Left Flank

In the wake of DPRK's nuclear declaration, followed by Washington's de-listing of Pyongyang from its terrorist watch list, Japan's Liberal Democrats and Ichiro Ozawa, according to two Observing Japan reports, are reacting badly. Not only has the Bush administration placated Pyongyang for Beijing's good graces, but Japan worries it is sidelined.

Firstly, LDP conservatives feel betrayed by the Bush administration.

In his memoir, Abe Shinzo wrote of his lonely fight — alongside Nakagawa Shoichi and a handful of other LDP conservatives — to oppose normalization with North Korea and place the abductions issue at the center of Japan's North Korea policy. They battled against the LDP, the media, academia, and the foreign ministry to force them to consider the plight of the abductees before providing North Korea with aid and clearing the way to diplomatic recognition.

Here we are in 2008 and Mr. Abe got his wish. Resolving the abductees issue has become a primary goal of Japan's North Korea policy, a goal that enjoys substantial support in the public, the media, and the LDP. The US is pilloried for giving (symbolic) ground to North Korea without resolution of the issue — and the Fûkûdá government is pilloried for letting the US shift happen. Mr. Abe, Hiranuma Takeo, and other conservatives set the tone on North Korea.

And, the opposition Democrats' leader, Ichiro Ozawa took aim at both Washington and the LDP

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, and earned Washington's disgust.

In short, Mr. Ozawa was making an election pitch to the people of Okinawa in this press conference. He was arguing that LDP governments over the past seven years have failed to stand up for Japan and have failed to articulate and defend Japan's national interests, preferring instead to hope that the US will defend Japan's national interests. Again, his position is less critical of the US for «abandoning» Japan than critical of LDP-led governments for leaving Japan in a position to feel abandoned in the first place.

Again, the clumsy giant trips over itself and its friends.

Regardless of how one views it—as unconstitutional or tactically opportunistic—it's a tactical defeat for Ichiro Ozawa. So much for consensus politics!

But really, what law got passed is not worth passing (except in the most symbolic of senses).

In response to past criticism that some of the MSDF fuel provided to other ships was actually used in the war in Iraq, Japanese government officials, in writing, will ask allies to use the fuel only for the anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan.

Refueling will only be conducted after the projected routes of the receiving ships are known.

The new law also limits the MSDF's activities to providing fuel and water to other ships.

The original special measures law that led to the start of the refueling mission included such activities as transport by the Air Self-Defense Force, search-and-rescue missions and providing assistance to displaced people.

Those activities were eliminated from the new law.

The new law also has a time limit of one year. If a further extension of the refueling mission is required, the government would have to pass another special measures bill into law.

Just in time to tack to the new US administration's line.

It's not a game yet, but the US should watch.

On Saturday, Mr. Fûkûdá played catch with Mr. Wen...The symbolism of this should not be underestimated. Playing catch, after all, is one of the oft-cited bonds that united President Bush and former Prime Minister Koizumi. (They played catch at Mr. Bush's ranch when first meeting in June 2001.) What a pointed but understated way for Mr. Fûkûdá to signal to Washington that Japan's priorities are changing, an argument Mr. Fûkûdá made explicitly when he visited Washington in November.

For the moment, concrete progress on disputed issues is beside the point. This is mood-setting, with its significance depending on Mr. Fûkûdá's staying around long enough to convert preliminary overtures into a lasting shift in Japanese foreign policy that will bind his successors. But the mood-setting is necessary. Japan is not in a position to choose between Beijing and Washington. It needs frank but cordial relations with both, although the two relationships are obviously different thanks to Japan's security relationship with the US. I remain unconvinced that grandiose rhetoric, which hints at a desire to prioritize the Sino-Japanese relationship to the detriment of the US-Japan relationship, is the way to change the mood in the Sino-Japanese relationship; by going to Beijing more quietly but no less determined to revive the relationship, Mr. Fûkûdá has, I think, embarrassed Mr. Ozawa yet again.

Now if he could only get certain US presidential candidates to realize that just as Japan has no choice between its largest trading partner and its most significant security partner, so the US has no choice but to maintain healthy relationships with both its long-time ally and trading partner and the emerging power.

Let's wait until April, 2008 to see if Tokyo is not playing catch-up!

