapsed a tyranny. Usually it just results in misery for the people who already suffer under the oppressive tyrants, a dynamic which the UN tried to avoid in Iraq by establishing the Oil-for-Food program. That turned into a massive corruption scandal that wound up enriching the tyrant that sanctions supposedly targeted. Even without the corruption, the sanctions lost popularity in just a couple of years, with some nations arguing that they killed 5,000 Iraqi children a month. The world has almost as little tenacity for sanctions as they do for military action.

The notion that worldwide condemnation would change the direction of the military junta seems mostly naive.

In another post, he attacks the shame weapon:

This process enables people to change action for rhetoric. We do that often enough already. In the case of Burma, even the testimony of diplomats attesting to dozens dead in the streets hasn't convinced China, Thailand, or India to cut off Burma and close down trade with them. Are we to believe that a strongly-worded letter from the State Department recapping what everyone already knows about the Burmese military dictatorship will exceed the power of those images?

Reliance on challenge documents just lets everyone off the hook. It seeks to embarrass governments that have no accountability to their people. Shame doesn't work in that setting, and for those who think that is the ultimate in diplomatic offensives, it keeps other solutions off the table. That's the harm.

Shame seeks to use group dynamics, to modify the behavior of a subgroup, in this case, the Burmese junta. Unfortunately, there are processes already at work, political and economic. Social psychological forces count for little at the global level. But, sanctions, are more a domestic palliative, for the governments giving them than for the junta receiving them, than a sharp tool, as Morrissey argues.

Again, Michael J.W. Sticking's raises the specter of genocide to advocate sanctions.

These are «techniques are modeled on the sanctions designed against North Korea,» sanctions which have been somewhat successful in terms of cutting off (Western) investment and other engagement with the Hermit Kingdom. But there is only so much the U.S. and Europe can do without Chinese and Indian support. As long as the totalitarians in Burma have China and India to prop up their regime, efforts to «speed their demise» may not be all that effective.

Still, it's something -- and something (Bosnia) is better than nothing (Rwanda). With military action not feasible, the crisis in Burma forces the U.S. and Europe to pursue other means, notably diplomacy (through the U.N.), tougher sanctions, pressure on China and India, and, presumably (hopefully), secret efforts in support of the protesters and their cause.

Sticking's wants to use shame to persuade India and China to pressure Myanmar, as well as implementing sanctions against the junta itself. Firstly, the Burmese people need closer integration with global markets, not less. Sanctions both inflict pain, but, as in the case of the DPRK, actually empower a sadistic state apparatus to mismanage its state and economy without the scrutiny of markets. Doing just something takes a backseat to doing something in a coordinated way. The UN and all major players have to agree, and that has not happened. And, it never will.

Tokyo's concern for journalist Nagai Kenji is an example. Any reaction short of parking a destroyer in the Indian Ocean is just perfunctory, and no other player would join Japan. So, instead of an honest reaction, Tokyo will lodge complaints. Netizens will raise awareness of Myanmar's plight with their invective, to a certain extent. There's not enough journalist or oil deposits in the world the Burmese junta could kill or spike, to alienate every country in the world with sufficient sadism and ineptitude for the world to park its armed forces around the Burmese borders.

Another pet peeve is the name game. Is it Myanmar, or Burma? I think it's just childish not to use Myanmar, to spite the junta. But, there is the issue of comprehension. So, I've chosen to use 'Myanmar' as the name of the country and 'Burmese' for the majority ethnic group living in Myanmar. The other alternative sounds like a butchered pronunciation of 'mayonnaise'.

As Yangon's streets seemingly stand poised for more riots, and the UN envoy is doing the rounds of both the junta and the opposition, it's good to recall, that his job is to manage conflict, not solve the crisis. There's no certainty, that with all the good will and negotiations, both sides could hammer out a compromise. And, it's equally unclear whether the opposition could rule Myanmar.

Of course, Burmese could just flee. That would incite instant global anger if thousands of immigrants hit foreign shores

Sisyphus might just be Burmese.

President Bush goes to the United Nations, and all the Chosun Daily hears is «North Korea is a 'brutal regime' «!

Actually, I thought his speech was dead on, and I would support all his recommendations, particularly a UNSC seat for Japan and reforming the UN Human Rights Commission. And, actually, «brutal regime» is a polite insult. Obviously Michael Gerson is much needed.

Running down the article's summary (for wired South Koreans recovering from five days of holiday over-eating, alcohol consumption, games, housework, and more alcohol), the latest episode in the Dayr az-Zawr airstrike drama, is Washington's imposition of sanctions on a North Korean missile company (more info at KT). Is this all that comes from all the speculation about nukes the past few weeks?

So - what was attacked near Dayr az-Zawr?  It's possible it was North Korean «nuclear material» recently shipped to Syria, i.e., stuff to make radioactively «dirty» warheads, but nothing to make a real nuke with as the Norks don't have real nukes (see Why North Korea's Nuke Test Is Such Good News, October 2006).

Another possibility is it was to take out a stockpile of long-range Zilzal surface-to-surface missiles recently shipped from Iran for an attack on Israel.

A third is it was a hit on the stockpile of Saddam's chemical/bio weapons snuck out of Iraq and into Syria for safekeeping before the US invasion of April 2003.

