Left Flank

Success breeds more success, or so hopes US Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Gates announced his new Army team:

The nomination of Petraeus to the Central Command post, which was vacated last month when Adm. William «Fox» Fallon abruptly resigned, was not unexpected. It was originally thought Petraeus would become the commander of US European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO troops in Brussels. But after Admiral Fallon resigned, over his increasingly public views on Iran that appeared to be at odds with the White House, speculation centered on Petraeus to replace him.

The decision to send Petraeus to Central Command and Odierno back to Baghdad hints that there is a shallow bench of officers suited for the job in Iraq. Gates acknowledged that there are only a «handful of generals» who have the experience necessary, but also said the vacancy left by Fallon's resignation left him few options. «So I'm faced with a critical combatant command where a commander is needed and a commander who knows what's going on in the region,» he said.

(…)

Odierno had already been nominated to become vice chief of the Army. That nomination will be withdrawn and Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli will be nominated in his place. General Chiarelli, who had been on the short list to replace Petraeus in Iraq, has been Gates's senior military aide for more than a year.

Intel Dump's Phillip Carter calls this all «musical chairs», especially the part about Odierno and Chiarelli.

I'm a bit surprised to see him moved into the vice chief of staff job, because I thought he was a shoe-in to take the top Iraq job that Odierno just got. But these are both four-star jobs and both important. And, there's definitely some institutional politics going on here. Unlike some of the other generals, Chiarelli remains relatively untainted by the Bush administration and the war in Iraq, because he served as a relatively apolitical corps commander and division commander. So putting him in at Vice means that the Army might get to keep him in a Democratic administration. Look for Chiarelli to be the next MNF-I or CENTCOM commander in January 2009 -- or to join the Joint Chiefs, either as chairman of the Joint Chiefs or chief of staff of the Army.

Thomas P.M. Barnett makes two arguments about Petraeus' promotion: that more responsibility will lead to more flexibility on Iran; that he's a better match for a President Obama than for a President McCain. What if a Vice-President Clinton is as forceful an «advisor» as the current vice-president?

Overall, all three decisions are prudent. It's what Uncle Jimbo likes. However, as Noah Schachtman summarizes, these Army nominations leave a trail of disgruntled old-schoolers in their wake.

First up, there's Mohamed ElBaradei. If we're rehabilitating public figures who were right about Iraq, the long-serving head of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be high on the list. But, he also makes a good point on Iran: you can't bomb knowledge!

Next, there's Francis Fûkûÿámá, who in his present anti-neocon pose, is almost a realist.

But the fundamental problem remains the lopsided distribution of power in the international system. Any country in the same position as the US, even a democracy, would be tempted to exercise its hegemonic power with less and less restraint. America’s founding fathers were motivated by a similar belief that unchecked power, even when democratically legitimated, could be dangerous, which is why they created a constitutional system of internally separated powers to limit the executive.

Such a system does not exist on a global scale today, which may explain how America got into such trouble. A smoother international distribution of power, even in a global system that is less than fully democratic, would pose fewer temptations to abandon the prudent exercise of power.

Finally,and more on the national security front, a little more budget help for the US Navy: Abolish the Air Force!

We aren't likely to see the end of the United States Air Force anytime soon, however. The institutional structure of the Air Force would resist its absorption into the Army and the Navy; friends of the Air Force in Congress and the public would fight to prevent consolidation. Strong proponents of the «Air Force way of war» remain, and aren't convinced by «boots on the ground zealots.» The Air Force would fight very hard to stay independent.

The consolidation of the services, of course, is no panacea for military difficulties. In spite of the formal unification of Israel's military forces, for instance, the Israel Defense Forces last summer embarked on a poorly planned strategic air campaign against Hezbollah and its Lebanese supporters. Israeli air attacks destroyed Lebanese infrastructure and killed Lebanese civilians without dealing serious damage to Hezbollah.

Nevertheless, the idea of an independent air force was not handed down on Mount Sinai. We have institutions because we've built them. When these institutions outlive their usefulness or fail as experiments, we can take them apart. In a post–September 11 world, we live with threats quite different from those that the Soviet arsenal used to pose. We can and should devise uses and a bureaucratic structure for American airpower better suited to our current challenges than those set out in 1947.

I'm grading midterms, and it's Friday movie night, so I'll leave you with this reading. It's either Gallipoli or Paradise Now tonight. Any votes, leave me a comment!