Left Flank

Michael T. Klare first warned about "conflict over valuable resources" in Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict in 2001, and he has now updated that geo-economic argument.

The great risk is that this struggle will someday breach the boundaries of economic and diplomatic competition and enter the military realm. This will not be because any of the states involved make a deliberate decision to provoke a conflict with a competitor--the leaders of all these countries know that the price of violence is far too high to pay for any conceivable return. The problem, instead, is that all are engaging in behaviors that make the outbreak of inadvertent escalation ever more likely. These include, for example, the deployment of growing numbers of American, Russian and Chinese military instructors and advisers in areas of instability where there is every risk that these outsiders will someday be caught up in local conflicts on opposite sides.

This risk is made all the greater because intensified production of oil, natural gas, uranium and minerals is itself a source of instability, acting as a magnet for arms deliveries and outside intervention. The nations involved are largely poor, so whoever controls the resources controls the one sure source of abundant wealth. This is an invitation for the monopolization of power by greedy elites who use control over military and police to suppress rivals. The result, more often than not, is a wealthy strata of crony capitalists kept in power by brutal security forces and surrounded by disaffected and impoverished masses, often belonging to a different ethnic group--a recipe for unrest and insurgency. This is the situation today in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, in Darfur and southern Sudan, in the uranium-producing areas of Niger, in Zimbabwe, in the Cabinda province of Angola (where most of that country's oil lies) and in numerous other areas suffering from what's been called the "resource curse."

The danger, of course, is that the great powers will be sucked into these internal conflicts. This is not a far-fetched scenario; the United States, Russia and China are already providing arms and military-support services to factions in many of these disputes. The United States is arming government forces in Nigeria and Angola, China is aiding government forces in Sudan and Zimbabwe, and so on. An even more dangerous situation prevails in Georgia, where the United States is backing the pro-Western government of President Mikhail Saakashvili with arms and military support while Russia is backing the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia plays an important strategic role for both countries because it harbors the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a US-backed conduit carrying Caspian Sea oil to markets in the West. There are US and Russian military advisers/instructors in both areas, in some cases within visual range of each other. It is not difficult, therefore, to conjure up scenarios in which a future blow-up between Georgian and separatist forces could lead, willy-nilly, to a clash between American and Russian soldiers, sparking a much greater crisis.

What makes the 2008 version "new", though is, that Klare has dropped his 2001 call for a "global authority", an extension of the International Energy Agency, to coordinate research on alternative fuels and protect current resources. Instead, Klare tepidly advocates "...rather than engage in militarized competition with China, we should cooperate with Beijing in developing alternative energy sources and more efficient transportation systems." Klare reprises Alfred Thayer Mahan, to underscore the US Navy's redeployment from its Cold War Rimland strategy to routes near Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Malacca Strait, and bases in Iraq. Finally, Klare raises the issue of the military industrial complex: military spending to compete with PRC and Russia will dry up funds for research into alternative sources of energy. But, that funding also perversely ensures the US will seek conflict.

I'm uneasy about Klare's retreat. Certainly, PRC is a formidable competitor—CIA Director Michael Hayden's comment is encouraging—for resources and diplomatic influence, and the Washington should engage it. However, bilateral relationships can degenerate into animosity. In the wake of Iraq, the US needs to simplify its relationship with the world to facilitate better ties with the rest of the states it has marginalized in the last eight years. In other words, it needs a policy, not a monkey on its back. Global cooperation on energy spurring global growth, backed by American naval power, is as good as any power point presentation could offer. The monster of military procurement needs to be shoved into a cave where it can scare pirates and dictators but not impede commerce. Klare can only follow the last eight years' nightmare of nationalism with a stronger dose of responsible internationalism.

PACOM's Admiral Timothy J. Keating lets Beijing have the US Navy's most dámnìng insult:

Adm. Timothy J. Keating, the head of U.S. Pacific Command, and Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval operations, both took sharp exception to the Chinese government's refusal to allow the minesweepers to come into port when threatened by rough seas.

"As someone who has been going to sea all my life, if there is one tenet that we observe it's when somebody is in need you provide [assistance] and you sort it out later," Roughead said.

Roughead noted that neither of the vessels was damaged by the storm and both were refueled at sea by a tanker.

China's denial of refuge for the minesweepers was perplexing and at odds with international mariner traditions, Keating said.

"This is, kind of, an unwritten law amongst seamen, that if someone is in need, regardless of genus, phylum or species, you let them come in; you give them safe harbor," Keating said. "Jimmy Buffett has songs about it, for crying out loud."

This is what comes of inviting the Dalai Lama to dinner.

First up, there's Mohamed ElBaradei. If we're rehabilitating public figures who were right about Iraq, the long-serving head of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be high on the list. But, he also makes a good point on Iran: you can't bomb knowledge!

Next, there's Francis Fûkûÿámá, who in his present anti-neocon pose, is almost a realist.

But the fundamental problem remains the lopsided distribution of power in the international system. Any country in the same position as the US, even a democracy, would be tempted to exercise its hegemonic power with less and less restraint. America’s founding fathers were motivated by a similar belief that unchecked power, even when democratically legitimated, could be dangerous, which is why they created a constitutional system of internally separated powers to limit the executive.

Such a system does not exist on a global scale today, which may explain how America got into such trouble. A smoother international distribution of power, even in a global system that is less than fully democratic, would pose fewer temptations to abandon the prudent exercise of power.

Finally,and more on the national security front, a little more budget help for the US Navy: Abolish the Air Force!

We aren't likely to see the end of the United States Air Force anytime soon, however. The institutional structure of the Air Force would resist its absorption into the Army and the Navy; friends of the Air Force in Congress and the public would fight to prevent consolidation. Strong proponents of the «Air Force way of war» remain, and aren't convinced by «boots on the ground zealots.» The Air Force would fight very hard to stay independent.

The consolidation of the services, of course, is no panacea for military difficulties. In spite of the formal unification of Israel's military forces, for instance, the Israel Defense Forces last summer embarked on a poorly planned strategic air campaign against Hezbollah and its Lebanese supporters. Israeli air attacks destroyed Lebanese infrastructure and killed Lebanese civilians without dealing serious damage to Hezbollah.

Nevertheless, the idea of an independent air force was not handed down on Mount Sinai. We have institutions because we've built them. When these institutions outlive their usefulness or fail as experiments, we can take them apart. In a post–September 11 world, we live with threats quite different from those that the Soviet arsenal used to pose. We can and should devise uses and a bureaucratic structure for American airpower better suited to our current challenges than those set out in 1947.

I'm grading midterms, and it's Friday movie night, so I'll leave you with this reading. It's either Gallipoli or Paradise Now tonight. Any votes, leave me a comment!