But the identity of the target is not the story - for the primary point of the attack was not to destroy that target.  It was to shut down Syria's Russian air defense system during the attack.  Doing so made the attack an incredible success.

Syria is shamed and silent.  Iran is freaking out in panic.  Defenseless enemies are fun.

Someone needs to work on those headlines. And, stop taking off for five days. Or, shoving all that news into one report.

But, Joshua Kurlantzick at TNR argues it is not enough, as police in Yangon fired shots over protesting monks' heads and arrested over 300.

The reason, as in 1988, is China.

Many Western powers believe that China, the most important foreign actor in Burma, can be convinced to withdraw its blanket backing for the junta. In a British cable earlier this year obtained by The New Republic, British diplomats argue «China is closer than any other country to Burma's military regime ... China's interests had changed in Burma. They [are] investing heavily and want to see a return on their investment ... There may be an opportunity to persuade China that it is in their interest to see a stable and developing Burma.» Indeed, some of this week's Burma protests have signaled popular anger at China as well, with demonstrators pointedly going by the Chinese embassy; several Burmese previously told me of kidnappings of Chinese businesspeople in the north of the country. Recently, according to AFP, senior Chinese official Tang Jiaxuan offered a gentle rebuke to the Burmese junta, telling its foreign minister that «China sincerely hopes that Myanmar can bring stability back to its domestic situation.»

Yet beyond these words, China has done little. It still has not thrown its support for tougher U.N. action against Burma. Unlike in North Korea, where China cut off some types of aid when trying to pressure Pyongyang to come to the bargaining table, Beijing has taken no such apparent actions towards the Burmese. Meanwhile, placing so much trust in China conceals the fact that there are still steps other nations can take on Burma. India and Thailand could at least demonstrate greater concern for the protestors, signaling to the Burmese junta there might be some consequences from neighbors if they crack down. The U.S. could appoint a special coordinator on Burma, thus placing more pressure on the U.N.'s coordinator and on China. While meeting with Chinese officials the White House also could more publicly call for specific actions from Beijing on Burma.

Apparently convinced they'd risk no serious sanction, in September 1988 the Burmese military stepped in, staging a kind of auto-coup. In the course of suppressing protests, Burmese troops killed as many as three-thousand people. Today, similar fears are rising. More soldiers reportedly are taking positions in Rangoon, and the regime reportedly is recruiting criminals, possibly to infiltrate protests and cause havoc, a tactic utilized in 1988. Burmese opposition radio has reported rumors that senior junta leader Than Shwe has ordered that authorities can use violence to squash demonstrations. Twenty years on, 1988 looks nearer than ever.

After calling attention to Beijing's footprint in Myanmar, the Christian Science Monitor calls on China to do the right thing:

China does itself no favors by associating itself - and thus implicitly equating itself - with such a regime. There is a clear difference between the many regimes in the world that deny their citizens democracy and the smaller number that deny their citizens everything. China belongs in the first category, while Burma belongs in the second. Regimes such as China's may deserve sustained criticism, but regimes such as Burma's deserve immediate intervention.

China has already gained global plaudits and prestige by withdrawing its blanket diplomatic support for North Korea. It is high time to do the same with Burma. Such a move would mute external criticism, not embolden it. (And Burma's lucrative natural resources will still be there for China to tap into when the junta eventually falls from power.)

Until Chinese leaders start distinguishing their own relatively successful regime from the unmitigated disaster that is Burma's, the human-rights protesters on their doorsteps can hardly be blamed for not discerning the difference.

There is that hopefulness that floats on the air in these events. That spirit is Clarissa Pinkola Estes, even composing a rhapsody to Aung Sang Suu Kyi.

Though some accuse the monks of being pawns of extremist groups, and some others accuse the monks of being hypocritical because some of their leaders sometimes ceremonially «sit in golden chairs» (each temple often has chairs given by the populace that are anywhere from simple to fancy) it is unlikely that such accusation hold much sway. More sturdy is that this could be China?s chance, despite multiple motives, to show how humane they can be by staying the Burmese government?s violent reactions to the protesters. It could be a chance for the United States to stand up for a people who dearly seem to want a rock-solid democracy instead of a mock democracy?as their government keeps averring they have a stepped plan for a democracy? some day. It would be a chance for the Burmese government to take down its armored bunker mentality and become a governing body instead of an exploitative one.

But, Myanmar's rulers have two other powerful weapons, 400,000 soldiers and one idea.

The Myanmar junta blames foreign economic sanctions for the nation?s poverty, and foreign meddling for the persistence of political opposition, including the current demonstrations.

The junta is led by a tough and taciturn military man, Senior Gen. Than Shwe, 74, a frequent, stolid, uniformed presence on the front pages of government-controlled newspapers.

(...)

General Than Shwe gave a taste of his worldview at a national day celebration in March in which he said, «Judging from lessons of history, it is certain that powerful countries wishing to impose their influence on our nation will make any attempt in various ways to undermine national unity.»

He vowed to «crush, hand in hand with the entire people, every danger of internal and external destructive elements obstructing the stability and development of the state.»

Against all that, China, soldiers, and xenophobia, the monks have an uphill battle.