Left Flank

With the recent disclosures about DPRK-Syria cooperation at al-Kibar, context is a rare commodity, and The Economist delivers.

Judging by its past behaviour, North Korea would do pretty much anything for cash; there are suspicions that it helped the Khan network supply nuclear material to Libya. That said, providing engineers and designs for Syria's reactor may chiefly have been meant to tweak America's nose, says Michael Green, a former Bush administration official now at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington, DC.

The Bush administration and North Korea fell out badly in 2002 over charges that Kim Jong Il's regime had secretly been trying to enrich uranium (also a potential bomb ingredient) while plutonium production was frozen by a previous agreement. The following year North Korea privately threatened to expand its «deterrent», test it (which it later did) and even sell it. With little to export beyond counterfeit currency, drugs and crises, says Mr Green, North Korea used Syria to up the ante—and the expected compensation for later agreeing to desist.

Now America and Mr Kim are negotiating again as part of a six-party deal (also including South Korea, Japan, China and Russia) to tempt him to give up his bombs. Senior American officials last week acknowledged that they had debated whether to try a combination of diplomacy and threats to end the Syrian project. For Israel, however, the Syrian reactor was an existential threat-in-the-making. There was no green light from the United States, the officials said: «none was asked for, none was given.»

Hoping to avoid retaliation, and to head off the risk of a wider Middle East war, Israel wanted the intelligence that led to the bombing kept secret. Worried that wider disclosure would sink the six-party effort too, America briefed only a score of senior members of Congress at the time.

But now the administration needs Congress's support for a controversial deal that could fall significantly short of the prize that the six-party negotiations were supposed to deliver: that, in return for oodles of energy aid and a lifting of some key sanctions, North Korea would first provide a full and accurate accounting of its nuclear past and later dismantle all its nuclear programmes. Instead it has merely declared a rather modest stockpile of plutonium and dug its heels in. Trying to move talks forward, American diplomats have struck a tentative deal that would allow North Korea to «acknowledge» American «concerns» about uranium and proliferation activities, in return for better verification of Yongbyon's plutonium haul. But the backtracking led Congress to demand the facts on Syria first.

George Bush said this week that by going public, America wanted to press North Korea's (notoriously impervious) Kim Jong Il into fuller disclosure, and send a message to proliferators everywhere. But the Syrian pictures may just as easily lead Congress to demand that America adopt a tougher stance in the six-party talks.

Another casualty could be the NPT itself. The IAEA's boss, Mohamed ElBaradei, says inspectors should have been given information about the Syrian reactor sooner by America and Israel. Yet Syria, had it not chosen to deny all, could have claimed that technically it was doing nothing wrong. Building a nuclear reactor is not against NPT rules, unless done with weapons intent—and that is hard, if not impossible, for inspectors to prove, says Henry Sokolski of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre in Washington. However, under a 1992 rule accepted by Syria, it should have alerted the IAEA to its reactor plans before construction started. North Korea, Iran and now Syria. The NPT seems there for the breaking.

Firstly, comes NPT reform and a proper way to share intelligence. And then, the US can deal with its armistice with the DPRK. In that order!

Putting the al-Kibar «reactor» disclosures into a geostrategic framework is necessary. Stratfor's George Friedman discusses a possible Israel-Syria agreement:

Iran will not be happy about all this. Tehran has invested a fair amount of resources in bulking up Hezbollah, and will not be pleased to see the militia shift from Syrian management to Syrian control. But in the end, what can Iran do? It cannot support Hezbollah directly, and even if it were to attempt to undermine Damascus, those Syrians most susceptible to Tehran's Shiite-flavored entreaties are the Alawites themselves.

The other player that at the very least would be uneasy about all of this is the United States. The American view of Syria remains extremely negative, still driven by the sense that the Syrians continue to empower militants in Iraq. Certainly that aid — and that negative U.S. feeling — is not as intense as it was two years ago, but the Americans might not feel that this is the right time for such a deal. Thus, the release of the information on the Syrian reactor might well have been an attempt to throw a spoke in the wheel of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations.

This interpretation is further reinforced by independent analyses of those videos from al-Kibar.

Professor William Beeman at the University of Minnesota passed along a note today from «a colleague with a U.S. security clearance» about the mysterious Syrian site targeted in a Sept. 6 Israeli airstrike.

The note raises more questions about the evidence shown last week by U.S. intelligence officials to lawmakers in the House and Senate.