Garrett DeOrio and ken Worsley both eulogize 2007 and make predictions for 2008 in Seijigiri #38: A Review of Politics in Japan in 2007. I hope 2008 offers TPR a larger audience for what is a very stimulating medium on a topic few westerners understand, or get an opportunity to tackle given language and cultural obstacles.

What really caugh my attention, though, were three discussions in this panoramic hour-long chat: DPRK and the abduction issue; Sino-Japanese disagreements about gas exploration; and, comfort women.

On the DPRK issue, both DeOrio and Worsley knock the ham-fisted Abe administration for marginalizing Japan diplomatically within the Six-Party format by pushing the abduction issue too far, and nearly causing a breech with the US. I think Pyongyang has managed to divide all parties in the talks very effectively, so Japan's situation is not unique, just the circumstances are special. The key is Seoul's decision, under the new Lee administration, on which partner to choose. If not Pyongyang, ROK could follow with Beijing or the US, at which point Japan should fall in line. The key to a solution lies with numbers, not principle.

On the gas exploration issue, it's interesting that the two divided about China, and it's sort of an indication of how no one knows how to deal with Beijing. One one hand, it's argued that Japan should improve its diplomatic game by playing the middle with Australia between the US and China, to create a regional, multilateral framework for dealing with a panoply of issues. On the other hand, Beijing prefers to take its diplomacy bilaterally. I think an international settlement on the driling would be a pleasant surprise, but that not being likely, I think Japan might have to back down, unless there's a Chinese economic downturn.

Finally, on comfort women, the Abe administration made itself look silly by denying the claims of comfort women. I think historical arguments are both unfair to japanese voters born after WW2 (and the US and Canadian resolutions transparently laughable), and proxies for the sort of Sino-Japanese issues like gas exploration. It's like code that reveals where the power is flowing between Japan and whomever is using WW2 history to criticize it. With that said, how the Abe administration framed the comfort women issue about as incompetently as possible. It's the leading reason Japan doesn't deserve diplomatic rewards, like a UNSC seat, because it simply is not competent enough.

A lot more stuff in the discussion, so listen and comment...

As discord erupted in Pakistan, it seems nothing but fulsome verbiage about deadlines and promises has bloomed in China between prime ministers, China's Wen Jiabao and Japan's Yasuo Fûkûdá. I would like to hear from a translator, but it seems Fûkûdá added yet more words to Japan's continuing avoidance of uttering an apology.

Speaking at Peking University, Fûkûdá also urged China to become Japan's partner in creating a peaceful and stable world, saying it is both a great opportunity and responsibility for the two nations to do so.

Referring to Japan's militarism as "an unfortunate period" in history, Fûkûdá said, "I believe it is our responsibility to squarely look at it and pass it on to our offspring.

"I believe we can prevent mistakes in the future only if we properly look at the past, and have the courage and wisdom to repent what we must repent," he said, triggering a round of applause from the mainly Chinese audience.

Fûkûdá's speech during his four-day visit to China was the first in the country by a Japanese prime minister since Ryutaro Hashimoto's 1997 trip.

It was broadcast live on China's state-run television, a rare move by China and seen as symbolic of the recent warming of testy bilateral relations.

"Japan and China have become major presences" in the world, Fûkûdá said. "The fact that Japan and China have come to acquire the abilities to contribute to the stability and development of Asia and the world is a big chance for the two countries," he said.

Both FT and Reuters listed the same issues both leaders enumerated for further discussion or as "progressing", including Taiwan, North Korea, and Sino-Japanese joint oil exploration. Asahi used the phrase for 2008 as "first year for a great leap in bilateral relations". And, PM Wen Jiabao announced that President Hu Jintao would visit Japan in April, 2008.

Now, who said Pyongyang was the only master of verbiage and brinkmanship in East Asia?

While in its dealings with North Korea the government is sticking firmly to the basic diplomatic stance of «dialogue and pressure» that was crafted by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and maintained by the Abe administration, the fact that Komura mentioned a possible definition of «progress,» and suggested that North Korea might receive «rewards» even if not all of the abductees are returned, are signs of a foreign policy shift.

(...)

As North Korea is expected to soon declare its nuclear weapons programs, Japanese government officials have stepped up their calls for warmer ties with North Korea, pointing out that when Pyongyang completes its declaration of its nuclear programs, Washington likely will remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, and that under such a scenario, Japan would be isolated in the six-party talks on North Korea's denuclearization.

It seems on the DPRK, the Fûkûdá administration can take care of itself, and doesn't need the American ambassador's help.