Left Flank

Ata Ur Rehman's neat contrast between American political parties and support for tyranny (via TMV) might be put to the test. Rehman argues that Democrats in the White House coincide with democratic leaders in Pakistan; Republicans favor dictators.

Yet, two conservative publications, Strategic Forecasting and Cato Institute disagree wildly about US policy in Pakistan after Benazir Bhutto's assassination. George Friedman (from an email alert, not a subscription), after a unsurprising analysis concludes with a zinger:

But the United States now faces its endgame under far less than ideal conditions. Iraq is stabilizing. That might reverse, but for now it is stabilizing. The Taliban is strong, but it is under pressure and has serious internal problems. The endgame always was supposed to come in Pakistan, but this is far from how the Americans wanted to play it out. The United States is not going to get an aggressive, anti-Islamist military in Pakistan, but it badly needs more than a Pakistani military that is half-heartedly and tenuously committed to the fight. Salvaging Musharraf is getting harder with each passing day. So that means that a new personality, such as Pakistani military chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, must become Washington's new man in Pakistan. In this endgame, all that the Americans want is the status quo in Pakistan. It is all they can get. And given the way U.S. luck is running, they might not even get that.

Cool, calm conservatism, indeed.

Cato Institute's Justin Logan must be voting for Ron Paul, though.

As Pakistan remains wracked by political unrest, Washington must keep its policy priorities ordered. First among them is ensuring the stability and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The Bush administration should make clear that it intends to cooperate with Pakistani authorities on anti-terrorism and, if necessary, in securing the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. At the same time, cooperation on those issues should not take the form of blanket support for the regime in Islamabad. Too often in the past America has allied itself with sitting governments only to see them toppled by opposition forces that then turn on the government's American patron. What is required today is close attention to American security interests in Pakistan, but an aloofness from the tumult of domestic Pakistani politics.

Gee whiz, another lecture about the Prime Directive, Captain Picard!

There might just be more interesting debates happening at the Republican convention this year!

McClatchy's Tim Johnson just has to enable my predilection for all-inclusive theories that efficiently allow me to post just once in a pithy way. The latest gem? Kim Jong-il tips his hat to Moammar Khaddafy.

So here goes the latest speculation: Just as Khaddafy won the good graces of the West by spilling the beans on the A.Q. Khan nuclear network, getting Libya out of the diplomatic doghouse, Kim Jong Il has now offered Washington the list of the buyers of its nuclear technology, including Syria. The Bush administration turned around and gave the info to Jerusalem, which sent the jetfighters scrambling to bomb the alleged nuclear site in Syria.

This speculation comes at the website of Stratfor, a subscription global intelligence outfit, whose reports are not always, er, on target. It was picked up at the China Matters blog, where I learned of it.

Nonetheless, the theory goes that North Korea is signaling to the United States, with which it dearly wants to weave a closer diplomatic relationship, that it can provide info of value. After all, North Korea is not entirely desirous of maintaining only one strategic ally, China. It would be more than happy to play China and the United States off each other.

There are many possible holes in this theory. North Korea has few ways to earn hard currency. Why would Pyongyang destroy relations with one of its few remaining customers for military/nuclear technology? What happens if the six-party talks on North Korea?s nuclear program break down again? North Korea will be more penniless than ever.

I accept China Hand's caveats, too, especially that Beijing hopes to keep the US enmeshed in as many relationships, preferably chronically troubled, in order to slowly bleed Washington's resources and soft power. I'm still skeptical the DPRK was doing little more than trading missiles in Syria, too. In the end, the Dayr az-Zwar play might have been little more than an opening maneuver in the current round of Six Party talks.