1. Satellite photos of the alleged reactor building show no air defenses or anti-aircraft batteries such as the ones found around the Natanz nuclear site in central Iran.
2. The satellite images do not show any military checkpoints on roads near the building.
3. Where are the power lines? The photos show neither electricity lines or substations.
4. Here is a link to a photo of the North Korean facility that the Syrian site was based on. Look at all the buildings surrounding it. The Syrian site was just one building.

The author of the note pinpoints irregularities about the photographs. Beeman's source alleges that the CIA «enhanced» some of the images.

Gee, I feel so empowered to be a minor dupe in a diplomatic ploy!

Image via Wikipedia

Joshua at OFK must be one of the few intelligible pundits on the planet who still seriously takes the CIA at its word. From Total Wonkerr: «Too bad there isn't some international agency with the capacity to provide an independent assessment of this sort of thing…»

Well, perhaps ACW can give us some technical details?

Despite early press reports that the fuel channels atop the Al Kibar reactor core were identical to Yongbyon, I and others — including Geoff Forden, Cheryl Rofer and Richard Wendland — see some pretty significant differences that suggest Al Kibar might have been quite a bit smaller than its North Korean cousin.

To be clear, I don't doubt that Al Kibar was a reactor and, although I think the evidence of North Korean involvement is less impressive than early press reports suggested, that's my working hypothesis too.

But I don't understand the claim that Al Kibar is a copy of Yongbyon in the strict sense — in particular, I don't understand how the IC concluded that Al Kibar is the same size as Yongbyon.

Noah Schachtman is still calling it a 'mystery'.

So, there's something to wait for. If, that is, you don't just believe the CIA!

Image by peace chicken via Flickr

There has already been much discussion about the remaining mysteries surrounding the Syrian plutonium-generation reactor. My own guess (and it is just a guess) is that the Syrian reactor was the fruit of a three-way partnership composed of Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Iran provided the money, idea, and leadership. Iran ordered Syria to provide the site and some of the labor. North Korea provided the expertise, for which Iran paid (directly or indirectly) in cash.

But where Westhawk is even more helpful is the other half of his post: , the NPT system is broken, so he asks, «What will replace the broken NPT-IAEA system?» I would argue that the system is fundamentally sound, if only nuclear powers with intelligence assets would share information and let the IAEA do its job.

The challenge of proliferation control lies not in the lack of proven techniques but in the absence of moral suasion and sustained diplomacy by the world leaders. The American government subsidized the spread of nuclear knowledge through the Atoms for Peace program to counter Soviet influence, and at virtually every critical juncture since then successive administrations have set aside long-term proliferation goals in favor of short-term strategic priorities. (Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets, and How We Could Have Stopped Him, p. 1844, Palm e-book)

Collins and Frantz advocate the following proposals to fix the system:

• a moratorium on enriched uranium;
• revision of the NPT, including eliminating the right to opt-out and a UN commitment to sanction violators;
• the reduction of nuclear arsenals and a moratorium on the creation of a new generation of weapons;
• restrictions on sales of nuclear technology;
• monitoring of civilian nuclear industries;
• intelligence-sharing

With the exception of sanctions, which are generally a worse remedy than the problems they seek to cure, this is a sane international nuclear policy

DPRK Forum creditably serves up the video facts and timeline on the Dayr az-Zwar reactor incident. The Economist is skeptical:

Many facts remain contested. White House officials told Congress that the reactor had «striking similarities» to North Korea's facility at Yongbyon. Footage presented to Congress is said to show Korean faces at the Syrian site. But David Albright and Paul Brannan, in an analysis for the Institute for Science and International Security, an American think-tank, note that evidence is missing for a Syrian weaponisation programme or for plutonium-separation facilities. The North Koreans may well have helped to build the site, but they say more evidence is needed to be sure that Syria had a bomb programme.

The target of Thursday's hearing was not Syria in the main. The Bush administration is divided over North Korea. Years of efforts to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme have been driven both by the American government and by six-party talks that involve China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and America. Last year North Korea agreed to dismantle the Yongbyon facility, as part of a deal agreed in 2005 that requires it to declare and dismantle all of its nuclear programmes. However progress was stalled several times, including after a row over the release of funds claimed by North Korea.

A smooth-talking American diplomat, Christopher Hill, was deployed to persuade North Korea to take the steps needed to move ahead with the deal. North Korea has publicly acknowledged its plutonium-making but is reluctant to own up publicly to efforts to import equipment for producing uranium and about nuclear help to Syria. Mr Hill has been working on a deal that would let North Korea acknowledge America's concerns about both these activities, while pushing ahead with dismantling its plutonium-making reactor at Yongbyon. But hawks in the administration, and outside critics, dislike the idea of any concessions to North Korea and want to ensure that the country is compelled to account for and dismantle the parallel uranium programme, such as it was.

Congress began threatening to cut off funding for Mr Hill's efforts unless the administration produced all the information it had about North Korea's proliferation activity. This resulted in the hearings on Thursday. Some conspiracy theorists think that the briefing was designed to embarrass the North Koreans and to provoke them to flounce out of the deal, pleasing the hawkish types who never liked it.

But it comes at a curious time on several fronts. Another American diplomat was in North Korea as the briefing took place, and the country's news agency reported that talks were held «in a sincere and constructive manner». Jamie Metzl, a Korea expert at the Asia Society in New York (and a former National Security Council staffer under Bill Clinton), notes that the agreement with North Korea essentially forgives past sins and focuses on disarming North Korea in the future. Thus the North Koreans have an incentive to confess and get this behind them, in order to get promised aid and other concessions.

Nukes of Hazard also points readers to an April 24 ISIS statement on the US video:

The release of this information is likely to prompt a fresh wave of questions about North Korea's commitment to verifiably dismantle its nuclear arsenal and halt its proliferation activities. This new information confirms the need to be concerned about Syrian and North Korean actions, including their nuclear cooperation which dates back many years. However, it should not be seen as a casus belli against Syria or a reason to scuttle the progress being made at the Six Party Talks in disabling and dismantling North Korea's nuclear arsenal.

First, the United States does not have any indication of how Syria would fuel this reactor, and no information that North Korea had already, or intended to provide the reactor's fuel. This type of reactor requires a large supply of uranium fuel. The lack of any identified source of this fuel raises questions about when the reactor could have operated, despite evidence that it was nearing completion at the time of the attack.

Second, the United States and Israel have not identified any Syrian plutonium separation or nuclear weaponization facilities. The absence of such facilities gives little confidence that the reactor was part of an active nuclear weapons program. The apparent absence of fuel, whether imported or indigenously produced, also lowers confidence that Syria has an active nuclear weapons program.

If OFK's account of the Congressional hearings and this exchange on the Lehrer Newshour are any indication of the useless invective with which conservatives have infused this debate, it's hard to evaluate any of this. One aspect of the A.Q. Khan investigations troubles me in this regard. CIA knew of Khan's activities as far back as the 70s before Khan even assembled a centrifuge in Pakistan. Yet, intelligence officials refused to share their evidence with international agencies, like the IAEA, whose job it is to investigate and regulate, out of simple ideological pique.

WangKon936 asks, "So, is the Bush administration genuinely concerned about proliferation and North Korea, or is this a clumsy neocon plot?" The goal then, as now, is partisan, and not on improving the international regime, or even presenting a unified national position in a diplomatic negotiation.

On Seymour M. Hersh's "Strike in the Dark", about as twisting a narrative as possible, I would go one further. It's less than what's already out there. Racing through the corridors if elected and bureaucratic hackdom distracts...

Sometime after midnight on September 6, 2007, at least four low-flying Israeli Air Force fighters crossed into Syrian airspace and carried out a secret bombing mission on the banks of the Euphrates River, about ninety miles north of the Iraq border. The seemingly unprovoked bombing, which came after months of heightened tension between Israel and Syria over military exercises and troop buildups by both sides along the Golan Heights, was, by almost any definition, an act of war.

Hersh should have stopped here, as wiser souls do. Besides, let's gear up for the Iran meme.

Weekly Standard's Michael Goldfarb argues that "nothing possibly could be any worse" in DPRK? I think this is the first bloggingheads TV diavlog that so well captures the humdrum Washington debate between Clintonians and Neo-cons on the DPRK issue right now. Just as in Iraq, no one can think beyond the fall of the government, or to consider the non-proliferation regime as a whole, and Neo-Cons assume that there's a nascent government waiting to stop an even more tragic catastrophe from ensuing.

Actually, Foreign Policy's Blake Hounshell, Goldfarb's interlocutor, is still just too optimistic about the disablement of the Yongbyon plutonium reactor, and both fail to mention the HEU (highly-enriched uranium) issue. The Syrian connection is a red herring, most probably more of the Israel-Bush administration echo chamber seeking to stir up a controversy to derail the Six-Party process.

In the end (and in "What happens if the Kim regime collapses?"), this is at best a much more civil, yet equally as arid and boilerplate a discussion, as the Korean blogosphere produces on a daily basis.